Antrim v. Civil Service Commission of City of Des Moines

Decision Date12 December 1967
Docket NumberNo. 52687,52687
PartiesCharles A. ANTRIM et al., Appellants, v. The CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION OF the CITY OF DES MOINES, Iowa, and Leo Danzinger, Chairman, Wilton Seymour and Donald Clark, Members of said Commission, Appellees.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

Stewart, Miller, Wimer, Brennan & Joyce, by Joseph B. Joyce, Des Moines, for appellants.

Philip T. Riley, Anthony T. Renda, John F. McKinney, Jr., Gary H. Swanson, and Robert D. McAllister, by Gary H. Swanson, Des Moines, for appellees.

RAWLINGS, Justice.

At all times here concerned plaintiffs were detectives in the Des Moines Police Department.

November 30, 1964, the city council adopted an ordinance effective March 8, 1965, under which the positions held by certain municipal employees, including plaintiffs, were reclassified with attendant pay scale revisions.

Plaintiffs were granted a uniform increase in compensation but not equal to that accorded sergeants in the department. Historically they had drawn the same pay.

September 27, 1965, plaintiffs gave notice of appeal to the civil service commission contending, as to them, the aforesaid pay variance constituted a demotion.

October 11, 1965, the city council, by special appearance, challenged jurisdiction of the commission to entertain the appeal, claiming absence of timely notice.

After hearing, the commission found it lacked jurisdiction. Plaintiffs sought review by certiorari, and the district court concluded the commission's finding was proper. We agree.

I. As previously disclosed the ordinance involved became effective March 8, 1965, but notice of appeal was not given until September 27th, or after more than six months had elapsed.

Section 365.20, Code 1962, provides: 'If there is an affirmance of the suspension, Demotion, or discharge of any person holding civil service rights, he may, Within twenty days thereafter, appeal therefrom to the civil service commission. If the suspension, Demotion, or discharge is not affirmed within five days the person who suspended, Demoted, or discharged such officer or employee may in like manner appeal.' (Emphasis supplied)

Plaintiffs contend this statutory enactment is not applicable but refer us to no other law under which a municipal employee may appeal to the civil service commission.

Furthermore, Wilson v. Stipp, 194 Iowa 346, 189 N.W. 665, resolves the matter adverse to plaintiffs. In that case the employee was discharged April 20, 1920, but did not give notice of appeal until the following October. There were no statutory grounds for his discharge and no charges were filed. Neither was the employee, a policeman, removed from office by the chief of police. In fact there was a conceded wrongful termination of employment by the department superintendent. No notice of discharge was given to the commission.

Holding the commission was without jurisdiction to act, this court said at pages 350--351 of 194 Iowa, at page 66 of 189 N.W.: 'Conceding that the removal of Wilson was unwarranted, and was not accomplished in the manner provided by statute, we do not see how these matters can affect the time within which Wilson should have presented his grievance to the commission. For the legal wrong visited upon him, the statute provided Wilson with a remedy. This remedy must be utilized within the time provided by the statute. Statutes of limitation relate to remedy, and not to the manner and essence of the injury. Edwards v. McCaddon, 20 Iowa 520. The commission had jurisdiction to consider and pass upon the wrong and injury sustained by Wilson, if presented to it in time. The irregular and illegal manner by which Wilson's discharge was effected pertained to the essence of the wrongful act of discharge; while the sole question presented here is as to remedy. In 25 Cyc. 1199, it is said:

"Where, although the cause of action itself has accrued, some preliminary step is required before a resort can be had to the remedy, the condition referring merely to the remedy, and not to the right, the cause will be barred, if not brought within the statutory period; therefore the preliminary step must be taken within that period."

Later in Allgood v. City of Oskaloosa, 231 Iowa 197, 1 N.W.2d 211, a discharged policeman sought restoration to his position by mandamus. This action was challenged by a motion to dismiss, asserting the statutory remedy by appeal to the commission barred mandamus. The motion was sustained. Plaintiff appealed and this court affirmed. In so doing we held the statutory remedy by appeal to the civil service commission provides a clear, speedy, convenient, complete and effective remedy to one to whom the statute is applicable.

And, as disclosed in Allgood v. City of Oskaloosa, supra, there have been no relevant changes effected by statutory revision since the Wilson case, except that time for appeal to the commission has been extended from five to twenty days, and the term 'demotion' was added to 'suspension' and 'discharge.'

It is to us evident section 365.20 of the Code, quoted above, is here applicable and controlling.

II. Plaintiffs also take the position time for appeal varied as to each of them.

In so doing they refer to the fact that under the ordinance the new pay scale took effect on the appointive anniversary date of each plaintiff individually, and this, not the effective date of the ordinance, is controlling. We cannot agree.

