Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp.

Citation126 S. Ct. 1991,164 L. Ed. 2d 720,547 U.S. 451
Decision Date05 June 2006
Docket NumberNo. 04-433.,04-433.
PartiesANZA et al. <I>v.</I> IDEAL STEEL SUPPLY CORP.
CourtUnited States Supreme Court

The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) prohibits certain conduct involving a "pattern of racketeering activity," 18 U. S. C. § 1962, and makes a private right of action available to "[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation" of RICO's substantive restrictions, § 1964(c), provided that the alleged violation was the proximate cause of the injury, Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corporation, 503 U. S. 258, 268. Respondent Ideal Steel Supply Corporation (Ideal) has stores in Queens and the Bronx. Petitioner National Steel Supply, Inc. (National), owned by petitioners Joseph and Vincent Anza, has stores in the same locations and is Ideal's principal competitor. Ideal filed suit in the District Court, claiming that National failed to charge New York's sales tax to cash-paying customers, allowing it to reduce its prices without affecting its profit margin; and that it submitted fraudulent state tax returns to conceal the conduct, which involved committing mail and wire fraud, both forms of "racketeering activity" under RICO. Ideal alleged that the Anzas violated § 1962(c), which forbids conducting or participating in the conduct of an enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity. It also claimed that all the petitioners violated § 1962(a)—which makes it unlawful for a person "to use or invest" income derived from a pattern of racketeering activity in an enterprise engaged in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce—when they used funds generated by the fraudulent tax scheme to open National's Bronx location, causing Ideal to lose business and market share. The District Court granted petitioners' motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), concluding that Ideal had not shown reliance on petitioners' misrepresentations, as required in RICO mail and wire fraud claims. Vacating, the Second Circuit held, with regard to the § 1962(c) claim, that a complaint alleging a pattern of racketeering activity designed to give a defendant a competitive advantage adequately pleaded proximate cause even where the scheme depended on fraudulent communications made to a third party; and held that Ideal adequately pleaded its § 1962(a) claim by alleging injury resulting from petitioners' use and investment of racketeering proceeds.

Held:

1. Ideal cannot maintain its § 1962(c) claim. Under Holmes, proximate cause for § 1964(c) purposes requires "some direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged." 503 U. S., at 268. The direct victim of the alleged RICO violation is the State of New York, not Ideal. Ideal's claim is too attenuated to satisfy Holmes' requirement of directness. This result is confirmed by the directness requirement's underlying premises, one of which is the difficulty that can arise when a court attempts to ascertain the damages caused by some remote action. Ideal claims lost sales because of National's decreased prices, but National could have lowered prices for reasons unrelated to the asserted tax fraud, and Ideal's lost sales could have resulted from other factors as well. The attenuated connection between Ideal's injury and the Anzas' injurious conduct thus implicates fundamental concerns expressed in Holmes. Further illustrating the absence of proximate cause is the speculative nature of the proceedings that would follow if Ideal were permitted to maintain its claim. A court would have to calculate the portion of National's price drop attributable to the pattern of racketeering activity and then calculate the portion of lost sales attributable to the relevant part of the price drop, but Holmes' proximate causation element was meant to prevent such intricate, uncertain inquiries from overrunning RICO litigation. A direct causal connection is especially warranted where the immediate victims can be expected to vindicate the laws by pursuing their own claims. Contrary to the Second Circuit's rationale, a RICO plaintiff cannot circumvent the proximate-cause requirement simply by claiming that the defendant's aim was to increase market share at a competitor's expense. Because Ideal has not satisfied that requirement, this Court has no occasion to address the substantial question whether a plaintiff asserting a RICO claim predicated on mail or wire fraud must show that it relied on the defendant's misrepresentations. Pp. 456-461.

2. The Second Circuit's judgment with respect to Ideal's § 1962(a) claim is vacated so that court can determine on remand whether petitioners' alleged § 1962(a) violation proximately caused Ideal's asserted injuries. Pp. 461-462.

373 F. 3d 251, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.

KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and STEVENS, SCALIA, SOUTER, GINSBURG, and ALITO, JJ., joined, and in which THOMAS, J., joined as to Part III. SCALIA, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 462. THOMAS, J., post, p. 463, and BREYER, J., post, p. 479, filed opinions concurring in part and dissenting in part.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

David C. Frederick argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Richard L. Huffman, William M. Brodsky, and V. David Rivkin.

Kevin P. Roddy argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.*

JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U. S. C. §§ 1961-1968 (2000 ed. and Supp. III), prohibits certain conduct involving a "pattern of racketeering activity." § 1962 (2000 ed.). One of RICO's enforcement mechanisms is a private right of action, available to "[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation" of RICO's substantive restrictions. § 1964(c).

In Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corporation, 503 U. S. 258, 268 (1992), this Court held that a plaintiff may sue under § 1964(c) only if the alleged RICO violation was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury. The instant case requires us to apply the principles discussed in Holmes to a dispute between two competing businesses.

I

Because this case arises from a motion to dismiss, we accept as true the factual allegations in the amended complaint. See Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U. S. 163, 164 (1993).

Respondent Ideal Steel Supply Corporation (Ideal) sells steel mill products along with related supplies and services. It operates two store locations in New York, one in Queens and the other in the Bronx. Petitioner National Steel Supply Inc. (National), owned by petitioners Joseph and Vincent Anza, is Ideal's principal competitor. National offers a similar array of products and services, and it, too, operates one store in Queens and one in the Bronx.

Ideal sued petitioners in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. It claimed petitioners were engaged in an unlawful racketeering scheme aimed at "gain[ing] sales and market share at Ideal's expense." App. 7. According to Ideal, National adopted a practice of failing to charge the requisite New York sales tax to cashpaying customers, even when conducting transactions that were not exempt from sales tax under state law. This practice allowed National to reduce its prices without affecting its profit margin. Petitioners allegedly submitted fraudulent tax returns to the New York State Department of Taxation and Finance in an effort to conceal their conduct.

Ideal's amended complaint contains, as relevant here, two RICO claims. The claims assert that petitioners, by submitting the fraudulent tax returns, committed various acts of mail fraud (when they sent the returns by mail) and wire fraud (when they sent them electronically). See 18 U. S. C. §§ 1341, 1343 (2000 ed., Supp. III). Mail fraud and wire fraud are forms of "racketeering activity" for purposes of RICO. § 1961(1)(B). Petitioners' conduct allegedly constituted a "pattern of racketeering activity," see § 1961(5) (2000 ed.), because the fraudulent returns were submitted on an ongoing and regular basis.

Ideal asserts in its first cause of action that Joseph and Vincent Anza violated § 1962(c), which makes it unlawful for "any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt." The complaint states that the Anzas' goal, which they achieved, was to give National a competitive advantage over Ideal.

The second cause of action is asserted against all three petitioners. It alleges a violation of § 1962(a), which makes it unlawful for any person who has received income derived from a pattern of racketeering activity "to use or invest" that income "in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of," an enterprise engaged in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce. As described in the complaint, petitioners used funds generated by their fraudulent tax scheme to open National's Bronx location. The opening of this new facility caused Ideal to lose "significant business and market share." App. 18.

Petitioners moved to dismiss Ideal's complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 9(b). The District Court granted the Rule 12(b)(6) motion, holding that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court began from the proposition that to assert a RICO claim predicated on mail fraud or wire fraud, a plaintiff must have relied on the defendant's misrepresentations. Ideal not having alleged that it...

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