Antunes v. Lowe's Home Ctrs.

• Decision Date: 05 January 2023
• Docket Number: CIVIL 3:20-CV-01890 (JCH)
• Parties: JACQUELINE ANTUNES, Plaintiff, v. LOWE'S HOME CENTERS, LLC Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut

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JACQUELINE ANTUNES, Plaintiff, v. LOWE'S HOME CENTERS, LLC Defendant.

CIVIL No. 3:20-CV-01890 (JCH)

United States District Court, D. Connecticut

January 5, 2023

RULING ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DOC. NO 36)

Janet C. Hall, United States District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

Jacqueline Antunes (“Antunes”) brings this action against her former employer, Lowe's Home Centers, LLC (“Lowe's”), alleging retaliation for reporting sexual harassment in the workplace in violation of the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (“CFEPA”), Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-60(b)(4) as well as negligent supervision and negligent retention under state law.

Now before the court is Lowe's Motion for Summary Judgment, see Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (“Def.'s Mot.”) (Doc. No. 36), which Antunes opposes, see Plaintiff's Objection to Defendant's Mot. for Summary Judgment (“Pl.'s Obj.”) (Doc. No. 40). For the reasons discussed below, Lowe's Motion is granted in part and denied in part.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background^[1]

Antunes worked as a Merchandising Associate at Lowe's Manchester, Connecticut location from March 25, 2019, until December 13, 2019. See Plaintiff's Local Rule 56(a)2 Statement of Facts (“Pl.'s SOF”) ¶ 1-2 (Doc. No. 44-2); Defendant's Local Rule 56(a)1 Statement of Facts (“Def.'s SOF”) ¶ 1 (Doc. No. 37); Defendant's Ex. 2, Antunes Resignation Email (Doc. No. 48-1). Antunes held the same position throughout her tenure, though she spent about a month as an acting Merchandizing Manager. Pl.'s SOF ¶ 3; Def.'s SOF ¶ 3. During that month, Antunes hourly wage did not change nor was she officially promoted. Pl.'s SOF ¶ 3; Def.'s SOF ¶ 3.

In the summer of 2019, Antunes told a fellow merchandizing associate-an out gay man-“don't be such a girl.” Pl.'s SOF ¶ 5; Def.'s SOF ¶ 5. On July 9, 2019, Antunes was given a final warning from Lowe's in response to the comment. Pl.'s SOF ¶ 5; Def.'s SOF ¶ 5. While receiving counseling related to the remark, Antunes told the store manager, Veejay Chandarpal, that she had been sexually harassed by the Merchandizing Manager, Kevin Cole. Pl.'s SOF ¶ 6; Def.'s SOF ¶ 6;^[2] Defendant's Exhibit 1, Deposition of Jacqueline Antunes (“Antunes Dep.”) at 21 (Doc. No. 48-1). Lowe's initiated an internal investigation into Antunes' allegation and terminated Cole “a couple of weeks” later. Pl.'s SOF ¶ 7; Def.'s SOF ¶ 7. Following Cole's termination, Antunes had no issues with the way that Lowe's addressed her complaint, and she was not subjected to any additional sexual harassment. Pl.'s SOF ¶ 8; Def.'s SOF ¶ 8. However, Jessica Kerpen-a Merchandizing District Manager who supervised Antunes' supervisor-and Anthony Guzman-a Merchandizing Area Manager who also supervised Antunes' supervisor and reported to Kerpen-told Antunes that she was not a “team player” and was “not one of us” following the complaint against Cole. Plaintiff's Exhibit 2, Complainant's Affidavit (“Antunes Aff.”) at 3 (Doc. No. 44-5).

Antunes' tenure with Lowe's ended when she left to accept a job as a USPS driver. Pl.'s SOF ¶¶ 3, 9; Def.'s SOF ¶¶ 3, 9; Antunes Dep. at 42. In her resignation email, Antunes expressed gratitude for all Lowe's offered and taught her. Pl.'s SOF ¶ 10; Def.'s SOF ¶ 10. In addition, Antunes offered to do anything she could “to help make [her] transition any easier....” Pl.'s SOF ¶ 10; Def.'s SOF ¶ 10.

Although Antunes left Lowe's to pursue a “better opportunity”, Pl.'s SOF ¶ 9; Def.'s SOF ¶ 9, she resigned from USPS within a week of starting her new job, Pl.'s SOF ¶ 12; Def.'s SOF ¶ 12. A few months later, Antunes applied for multiple positions at Lowe's. Pl.'s SOF ¶ 13; Def.'s SOF ¶ 13. The resume Antunes submitted with her application contained several “mistake[s].” See Pl.'s SOF ¶¶ 14-18; Def.'s SOF ¶¶ 1418. First, the resume indicated that Antunes was currently employed by USPS, though she admits that was no longer true by the time she submitted her application. Pl.'s SOF ¶ 14; Def.'s SOF ¶ 14. Second, Antunes' resume suggested she worked at Lowe's as a Merchandizing Manager for the duration of her tenure, though she later testified that this was not her job title and it was a “mistake” to suggest it was. Pl.'s SOF ¶ 15; Def.'s SOF ¶ 15. Third, Antunes' resume noted that she “[r]eceived two President's Club awards . . . for outstanding customer service and customer service excellency” during her time at Lowe's. Pl.'s SOF ¶ 16; Def.'s SOF ¶ 16. However, “Lowe's does not have or give out” such an award, and Antunes testified that this was a “mistake” as well. Pl.'s SOF ¶¶ 17-18; Def.'s SOF ¶¶ 17-18. Instead, Antunes testified that this was an award she received while at Wal-Mart. Antunes Dep. at 47.