Touching on that subject this court said in Wilson v. Stipp, supra, loc. cit., 194 Iowa 349, 189 N.W. 666: 'Though it is conceded by all parties that Wilson was removed from office without cause or justification, by an officer without authority, yet he was discharged. He was removed from his job. At the moment when he was removed from his position, his rights were invaded. It was then that he received injury. It was then that his cause of action and right of appeal accrued. To have his rights established, Wilson must then apply to the civil service commission. To regain his position,--to be reinstated,--he must present his grievance to the civil service commission. That was his remedy.'

Referring now to the case at hand, it stands without dispute the ordinance reclassifying positions and revising pay scales was properly enacted and duly published.

The argument advanced by plaintiffs that the effective date of the ordinance is not controlling overlooks the fact their attempted appeal to the commission is unavoidably based upon a claim The ordinance served in effect to demote them. In a legal sense any pay variance is merely incidental to the ordinance-created wrong.

Since the premise upon which they sought administrative review is adoption of the alleged offending ordinance, the effective date of that municipal enactment is the commencement point of the statutory period within which their appeals could be lawfully taken.

Under the circumstances we are satisfied, if there was an invasion of plaintiffs' rights, it occurred on the effective date of the ordinance. Their lawful right of appeal then accrued, and they manifestly failed to pursue the remedy provided within the twenty days prescribed by law.

III. However, plaintiffs contend the special appearance filed by the city was of no legal force or effect.

Here they refer to section 365.22 of the Code which provides written specifications of charges shall be filed within five days after notice of appeal has been given.

No such specifications were submitted, and the special appearance was filed about fourteen days after notice of appeal had been given.

Elk River Coal & Lumber Co. v. Funk, 222 Iowa 1222, 1235, 271 N.W. 204, 110 A.L.R. 1415, discloses it is doubtful whether a special appearance is applicable to proceedings before an administrative body or board. See also 2 Am.Jur.2d, Administrative Law, section 366, page 176.

Be that as it may, plaintiffs do not challenge the special appearance procedurally. They argue, in effect, where jurisdiction is lacking it may still be conferred by estoppel or consent, i.e., by the city's failure to file specifications it lost all right to challenge the board's authority.

Jurisdiction is unquestionably essential to the validity of any proceeding undertaken by a public administrative tribunal, without which its actions are void. See 73 C.J.S. Public Administrative Bodies and Procedure § 66, page 392, and 2 Am.Jur.2d, Administrative Law, sections 321, page 146, 327--328, pages 149--151, and 489, page 295.

All appeals are pure creatures of statute. Bales v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 249 Iowa 57, 60, 86 N.W.2d 244.

And laws relating to appeals are generally accorded strict construction. Crawford v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 247 Iowa 736, 742, 76 N.W.2d 187; Civil Service Law, by Oliver P. Field, page 212; and 2 Am.Jur.2d, Administrative Law, sections 354, page 168, and 360, page 172.

Furthermore, an appellate tribunal derives its jurisdiction from the law. It cannot be acquired by estoppel or consent alone. Turning again to Wilson v. Stipp, supra, loc. cit., 194 Iowa 351, 189 N.W. 666, this court stated: 'As bearing on limitation of time to invoke remedy, see Prescott v. Gonser, 34 Iowa 175; Lower v. Miller, ...

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9 cases
  • City of Mound Bayou v. Johnson
    • United States
    • Mississippi Supreme Court
    • April 18, 1990
    ...derives its jurisdiction from the law. It cannot be acquired by estoppel or consent alone. Antrim v. Civil Service Com'n of City of Des Moines, 261 Iowa 396, 154 N.W.2d 711, 714 (1967). "It is fundamental that the right of appeal is purely statutory and may be granted or denied by the legis......
  • Marshall v. State
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    ...derives its jurisdiction from the law. It cannot be acquired by estoppel or consent alone." Antrim v. Civil Service Com'n of City of Des Moines, 261 Iowa 396, 154 N.W.2d 711, 714 (1967). "It is fundamental that the right of appeal is purely statutory and may be granted or denied by the legi......
  • Brightman v. Civil Service Commission of City of Des Moines
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    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • October 14, 1969
    ...on review by certiorari. We affirmed the judgment of the district court on grounds hereinafter explained. Antrim v. Civil Service Comm. of City of Des Moines, Iowa, 154 N.W.2d 711. As before stated, the claimed illegal action of the city from which the 33 detectives appealed to the commissi......
  • Iowa Dept. of Revenue v. Iowa Merit Employment Commission
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    ...1974). Moreover, appellate review is purely statutory and subject to strict construction. See Antrim v. Civil Service Com'n of City of Des Moines, 261 Iowa 396, 401, 154 N.W.2d 711 (1967). III. Defendants obviously misconstrue statutory absence of probationary employee appeal limitations to......
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