Antrup v. State
Decision Date | 09 March 1978 |
Docket Number | No. 3-876A196,3-876A196 |
Citation | 373 N.E.2d 194,175 Ind.App. 636 |
Parties | Charles E. ANTRUP, Appellant (Defendant below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below). |
Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
William B. Bryan, Tubergen, Bryan & Hornbacher, Angola, for appellant.
Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Alembert W. Brayton, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
Antrup appeals from his conviction of theft for which he received a prison sentence of not less than one nor more than ten years. He presents these questions for review:
(1) Did the trial court err in admitting a statement Antrup gave before trial to Trooper Urbahns because:
a. Antrup did not understand the rights waiver form which he signed before giving the statement, and
b. his attorney had instructed police not to speak to him or question him?
(2) Did the trial court err in admitting certain evidence which Antrup contends was the product of an unreasonable search?
(3) Did the prosecutor's remarks at summation constitute misconduct?
(4) Did the trial court err in giving Instruction No. 12?
We affirm.
We examine first the State's contention that Antrup's appeal must fail because his motion to correct errors and his memorandum in support of it lack the requisite specificity.
Antrup's motion to correct errors does not present us with the grounds for his assertions that admission of his pretrial statement and admission of evidence seized from his residence constitute reversible error. His motion directs us to his supporting memorandum for these grounds. Antrup's supporting memorandum, in turn, directs us to the record of the hearing on his pretrial Motion to Discharge and in the Alternative to Suppress, and to the memorandum in support of that motion, for these grounds. 1 This memorandum, however, was neither attached to nor submitted with his motion to correct errors. Similarly, the motion to correct errors gives us no clue as to how the prosecutor's remarks at summation amounted to misconduct. In short, we are forced to dig from Antrup's brief and from the record the generalities, as well as the specifics, of his appeal.
Ind.Rules of Procedure, Trial Rule 59(B), requires that the motion to correct errors "be specific rather than general," and that it be "accompanied by a statement of the facts and grounds upon which errors are based." In recent years this Court has been compelled to harp on the need for specificity in the motion. See, e. g., Sacks v. State (1977), Ind.App., 360 N.E.2d 21; Bennett v. State (1973), Ind.App., 304 N.E.2d 827; Ostric v. St. Mary's College (1972), 153 Ind.App. 616, 288 N.E.2d 565. 2
In Bennett, supra, Judge Buchanan offered the rationale behind the specificity directive "Id. at 829.
The sanction imposed for failure to comply with the requirements of TR. 59 is waiver of the claimed error. TR. 59(G). See Anderson v. Indiana State Emp. Appeals Com'n (1977), Ind.App., 360 N.E.2d 1040; Matthew v. State (1972), 154 Ind.App. 182, 289 N.E.2d 336. But in recent cases in which the technical requirements of appeal were disregarded the rule has arisen that alleged error will be deemed waived only when the defendant's noncompliance with the requirement is substantial enough to impede our consideration of the issues raised. Davis v. State (1976), Ind., 355 N.E.2d 836 ( ); Ind. St. Bd. of Tax Com'rs v. Lyon & Greenleaf Co. (1977), Ind.App., 359 N.E.2d 931 (content of briefs). See also Edwards v. State (1976), Ind., 352 N.E.2d 730. Although Antrup's motion and supporting memorandum lack specificity, we are able to glean from his brief and from the record the gist of his arguments. We eschew deciding cases on technicalities; we prefer deciding cases on their merits. Ind. St. Bd. of Tax Com'rs, supra.
Furthermore, while the motion to correct errors serves as the complaint on appeal, its primary purpose is to afford the trial court the opportunity to rectify errors it has committed. Bennett, supra. In Antrup's case the trial court also presided at the hearing on his suppression motion. It was therefore familiar with the facts and grounds of the claimed error, and Antrup's allegations in his motion to correct errors were no doubt specific enough for the trial court to make an informed ruling thereon.
We proceed, then, to examine the merits of Antrup's appeal.
Police arrested Antrup and charged him with the burglary of Don's Shell Station in Fremont, Indiana. After he was in custody and had retained counsel, Antrup asked to see Trooper Urbahns, who was one of the investigating officers in his case. When Urbahns visited Antrup in jail on December 19, 1976, he asked Antrup if Antrup wanted to see him. Antrup replied that he did. Urbahns gave Antrup a standard rights waiver form, 3 which Antrup signed after indicating that he was familiar with the form. Urbahns testified in a suppression hearing and at trial that after Antrup had given him information on other crimes committed in the Fremont area, the following conversation took place between the two:
Antrup argues that the statement should have been suppressed because he did not understand what he was signing when he signed the rights waiver form.
We conclude that Antrup understood the nature of the rights form, the nature of his rights, and that he voluntarily waived those rights. Trooper Urbahns testified that in his opinion Antrup knew what he was doing when he signed the form and that he voluntarily waived his rights. At the suppression hearing Antrup himself admitted that he was familiar with the form. Antrup had already retained counsel and had consulted with him at the time of the alleged waiver. Although he had been advised by counsel not to speak with any police officers, Antrup personally summoned Urbahns for the purpose of making a statement. Further, after making the statement in question, Antrup exercised his right not to say anything more without his attorney present. Although a signed waiver of rights is never conclusive, Emler v. State (1972), 259 Ind. 241, 286 N.E.2d 408, none of the facts before us refute the contention that Antrup voluntarily waived his rights. Antrup's actions demonstrated that he understood that he could not be compelled to speak to police; this principle is the primary focus of those rights a defendant possesses when he is interrogated by law enforcement officers.
The contention that the statement was inadmissible because Antrup's attorney had instructed police not to speak with Antrup is without merit. On his own initiative Antrup sought out Urbahns for the purpose of making a statement; as examined supra, Antrup did so despite his awareness that his attorney advised him to speak to no one. See Weaver v. State (1966), 247 Ind. 315, 215 N.E.2d 533.
We do not agree with Antrup's contention that certain evidence admitted at trial was the product of an unreasonable search of Antrup's residence and should have been suppressed. The record discloses that after Antrup voluntarily accompanied police to the city police station for questioning, his mother called the police and indicated that she and Antrup's father had found a large sum of money in the closet of a bedroom shared by Antrup and his younger brother. When Trooper Urbahns later arrived at the house, Antrup's mother led him to the bedroom closet and showed him the money.
No evidence supports the conclusion that Trooper Urbahns had committed an unreasonable search. Antrup's mother found the money and turned it over to him. Constitutional proscriptions against unreasonable searches and seizures are intended only to protect against such actions by the government. Neither the state nor the federal provisions apply to the acts, however unauthorized, of private individuals. Zupp v. State (1972), 258 Ind. 625, 283 N.E.2d 540; Gunter v. State (1971), 257 Ind. 524, 275 N.E.2d 810.
Misconduct
During his summation the prosecutor remarked:
Antrup objected to these remarks and now contends that they amounted to misconduct. For the prosecutor's remarks to be grounds for reversal, they must be so inflammatory or prejudicial in their persuasive effect as to have placed the defendant in grave peril. Phelps v. State (1977), Ind., 360 N.E.2d 191; Hackett v. State (1977), Ind., 360 N.E.2d 1000. We conclude that the prosecutor's remarks did not reach that standard and did not amount to misconduct. 4
Antrup's argument that the trial court erred in giving its Instruction No. 12 and in refusing his tendered instruction is also without merit. The instruction concerns the credibility of witnesses, and it was given both...
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