Antle v. Sexton

• Decision Date: 11 May 1891
• Citation: 27 N.E. 691,137 Ill. 410
• Parties: ANTLE et al. v. SEXTON et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

137 Ill. 410

27 N.E. 691

ANTLE et al.

v.SEXTON et al.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

May 11, 1891.

Appeal from appellate court, third district.

Brown, Wheeler & Brown and Palmer & Shutt, for appellants.

Patton & Hamilton and Robert Matheny, for appellees.

BAKER, J.

This was an action on the case by appellee against appellants, to recover damages for fraud and deceit in the sale of timber standing on the land of one Jameson. His subjects of the sale were the timber that had been bought by appellants from Jameson, a saw-mill and its appurtenances, and 13 acres of timber on the Hadley land. The sum of $3,000 in gross was paid for the property, no separate prices being fixed for the different articles. The ground of fraud relied on was the representation that the tract of timber bought from Jameson centained 80 acres, when in fact the Jameson contract only conveyed to appellants 30 acres of timber. Appellees recovered in the circuit court judgment for $900, and that judgment was affirmed in the appellate court, (32 Ill. App. 437,) and the cause was brought here on a certificate of importance. In the written contract signed by the parties it is recited that the appellants agreed as follows: ‘(2) That they hereby assign and transfer to said Sexton & Bybee all interest which they have acquired in and to about 80 acres of saw timber in Gardner township, Sangamon county, Illinois, under a contract heretofore entered into by the said N. C. Antle & Bro. with one S. H. Jameson. * * * (4) They hereby agree to assign over to the said Sexton & Bybee the written contracts with said Jameson & Hadley above referred to.’ It is suggested by appellants that where the means of knowledge are at hand, and equally available to both parties, and the subject of purchase is open to inspection, the purchaser cannot be heard to say that he was deceived by the vendor's misrepresentations; and fault is found that the court instructed the jury that, if the representation was made ‘in such a way and under such circumstances as to induce a reasonably prudent man to believe that the matter stated was true;’ and if the plaintiffs, ‘in the exercise of reasonable prudence, believed the representation to be true,’ etc., it sufficiently sustained the action for deceit. The false representation consisted in misstating the terms of the James on contract, and the parties did not stand upon an equal footing in respect thereto. Said contract was in the possession of the appellants, and they had full knowledge of its provisions, while appellees did not have access to it, and it was withheld from their inspection upon a plausibel pretext stated by appellants. The land upon which the timber grew was in a peculiar shape, and was contiguous to other timber lands, and, although the timber was pointed out to appellees, yet it is manifest that, without a knowledge of the boundaries and an actual measurement, no person could tell the number of acres in the In numerous instructions given by the court the knowledge of appellants that the representation was false, and the fact that the same was made with the intent and for the purpose of deceiving and defrauding appellees, were made conditions precedent to the right of recovery. Surely, where a misrepresentation is made as to a material fact, and such misrepresentation is made knowingly, and for the express purpose of deceiving and defrauding, and the party injured relies upon the statement made, and under circumstances which would induce a reasonably prudent man to so rely, there must be a right of action, at law, for fraud and deceit. To throw a purchaser out of court in such case, upon the plea he did not avail himself of the means of knowledge open to him, would be offering a premium on fraud, and would be destructive of confidence in business transactions. There was no error of which appellants can complain in instructing the jury as above indicated. Linington v. Strong, 107 Ill. 295;Endsley v. Johns, 120 Ill. 469, 12 N. E. Rep. 247; Schwabacker v. Riddle, 99 Ill. 343;Hicks v. Stevens, 121 Ill. 186, 11 N. E. Rep. 241.

In the opinion of the appellate court, by WALL, J. reference is made to the second clause of the written contract between appellants and appellees, which is quoted above, and also to the fact that at the trial the appellants moved to exclude from the jury all the oral evidence and representations referring to the subject-matter of said second clause. Said opinion then proceeds as follows: ‘The motion was overruled, and the point was presented by instructions asked for defendants, which were refused. It is urged that in the action of ...