Antonyuk v. Bruen
| Decision Date | 31 August 2022 |
| Docket Number | 1:22-CV-0734 (GTS/CFH) |
| Parties | IVAN ANTONYUK; GUN OWNERS OF AMERICA, INC.; GUN OWNERS FOUNDATION; and GUN OWNERS OF AMERICA NEW YORK, INC., Plaintiffs, v. KEVIN P. BRUEN, in his Official Capacity as Superintendent of the New York State Police Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York |
STAMBOULIEH LAW, PLLC
OF COUNSEL: STEPHEN D. STAMBOULIEH, ESQ.
Counsel for Plaintiff
WILLIAM J. OLSON, P.C.
OF COUNSEL: ROBERT J. OLSON, ESQ.
Co-Counsel for Plaintiff
DECISION AND ORDER
Currently before the Court, in this civil rights action filed by Ivan Antonyuk and the three above-captioned organizations ("Plaintiffs") against Kevin P. Bruen in his official capacity as Superintendent of the New York State Police ("Defendant"), is Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. (Dkt. No. 9.) For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs' Complaint is sua sponte dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3), and their motion for a preliminary injunction is denied without prejudice as moot.
On June 23, 2022, the Supreme Court held that N.Y. Penal Law § 400.00(2)(f), which conditioned the issuance of an unrestricted license to carry a handgun in public on the existence of "proper cause," violated the Second and Fourteenth Amendments by impermissibly granting a licensing official the discretion to deny a license to a law-abiding, responsible New York State citizen based on a perceived lack of a special need for self-protection distinguishable from that of the general community. N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Assoc, Inc. v. Bruen, 142 S.Ct. 2111, 2156 (2022) ("NYSRPA").
On July 1, 2022, New York State passed the Concealed Carry Improvement Act ("CCIA"), which generally replaced the "proper cause" standard with, in pertinent part, (1) a definition of the "good moral character" that was required in order to complete the license application or renewal process, (2) the requirement of an in-person interview, social-media-account disclosure and review, at least four "character references" and additional hours of required in-person firearm training in order to complete the license application or renewal process, and (3) a list of "sensitive locations" and "restricted locations" where carrying arms is prohibited. 2022 N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 371.
On July 11, 2022, Plaintiffs filed their Complaint in this action. (Dkt. No. 1.) Generally, in their Complaint, Plaintiffs assert four claims against Defendant: (1) a claim for violating the Second Amendment; (2) a claim for violating the Second Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983"); (3) a claim for violating the First Amendment; and (4) a claim for violating the First Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, and Section 1983. (Id.) Each of these claims challenge one or more of the following seven aspects in the revised law: (a) its allegedly subjective definition of "good moral character"; (b) its allegedly onerous requirement of an in-person interview by the licensing officer; (c) its allegedly onerous requirement that the applicant disclose a list of his or her current and past social media accounts for the past three years; (d) its allegedly onerous requirement of at least four "character references" who can attest to the applicant's "good moral character and that such applicant has not engaged in any acts, or made any statements that suggest they are likely to engage in conduct that would result in harm to themselves or others"; (e) its allegedly onerous requirement of a minimum of 16-hours of in-person training (plus a minimum of two hours of live-fire training) and accompanying fees; (f) its expansive list of "sensitive locations"; and (g) its expansive definition of "restricted locations." (Id.)
On July 20, 2022, Plaintiffs filed their motion for preliminary injunction. (Dkt. No. 9.) On August 15, 2022, Defendants filed their opposition. (Dkt. No. 19.) On August 22, 2022, Plaintiffs filed their reply. (Dkt. No. 40.) On August 23, 2022, the Court held a hearing on Plaintiffs' motion, at which it not only received evidence, but heard oral argument. (Text Minute Entry dated Aug. 23, 2022; Dkt. 46 [Hrg. Tr.].)
Generally, in their memorandum of law, Plaintiffs assert five arguments. .)
