Antoine v. Brooklyn Maids 26, Inc.

• Decision Date: 26 September 2020
• Docket Number: 19-CV-5676 (KAM)
• Citation: 489 F.Supp.3d 68
• Parties: Lovely ANTOINE, Plaintiff, v. BROOKLYN MAIDS 26, INC., and James Henestroza, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

489 F.Supp.3d 68

Lovely ANTOINE, Plaintiff,

v.BROOKLYN MAIDS 26, INC., and James Henestroza, Defendants.

19-CV-5676 (KAM)

United States District Court, E.D. New York.

Signed September 26, 2020

H. Joseph Cronen, Shawn Raymond Clark, Phillips & Associates, PLLC, New York, NY, for Plaintiff.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

KIYO A. MATSUMOTO, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff Lovely Antoine ("plaintiff") commenced this action on October 8, 2019 against Brooklyn Maids 26, Inc. ("Brooklyn Maids") and James Henestroza (collectively, "defendants"), asserting claims of discrimination, sexual harassment, hostile work environment,¹ and retaliation on the basis of her sex/gender under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. , the New York State Human Rights Law ("NYSHRL"), N.Y. State Exec. Law §§ 296 et seq. , and the New York City Human Rights Law ("NYCHRL"), N.Y. City Admin. Code §§ 8-107 et seq. (See generally ECF No. 1, Compl.) Plaintiff further asserts claims of common law assault and battery against Mr. Henestroza in his individual capacity. (Id. ) Plaintiff seeks to recover back pay, prejudgment interest on back pay, front wages, emotional distress damages, punitive damages, and post-judgment interest, as well as attorneys’ fees and costs. (Id. ) Presently before the court is plaintiff's motion for default judgment against defendants pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b) and Local Civil Rule 55.2(b). (See generally ECF No. 15, ECF No. 17.)

The court has reviewed plaintiff's unopposed submissions, which include the complaint, plaintiff's affidavit, the memorandum of law in support of plaintiff's motion for default judgment, the affidavits from plaintiff's counsel in support of plaintiff's motion for default judgment, plaintiff's supplemental submissions regarding damages, and the transcript of plaintiff's testimony at the June 26, 2020 damages inquest. For the reasons below, the court grants plaintiff's motion for default judgment with respect to all claims, awards compensatory and punitive damages with pre- and post-judgment interest, and attorneys’ fees and costs.

BACKGROUND

I. Factual Background

The facts recited herein are drawn solely from plaintiff's complaint. Given defendants’ failure to respond to the complaint, plaintiff's well-pleaded factual allegations are accepted as true. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(6) ; Greyhound Exhibitgroup, Inc. v. E.L.U.L. Realty Corp. , 973 F.2d 155, 158 (2d Cir. 1992) ("[A] party's default is deemed to constitute a concession of all well pleaded allegations of liability."). In determining whether a plaintiff is entitled to default judgment, the court is "limited to the non-conclusory, factual allegations" in the complaint. Johannes Baumgartner Wirtschafts-Und Vermogensberatung GmbH v. Salzman , 969 F. Supp. 2d 278, 287 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).

Lovely Antoine accepted a job as a housekeeper for Brooklyn Maids in October 2018. (Compl. ¶¶ 6, 14.) At all relevant times, Mr. Henestroza was the Chief Executive Officer of Brooklyn Maids, and supervised plaintiff during her term of employment. (Id. ¶¶ 10-11.) In late January 2019, Henestroza asked plaintiff to clean his apartment. (Id. ¶ 18.) Plaintiff was subjected to inappropriate sexual remarks and advances at Henestroza's apartment. (Id. ¶ 19.) Henestroza brought plaintiff to his bedroom and told her, "this is where the magic happens." (Id. ¶ 20.) He also asked her about her sexual history and what kinds of sex acts she enjoyed. (Id. ) After plaintiff left, Henestroza sent plaintiff text messages conveying his romantic interest in her, and describing the size of his penis. (Id. ¶ 21.) Plaintiff was "shocked" by Henestroza's behavior, rebuffed his overtures, and insisted that she was not romantically interested in him. (Id. ¶ 22.) Henestroza responded that he "really wanted to help her" and would provide her with more work hours and return her to a five-day per week schedule.² (Id. ¶ 23.)

In early February 2019, Henestroza joined plaintiff on an apartment-cleaning assignment, ostensibly to help her with the laundry. (Compl. ¶ 24.) As plaintiff was working, Henestroza locked the apartment door and began pressuring her to have sex. (Id. ¶ 25) He then pushed her onto the bed and coerced her into having sex. (Id. ) Afterward, plaintiff reiterated to Henestroza that she was not interested in him sexually and wanted to maintain a professional relationship. (Id. ¶ 26.) Henestroza subsequently reduced plaintiff's workdays and work hours. (Id. ¶ 27.)

