Antonick v. Elec. Arts Inc.

Decision Date22 January 2014
Docket NumberNo. C 11-1543 CRB,C 11-1543 CRB
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of California
PartiesROBIN ANTONICK, Plaintiff, v. ELECTRONIC ARTS INC., Defendant.
ORDER GRANTING EA'S AMENDED
RENEWED PHASE II MOTION FOR
JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF
LAW, OR, ALTERNATIVELY, FOR A
NEW TRIAL

Following a two-phase trial in which the jury found EA breached its contract with Plaintiff Robin Antonick, the parties filed several post-trial motions, which are now before the Court. Defendant Electronic Arts ("EA") moves for judgment as a matter of law as to both phases of the trial or, in the alternative, for a new trial. See generally dkts. 443, 540. Antonick moves for prejudgment interest on the royalties he is owed as a result of the Phase II verdict, see dkt. 528, and for entry of final judgment as to his fraud claim, see dkt. 542. Upon consideration of the motions, the oppositions thereto, and the entire record of the case, the Court DENIES EA's motion for judgment as a matter of law as to Phase I, GRANTS EA judgment as a matter of law as to Phase II, and conditionally GRANTS EA's motion for a new trial of Phase II.

I. BACKGROUND

In 1984, EA hired Antonick to write source code for a video game to be called "Football." After EA negotiated with John Madden to use his name and likeness for the game, Antonick and EA entered into a new contract to develop a game for the Apple II computer called John Madden Football. Trial Ex. 15 (1986 Contract). The Contract also gave Antonick the right to royalties on "Derivative Works," defined as "any computer software program or electronic game which . . . constitutes a derivative work of the Work within the meaning of the United States Copyright law." Id. § 1.03.

In 2011, Antonick brought this suit against EA alleging breach of contract and fraud based on EA's failure to pay him royalties on allegedly derivative works. See generally Compl. (dkt. 1). Following a motion to dismiss and three motions for summary judgment, the Court held a jury trial in two phases. In Phase I, the jury was asked to decide whether the statute of limitations barred Antonick's claims. At the close of evidence, the jury found that Antonick proved by a preponderance of the evidence that before November 21, 2005, he did not discover, and did not know of facts that would cause a reasonable person to suspect, that EA had allegedly breached the 1986 Contract or made the allegedly fraudulent statements. See Verdict (dkt. 441).

In Phase II, the same jury was asked to determine whether Antonick proved that there are substantial similarities between Sega Madden and Apple II Madden1 with respect to the expression in the source code of (1) field width or (2) plays and formations. Then, for any Sega Madden game for which the jury found substantial similarities in either of those elements, the jury was asked to determine whether Antonick proved that that particular Sega Madden game is virtually identical to Apple II Madden when considering the games as a whole. In response to Question 1, the jury found that Antonick did not prove that there aresubstantial similarities in the expression of field width in the source code, but did prove there are substantial similarities between the expression of the source code for plays and formations. See Verdict (dkt. 516) at 1. In Question 2, the jury found that each of the seven Sega Madden games at issue were "virtually identical" to Antonick's version. Id. at 2. By this verdict, the jury found that the Sega Madden games are derivative works under the 1986 Contract, and that EA breached the contract by failing to pay Antonick royalties on their sales.

EA now moves for judgment as a matter of law as to both phases of the trial under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b), or, in the alternative, for a new trial under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59. Antonick moves for prejudgment interest and for entry of final judgment as to his fraud claim, which the Court dismissed prior to Phase II.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b)

"Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate when the evidence, construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, permits only one reasonable conclusion, which is contrary to the jury's verdict." Hagen v. City of Eugene, 736 F.3d 1251, 1256 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Omega Envtl., Inc. v. Gilbarco, Inc., 127 F.3d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 1997)). The court may grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law only where "there is no legally sufficient basis for a reasonable jury to find for [the non-moving] party on that issue." Krechman v. Cnty. of Riverside, 723 F.3d 1104, 1109-10 (9th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also, e.g., Byrd v. Maricopa Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 629 F.3d 1135, 1138 (9th Cir. 2011) ("[A] motion for judgment as a matter of law is properly granted only if no reasonable juror could find in the non-moving party's favor.") (internal quotation marks omitted).