Neither party addresses the following, but Kerpen-who oversaw merchandizing operations in nine stores, including the Manchester location at which Antunes previously worked-reviewed Antunes application for all the Lowe's stores in her district. Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, Kerpen's Dep. at 15 (Doc. No. 44-4). Kerpen knew of Antunes' complaint about Cole, Kerpen's Dep. at 27, and decided not to move her application forward in the hiring process by scheduling an interview, see Kerpen's Dep. at 10. This is contrasted by Antunes' application to Lowe's Worcester, Massachusetts and Danbury, Connecticut locations. Antunes Aff. at 4. Neither location is within Kerpen's district, and Antunes' applications there were quickly met with invitations to interview. Id. Ultimately, Antunes was not offered a job at the Worcester store. Id. Antunes also interviewed with the store manager of Lowe's New Haven location. Id. at 5. At the conclusion of the interview, the store manager indicated that he would get in touch with Kerpen about Antunes' application. Id. After that, Antunes did not hear back from the New Haven location until her follow up call to the store manager was met with an email relaying that they had selected another candidate. Id.

B. Procedural Background

Antunes filed her complaint against Lowe's on November 24, 2020, in the Superior Court for the State of Connecticut. See Notice of Removal, Defendant's Exhibit 1 at 5 (Doc. No. 1-1). Lowe's removed the action to federal court on December 18, 2020. See Notice of Removal at 1 (Doc. No. 1). On July 15, 2021, the court granted Lowe's Partial Motion to Dismiss with respect to Counts Two and Five. See Ruling on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 26).

The court now considers Lowe's Motion for Summary Judgment as to the remaining three Counts. See Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J.; Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (“Def.'s Mem.”) (Doc. No. 38); Defendant's Reply in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (“Def.'s Reply”) (Doc. No. 45). Antunes opposes the Motion. See Pl.'s Obj.; Pl.'s Memorandum of Law in Support of Objection to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (“Pl.'s Mem.”) (Doc. No. 44-1).

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A motion for summary judgment may be granted only when the moving party can establish that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986); Wright v. N.Y. State Dep't of Corr., 831 F.3d 64, 71-72 (2d Cir. 2016). If the moving party satisfies this burden, the nonmoving party must set forth specific facts demonstrating that there is indeed “a genuine issue for trial.” Wright v. Goord, 554 F.3d 255, 266 (2d Cir. 2009). A genuine issue exists where “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Cross Commerce Media, Inc. v. Collective, Inc., 841 F.3d 155, 162 (2d Cir. 2016). Unsupported allegations do not create a material issue of fact and cannot overcome a properly supported motion for summary judgment. See Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 41 (2d Cir. 2000). In assessing the record to determine whether there are disputed issues of material fact, the trial court must “resolve all ambiguities and draw all inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought.” LaFond v. Gen. Physics Servs. Corp., 50 F.3d 165, 175 (2d Cir. 1995).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Count: Retaliation Under CFEPA

In support of their Motion for Summary Judgment, Lowe's argues that Antunes' retaliation claim fails because she cannot establish a prima facie case. Def.'s Mem. at 6. Lowe's adds that, even if Antunes could demonstrate a prima facie case, her claim would still fail because Lowe's has legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for not rehiring her. Id. In opposition to the Motion, Antunes counters by arguing that she has laid out a causal connection between her complaint of sexual harassment and Lowe's failure to rehire her-as needed to establish a prima facie case. Pl.'s Mem. at 12. Moreover, Antunes posits that Lowe's non-retaliatory reasons are pretextual, and that her complaint about sexual harassment in the workplace was a motivating factor for the decision not to rehire her. Id. at 13.

CFEPA claims are analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. Bentley v. AutoZoners LLC, 935 F.3d 76, 88 (2d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted); Tucker v. Journal Register East, 520 F.Supp.2d 374, 379 n.1 (D. Conn. 2007) (“Connecticut courts examine federal precedent for guidance in construing Connecticut's anti-discrimination statutes.”). The first step is establishing a prima facie case of relation, which demands that a plaintiff demonstrate “(1) participation in a protected activity; (2) the defendant's knowledge of the protected activity; (3) an adverse employment action; and (4) a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.” Zann Kwan v. Andalex Group LLC, 737 F.3d 834, 844 (2d Cir. 2013) (...