In mid-February, plaintiff asked Henestroza when her normal hours would be restored. (Compl. ¶ 28.) In response, Henestroza withheld plaintiff's pay for time she had worked until late February, though he ultimately paid her back wages due. (Id. ¶¶ 28-29.) Soon after, Henestroza again withheld plaintiff's wages, prompting plaintiff to venture to Henestroza's house on March 1, 2019 in an attempt to collect her wages. (Id. ¶ 30.) Henestroza responded by throwing plaintiff against the wall and choking her. (Id. ¶ 31.) Henestroza warned plaintiff not to come back to his home, and threatened that he "used to kill animals as a child." (Id. ) Plaintiff told Henestroza not to contact her again. (Id. ¶ 32.)

Plaintiff concludes that the foregoing "are just some of the ways Defendants discriminated and retaliated against Plaintiff while employing her." (Id. ¶ 37.)

II. Procedural Background

Plaintiff timely and properly filed her Title VII charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") on July 1, 2019, and was granted the right to sue on September 9, 2019. (ECF No. 1-1.) Plaintiff filed a federal complaint against Brooklyn Maids and Mr. Henestroza on October 8, 2019, asserting sex/gender discrimination and retaliation under Title VII, the NYSHRL, and the NYCHRL against both parties, and assault and battery against Henestroza in his individual capacity. (See generally Compl.)

On October 30, 2019, Magistrate Judge Kuo scheduled an Initial Conference for December 12, 2019. (ECF No. 6.) On December 10, 2019, plaintiff moved to adjourn the upcoming conference, having served Brooklyn Maids on October 22, 2019, and Henestroza on November 16, 2019, without response or answer from either defendant. (ECF No. 10.) Plaintiff concurrently sought leave to move for default judgment. (Id. ) On December 10, 2019, Magistrate Judge Kuo granted plaintiff leave to move for default judgment against defendants. (Dkt. Order dated Dec. 10, 2019.)

On January 13, 2020, plaintiff requested a certificate of default. (ECF No. 11.) The Clerk of Court entered default against defendants on January 21, 2020. (ECF No. 14.) On January 24, 2020, plaintiff filed a motion for entry of default judgment, supplemented with plaintiff's affidavit and memorandum and the affidavits of counsel. (ECF Nos. 15-17.) Defendants were served (ECF No. 16-6), but did not oppose the motion. In addition, plaintiff provided live video testimony at a damages inquest, held on June 26, 2020. (See Minute Entry dated June 26, 2020; see generally ECF No. 30, Transcript of Damages Inquest Hearing, held June 26, 2020 ("Inquest Tr.").) Defendants were notified in advance of the inquest hearing (ECF No. 18), but did not appear.

DISCUSSION

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 establishes a two-step process in the event of a defendant's default. First, the Clerk of the Court must enter the default if defendant fails to "plead or otherwise defend" in response to a properly served and filed complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a) ; Priestley v. Headminder, Inc. , 647 F.3d 497, 504 (2d Cir. 2011). Second, a default judgment may then be entered if the complaint sets forth a valid claim and the plaintiff has established her entitlement to a specific amount of damages. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b). When determining whether to grant a default judgment, the court considers three factors: "(1) whether the defendant's default was willful; (2) whether defendant has a meritorious defense to plaintiff's claims; and (3) the level of prejudice the non-defaulting party would suffer as a result of the denial of the motion for default judgment." Joseph v. HDMJ Restaurant, Inc. , 970 F. Supp. 2d 131, 141 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (quoting Mason Tenders Dist. Council v. Duce Constr. Corp. , No. 02-CV-9044, 2003 WL 1960584, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2003) ).³ The below analysis considers these factors with respect to plaintiff's motion for entry of default judgment against defendants.

I. Willfulness

The Second Circuit has held that failure to respond to a complaint evinces willful default. See S.E.C. v. McNulty , 137 F.3d 732, 738–39 (2d Cir. 1998) (unexplained failure to respond to complaint indicates willfulness); Indymac Bank v. Nat'l Settlement Agency, Inc. , No. 07-CV-6865, 2007 WL 4468652, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2007) (finding defendants’ failure to appear, failure to respond to the complaint, and failure to respond to a motion for default judgment indicated willful conduct); United States v. DiPaolo , 466 F. Supp. 2d 476, 482 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (grounds for default judgment were established by defendant's failure to answer the complaint, particularly in light of the fact that the defendant had expressed no intention to do so at a later time).

It is indisputable that defendants have not appeared, or responded to the complaint or plaintiff's default motion. As an initial matter, however, the court must determine whether service was properly effected upon defendants in order to determine whether their default was willful. See Deep Foods Inc. v. Deep Foods Inc. , 419 F. Supp. 3d 569, 577 (W.D.N.Y. 2019) (willfulness found where plaintiff submitted proof of service demonstrating the summons and complaint were personally served on defendants, plaintiff's motion for default judgment was served upon defendants at their last known addresses, and defendants also did not respond to either).

A defendant may be served as provided by Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Und...