Anyan v. New York Life Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 03 April 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 00 Civ.8757(DC).,00 Civ.8757(DC). |
| Parties | Joseph Addison ANYAN, Jr., Plaintiff, v. NEW YORK LIFE INSURANCE CO., et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
McMickens & Ellis, L.L.P., By: Jacqueline McMickens, Brooklyn, New York, for Plaintiff.
Pillsbury Winthrop, L.L.P., By: Kristan Peters, Nancy Merwin, David Lagasse, Stamford, Connecticut, for Defendants.
Plaintiff Joseph Anyan sold insurance products for defendant New York Life Insurance Company ("New York Life") from 1980 through 1999, when his contract with New York Life was terminated. Anyan alleges that defendants discriminated against him on the basis of his race and color, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ("Title VII"), and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 ("section 1981"), and his disability, namely, diabetes, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12102 et seq. (the "ADA"). Anyan also brings claims under the New York State Human Rights Law (the "NYHRL"), N.Y. Exec. Law § 296 et seq. (McKinney 2001).
Defendants move for summary judgment, pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, asserting that (i) plaintiff was not an employee within the meaning of the statutes, and (ii) even assuming that he was an employee, he was dismissed for failing to meet New York Life's production standards and not for any discriminatory reason. As set forth below, a reasonable jury could only conclude that Anyan was an independent contractor rather than an employee. Moreover, no reasonable jury could find that defendants discharged plaintiff because of his race or disability. Therefore, defendants' motion is granted and the complaint is dismissed.
For purposes of this motion, the facts attested to by plaintiff are assumed to be true and all conflicts in the evidence have been resolved in his favor.
There are two types of agents at New York Life: Training Allowance Subsidy Agents, or "TAS agents," and "Established Agents." (Decl. of Margaret Anderson-Miller at ¶ 2).1 TAS agents are individuals who have been affiliated with the company for less than three years and are considered New York Life employees. (Id. at ¶ 3). After three years, TAS agents are deemed fully trained and become Established Agents. (Id. at ¶ 3). Established Agents are treated as independent contractors, and must produce a certain level of sales to maintain their contracts. (Id. at ¶¶ 4-5).
Plaintiff signed an "Apprentice Field Underwriter's Agreement" on August 25, 1980, which provided a salary of $600.00 per month. (Pl.Ex. 31). The Agreement states that it "shall commence on the effective date stated above and terminate at the end of the third Contract Year, as defined in this Agreement, or earlier in accordance with its provisions." While the August 25, 1980 Agreement was in effect, plaintiff was considered a New York Life employee, "subject to its direction and control," and was obligated to "diligently study the NYLIC Training Courses, fulfill the Company's requirements in connection therewith, comply with any other educational and training requirements of the Company, and keep such records and make such reports as may be required." (Id.).
Apparently, it did not take plaintiff three years to learn how to be an agent, because he signed an "Agent's Contract" on October 5, 1981. (Pl.Ex. 33). Paragraph 5 of that contract states:
[N]either the term `agent,' used in this contract solely for convenience in designating one of the parties, nor anything contained in this contract or in any of the rules or regulations of the corporation, shall be construed as creating the relationship of employer or employer and employee between the corporation and the agent.
(Pl.Ex. 33; see Pl. Dep. Tr. at 35, 62, 123).
In 1983, plaintiff signed a "Registered Representative's Agreement" enabling him to solicit applications for the New York Life Variable Contracts Corporation ("VCC") in addition to New York Life. (Pl.Ex. 35). The Registered Representative's Agreement provided that plaintiff's Agent's Contract "shall continue in full force and effect according to [its] terms and nothing herein shall be construed as relieving the agents from responsibilities under such contracts." (Id.). The Registered Representative's Agreement also stated that in agreeing to submit to the supervision of VCC "the agent will, nevertheless, be considered to be and act at all times as an independent contractor under contract with the VCC, the Company and NYLIAC and not as an employee of either VCC, the Company, or NYLIAC, except that nothing in this Agreement shall be considered as altering the relationship of an agent designated as an employee as a result of any applicable training allowance agreements." (Id.).
After 1983, New York Life did not withhold any state, local, or federal income taxes from plaintiff. (Pl. Dep. Tr. at 62-3). Plaintiff acknowledges that commissions were "the only thing we [we]re paid," except for a fluctuating monthly paycheck based on previous policies. (Id. at 63).
Plaintiff's contract did not require him to work at New York Life's offices and he was not required to work a 40-hour week. (Id. at 47, 56). Plaintiff did receive referrals and projects from New York Life, but he could refuse those projects at any time. (Id. at 54-6). Plaintiff did not have paid vacation, holidays, or sick leave. (Id. at 47-48). From 1996 until 1999 plaintiff rented space from New York Life. (Id. at 53). Prior to 1996 plaintiff shared an office at New York Life's corporate offices. (Id.). During his entire career as an agent, he had to pay for his own telephone expenses, postage, stationery, office supplies, computer, business cards, and travel expenses. (Id. at 48-52). He also paid an equipment charge for photocopying. (Id. at 48). New York Life did not place any prohibitions on plaintiff's ability to hire a secretary or other clerical assistants, and plaintiff used temporary workers without getting clearance from New York Life. (Id. at 57, 61).