If, however, "there is such relevant evidence as reasonable minds might accept as adequate to support the jury's conclusion," the motion should be denied. Hagen, 736 F.3d at 1256 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Barnard v. Theobald, 721 F.3d 1069, 1075(9th Cir. 2013). When considering a motion for judgment as a matter of law, the court may not make credibility determinations, weigh the evidence, or substitute its own view of the evidence for the jury's. See, e.g., Krechman, 723 F.3d at 1110.

B. Motion for a New Trial Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59

The court "may grant a new trial if, having given full respect to the jury's findings, the judge on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed . . . ." Tortu v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep't, 556 F.3d 1075, 1087-88 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(1)(A) (providing that district courts may grant a motion for a new trial "on all or some of the issues . . . after a jury trial, for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court."). "The primary basis for granting a new trial is that the jury's verdict was against the clear weight of the evidence." Computer Access Tech. Corp. v. Catalyst Enters., Inc., 273 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1065 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (citing Landes Constr. Co., Inc. v. Royal Bank of Canada, 833 F.2d 1365, 1371 (9th Cir. 1987)). In contrast to its role with respect to a motion for judgment as a matter of law, when considering a motion for a new trial, the court "can weigh the evidence and assess the credibility of witnesses, and need not view the evidence from the perspective most favorable to the prevailing party." Landes Constr. Co., 833 F.2d at 1371 (citations omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

EA seeks judgment as a matter of law on Phase I, arguing that (1) the doctrine of judicial estoppel should bar Antonick from changing his position as to when he first became aware that he might have a claim against EA, and (2) no reasonable jury could have found that Antonick was not on notice of his claim before November 2005. In its motion for judgment as a matter of law on Phase II, EA contends that Antonick failed to prove (1) that there are substantial similarities in the expression in the source code plays and formations between Apple II Madden and Sega Madden, or (2) that any Sega Madden game is virtually identical to Apple II Madden when each game is considered as a whole.

In response to each motion, Antonick contends that EA waived many of its Rule 50(b) arguments by failing to raise them in its Rule 50(a) motion,2 and that, even if preserved, they should be rejected on the merits because substantial evidence supports the Phase I and Phase II verdicts.3

A. EA Is Not Entitled to Judgment as a Matter of Law on Phase I
1. Judicial Estoppel Doctrine Does Not Apply

The issue raised by EA's judicial estoppel motion is whether Antonick impermissibly changed his position at trial regarding when he became aware of a possible claim against EA for purposes of the discovery rule4 such that (1) his trial testimony was clearly inconsistent with his prior position; (2) the prior position persuaded the Court to deny EA's motions to dismiss and for summary judgment; and (3) if not estopped from asserting the inconsistent position, Antonick would derive an unfair advantage and EA would face an unfair disadvantage. See Ah Quin v. Cnty. of Kauai Dep't of Transp., 733 F.3d 267, 270-71 (9th Cir. 2013).

In his Complaint, Antonick alleged that

Only with the extensive publicity surrounding Electronic Arts' Madden NFL 20th Anniversary celebrations did Antonick become aware that Electronic Arts had continued to create derivative works from his work and considered its current software to have derived from Antonick's intellectual property. Specifically, in its publicity materials surrounding the 20th Anniversary[,] Electronic Arts, to Antonick's surprise[,] traced its current software back to his software[,] not the version developed by Park Place.

Compl. ¶ 92. Also in 2009, at the suggestion of an acquaintance, Antonick viewed a CNBC interview of Electronic Arts founder Trip Hawkins, in which Hawkins traced the Madden franchise back to Antonick's version by observing that the first version "took four years" to create. Id. ¶ 93. The interview

caused Antonick to do some additional research during which he came across the website of Park Place co-founder Troy Lyndon. Ex. 19, Response to Defendant's First Set of Interrogatories at 18. On the website, Lyndon credited Hilleman with helping him develop the 1990 Sega Genesis version of Madden and referred to the "countless hours" Hilleman spent assisting Jim Simmons to develop the game. Ex. 15, Troy Lyndon Website at 2. At this point, Plaintiff was stunned. He knew that Hilleman had also spent "countless hours" working with him on the 1989 version of Madden.
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