First, Plaintiffs argue, they have standing because (a) even setting aside the need to undergo onerous training and social-media-disclosure requirements before he recertifies his carry permit in January 2023, Plaintiff Antonyuk faces a real, immediate, and direct threat of arrest, prosecution or other enforcement action if he carries his firearm in any of the numerous "sensitive locations" and "restricted locations" defined in the CCIA, after the CCIA takes effect on September 1, 2022, (b) the three organizational Plaintiffs have members and supporters in New York State who will face the same or similar harms as Plaintiff Antonyuk due to the impending implementation of the CCIA, and (c) these injuries are fairly traceable to Defendant, who is tasked with enforcing these impending restrictions. (Id. at 3-7 .)
Second, Plaintiffs argue, they are likely to succeed on the merits of one or more of their claims for four independent reasons: (a) like the "proper cause" standard that was rejected by the Supreme Court in NYSRPA, the "good moral character" standard impermissibly grants licensing officers the discretion to deny a license based on a perceived lack of something (here, the "essential character, temperament and judgment necessary ... to use [the weapon entrusted to the applicant] only in a manner that does not endanger oneself or others," which is a vague and subjective term); (b) its requirements of an in-person interview, four "character references," the divulging of family and associates, and the disclosure of social-media accounts are impermissible for numerous reasons, including the fact that they afford the licensing officer too much discretion under the Second Amendment and infringe on the applicant's First (and possibly Fifth) Amendment rights; (c) its long list of "sensitive locations" impermissibly includes numerous locations that are nonsensitive, and its definition of "a restricted location" impermissibly encompasses all private property in the state unless the property owner expressly permits the carrying of firearms; and (d) its four-and-a-half times increase in required training hours will cost hundreds of additional dollars in course fees (and possibly lost wages), which will impermissibly extinguish the right to bear arms of those responsible New Yorkers who cannot afford those costs, and it is precisely what the Supreme Court in NYSRPA warned against when it stated that it would "not rule out constitutional challenges to shall-issue regimes where, for example,... exorbitant fees deny ordinary citizens their right to public carry." (Id. at 8-25 [pages "5" through "23"].)
Third, Plaintiffs argue, they are likely to suffer irreparable harm absent preliminary relief because (a) a strong showing of a constitutional deprivation (even if the deprivation is for only a minimal period of time) constitutes irreparable harm, and (b) here, the above-discussed aspects of the CCIA either deprives Plaintiffs of their Second Amendment rights or forces them to waive various of their First Amendment rights to exercise their Second Amendment rights. (Id. at 25 [page "23"].)
Fourth, Plaintiffs argue, the balance of equities tips overwhelmingly in Plaintiffs' favor because the New York State legislature intentionally tramples the clearly enumerated Second Amendment right to bear arms outside of the home (in addition to well-established First Amendment rights). (Id. at 26 [page "24"].)
Fifth and finally, Plaintiffs argue, an injunction is in the public interest because (a) the public has an interest not only in vindicating Second (and First Amendment) rights, but also in the prevention of the egregious curtailment of those rights, (b) the Supreme Court's new ban on means-end scrutiny now prevents Defendant from relying on public safety as an automatic form of public interest, and (c) the CCIA consists of unprecedented restrictions on constitutional rights that have no historical analog. (Id. at 25-26 [pages "24" and "25"].)
Generally, in his opposition memorandum of law, Defendant asserts eleven arguments. (Dkt. No. 19 [Def's Opp'n Memo, of Law].)
First, Defendant argues, with regard to the issue of standing, under controlling Second Circuit precedent, the three organizational Plaintiffs have not alleged facts plausibly suggesting standing to sue in their own right because they must do so without relying on their members' injuries (much less their supporters' injuries). (Id. at 24-26 [pages "10" through "12"].)
Second, Defendant argues, he is not a proper defendant because any alleged injury from the licensing laws is not fairly traceable to him, and the Eleventh Amendment separately bars suit against him (given that New York State has not consented to be sued and he has no specific connection with the enforcement of the CCIA). (Id. at 26-29 [pages "12" through "15"].)
Third Defendant argues, Plaintiff Antonyuk has not alleged an...
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