Plaintiff developed diabetes in 1996. Plaintiff believes that his diabetes developed due to the stress of a class action suit in which he was named a defendant. (Id. at 104). While plaintiff's physician has not linked the diabetes to the lawsuit, he did say that it was related to the stress of plaintiff's job. (Id. at 104). On March 28, 1997, plaintiff's doctor wrote a note to New York Life describing plaintiff's diabetes. (Id. at 106). The note stated:
Joseph Anyan has been followed in my office for uncontrolled diabetes and hypertension since 11/96. He is currently taking the following medications: Glucotrol XL, two tab daily; Glucophage, 500 milligram, one tab twice daily; Vasotec, 20 milligram, one tab daily.
(Pl.Ex. 41; Pl. Dep. Tr. at 108).
The medication "didn't start controlling everything immediately; it took time." (Id. at 107). Plaintiff gave the note to a managing partner for inclusion in his file. Plaintiff "wanted her to know that I am not going to operate on full speed because I can't—I can't travel, from when I had appointments, by the time I go to the train station, I need a bathroom, you know, things like that." (Id. at 107). That managing partner left New York Life, but plaintiff believed that "this thing [the note] should have been available to any new managing partner." (Id. at 111). Plaintiff is uncertain whether the next managing partner knew of the note's existence, but the next partner did inquire into plaintiff's health and knew that plaintiff was sick. (Id. at 113).
Managing Partner George Gordon ("Gordon"), who plaintiff alleges was primarily responsible for his discharge, was not aware of plaintiff's diabetes before plaintiff's contract was terminated, but plaintiff contends that Gordon "should have known" about plaintiff's diabetes because Gordon's predecessor knew plaintiff was "sick," and because plaintiff applied for an insurance policy and was declined because of his high blood sugar. (Gordon Dep. Tr. at 80, 130; Pl. Dep. Tr. at 115, 170, 243-46). As discussed below, however, Gordon was not transferred to New York until 1999, approximately two years after the doctor's note was written.
Plaintiff's contract with New York Life did make him eligible for a personal incapacity benefit, or "PIC." These PICs "compensate[] agents when, because of illness or injury, they are not able to work as a New York Life agent." (Decl. of Sophia Magrath at ¶ 4). To receive a PIC, the agent must fill out a PIC application form and the agent's physician must complete an attending physician's statement. (Id. at ¶ 6). After review, if the agent is approved for a PIC the agent will receive PIC income. According to New York Life's records, plaintiff never applied for a PIC. (Id. at ¶ 7).
To maintain their contracts with New York Life, Established Agents must make a certain amount of sales pursuant to the Contract Maintenance Standard, or "production standard." (Anderson-Miller Decl. at ¶ 5). Established Agents who meet the requisite level of sales are known as "proactive" agents. (Id. at ¶ 6). These production standards apply to all agents, and are established and published annually by the agency department. (Id. at 7-8).
The production standard for 1998 and 1999 was set at $22,000 in first year commissions ("FYCs"). (Id. at 9). An agent who failed to make sufficient sales in 1998 would be placed on quarterly probation in which he would have to meet the "proactive" levels set for the next year and every quarter on a pro-rata basis. (Id. at ¶ 8; Pl. Dep. Tr. at 217). Therefore, an agent who did not make $22,000 in FYCs by December 31, 1998 would be placed in probation in early 1999...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Hawana v. City of New York
...that he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Thus, the claim would be abandoned in any event. Anyan v. New York Life Ins. Co., 192 F.Supp.2d 228, 237 (S.D.N.Y.2002).2 Any claims of discrimination for events that occurred more than 300 days before the plaintiff's complaint to the E......
-
Tomney v. International Center for Disabled
..."some" evidence, but must produce sufficient evidence to support a rational jury verdict in her favor); Anyan v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 192 F.Supp.2d 228, 237-38 (S.D.N.Y.2002). Plaintiff's counsel admits that the disproportionality evidence is "not as encompassing as it might be," but argues ......
-
Siani v. State Univ. of N.Y. at Farmingdale
...under the NYHRL generally entail an analysis of whether the defendant had “sufficient authority and power.” Anyan v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 192 F.Supp.2d 228, 239 n. 3 (S.D.N.Y.2002). In an abundance of caution, however, the Court will assume that each individual defendant had such authority, ......
-
Browning v. Ceva Freight, LLC
...The ability to reject assignments without penalty can support a finding of independent contractor status. See Anyan v. New York Life Ins. Co., 192 F.Supp.2d 228, 239 (S.D.N.Y.2002); Barak v. Chen, 87 A.D.3d 955, 929 N.Y.S.2d 315 (2nd Dep't 2011) (considering fact that drivers had discretion......