De Antonio v. New Haven Dairy Co.

• Decision Date: 05 March 1927
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: DE ANTONIO v. NEW HAVEN DAIRY CO.

136 A. 567

105 Conn. 663

DE ANTONIO v. NEW HAVEN DAIRY CO.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

March 5, 1927

Appeal from Superior Court, New Haven County; Allyn L. Brown, Judge.

Action by Louis De Antonio against the New Haven Dairy Company to recover damages for alleged negligence of defendant's servant. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals from a denial of the motion to set aside the verdict and for errors in the charge. No error.

The jury might reasonably have found the following material facts pertaining to the collision between the plaintiff's car and the defendant's truck: On the morning of December 24, 1924, at about 7 o'clock, the plaintiff was driving a Ford roadster southerly along North Main street in Thomaston, on his way to work in a clock factory in that village. The highway was of concrete, 20 feet wide, with dirt shoulders on either side. As a result of a sleet storm during the night, the roadway was covered with a thin sheet of ice. The plaintiff was driving his car, which was not equipped with chains, at about 10 miles per hour along his extreme right-hand side of the road, the left wheels near the edge of the concrete and the right on the dirt shoulder near an embankment extending above the level of the road and 4 or 5 feet from the edge of the pavement. As he was proceeding in this manner, the defendant's 3-ton truck, loaded with about a ton and a half of ice cream and ice, was being driven northerly, from Waterbury to Torrington and Winsted. At a point about 300 feet southerly from the place of collision, the truck came upon a descending grade of 6 or 7 per cent. for a distance of about 75 feet. From the bottom of this grade northerly the road was practically level. As the truck was descending the grade, the rear end skidded to the left on the icy concrete, and continued to so skid at an increasing angle until, after skidding about 200 feet, the rear end crossed the center of the road, and, 50 feet further on, the truck being then nearly at right angles with the road, a can rack on the rear struck the plaintiff's car, tearing off the upper part of it, and seriously injuring the plaintiff. When the truck began to skid, the right front wheel was off the pavement to the right, and the driver tried to turn to the left in order to straighten the car, but could not get the wheel over the edge of the concrete, and the truck continued to go sidewise until it struck the plaintiff's car. The truck had four speeds, and was in third at the time. The driver did not apply brakes until within about 15 feet of the plaintiff's car.

Walter J. Walsh, of New Haven, for appellant.

Cornelius J. Danaher, of Meriden, for appellee.

Argued before WHEELER, C.J., and MALTBIE, HAINES, HINMAN, and WOLFE, JJ.

HINMAN, J. (after stating the facts as above).

The defendant contends, in furtherance of its appeal from the refusal of the trial court to set aside the verdict, that the evidence did not warrant the jury in holding the plaintiff to have been free from contributory negligence or the driver of defendant's truck negligent. The plaintiff testified that he saw the truck at the top of the grade, but did not observe it again until it struck his car, and the defendant claims that he was negligent in not noting the course subsequently taken by the truck and in not stopping in time to avoid the collision. We think, however, especially in view of the position in which the plaintiff was driving, nearly off the concrete to his right, and leaving almost the entire width of the road to other traffic, that the jury might well have held that reasonable care required or permitted that, instead of watching other traffic from which no danger was likely, he give, as he apparently did, close attention to guiding his own car, particularly considering the icy conditions and the fact that he was driving largely on the dirt shoulder, and close to the adjoining embankment; also, they might reasonably have found that, even if he had watched the truck as it approached him more closely, he could not have turned further away from its course because of the embankment, and that, if he had stopped his car, the collision would have occurred, notwithstanding.

If, as the jury were justified in holding, the collision was not due to the negligence of the plaintiff, it follows that it was caused by fault of the defendant's driver or was an accident unavoidable by the exercise of reasonable care. The defedant contends that the cause was the skidding of the truck without fault on the part of its driver. It is true, as the trial court charged the jury, that the skidding of an automobile is not an occurrence of such a character as, of itself, necessarily to establish or constitute negligence in the operation of an automobile. If the driver acted as would a reasonably prudent person, under the circumstances, he is not to be held negligent merely because the car skidded and did damage. But upon the evidence here it was an open question whether or not the conduct of the defendant's driver was such as to render this rule applicable. It appeared that he was entirely familiar with the road and with its general condition on the morning in question, knew the truck, its weight, and that of its load and its characteristics, and it...