Anzaldua v. Band
Decision Date | 09 June 1998 |
Docket Number | Docket Nos. 106469,No. 12,106471,12 |
Citation | 578 N.W.2d 306,457 Mich. 530 |
Parties | , 126 Ed. Law Rep. 379, 14 IER Cases 320 Sharon ANZALDUA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Rudolph Neal BAND, Defendant-Appellant, and Michigan State University, Defendant-Appellee. Sharon ANZALDUA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Rudolph Neal BAND, Defendant-Appellee, and Michigan State University, Defendant-Appellant. Calendar |
Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Green, Green & Craig, P.C. by Christine A. Green, Ann Arbor, for plaintiff-appellee.
Fraser, Trebilcock, Davis & Foster, P.C. by Michael E. Cavanaugh, Mark R. Fox, and Graham K. Crabtree, Lansing, for defendant-appellant Band.
Michael J. Kiley, East Lansing, for defendant-appellant Michigan State University.
Butzel Long by Leonard M. Niehoff and John C. Blattner, Ann Arbor, Scott P. Hill-Kennedy, Big Rapids, Elizabeth M. Barry, Gloria A. Hage, Ann Arbor, and Daniel J. Bernard, Detroit, amici curiae, for Ferris State University, University of Michigan, and Wayne State University.
Clark, Hill, P.L.C. by Duane L. Tarnacki and J. Walker Henry, Detroit, amici curiae, for Michigan Manufacturers Association.
Roy, Shecter, Mirer & Vocht, P.C. by Jeanne Mirer, Bloomfield Hills, amici curiae, for Michigan Trial Lawyers Association.
Rentrop, Vanderkloot, Haynes & Morrison, P.C. by Jeffrey K. Haynes and C. Thomas Ludden, Bloomfield Hills, amici curiae, for Michigan Environmental Council.
We granted leave in this case to decide whether there is a right to trial by jury in an action under the Whistleblowers' Protection Act. M.C.L. § 15.361 et seq.; M.S.A. § 17.428(1) et seq. If the right does exist, does it obtain when the defendant is the state or one of its political subdivisions? We hold that the act contains a right to a jury trial, and that the right exists in suits against the state of Michigan and its subdivisions. We thus affirm the result reached by the Court of Appeals, but for a different reason.
Plaintiff began an action under the Whistleblowers' Protection Act in circuit court against Michigan State University and Professor Rudolph Band. She alleged that her contract as a research laboratory worker had not been renewed because she had complained to the university's Environmental Affairs Office about conditions in a university laboratory. The circuit court granted a defense motion to strike the plaintiff's jury demand.
Plaintiff filed an application for leave to appeal. The Court of Appeals granted the application and held that there is a right to a jury trial in an action brought under the act. 216 Mich.App. 561, 550 N.W.2d 544 (1996). It held, also, that the right to jury trial exists even when the defendant is a state entity. We granted defendants' applications for leave to appeal. 456 Mich. 864, 568 N.W.2d 683, 684 (1997).
This Court is asked to review the Court of Appeals reversal of the trial court's decision to deny plaintiff a jury. The trial court granted defendants' motion to strike plaintiff's jury demand because it determined that the act provided no right to a jury trial. Defendants pose a question of law, which we review de novo. Cardinal Mooney High School v. Michigan High School Athletic Ass'n, 437 Mich. 75, 80, 467 N.W.2d 21 (1991).
The Legislature designed the Whistleblowers' Protection Act to protect the public from unlawful conduct by corporations and government bodies. 1 The act protects the public by removing barriers to the reporting of violations of law by employees. Dolan v. Continental Airlines, 454 Mich. 373, 379, 563 N.W.2d 23 (1997). It defines "employees" to include essentially all workers except those in state classified civil service. M.C.L. § 15.361(a); M.S.A. § 17.428(1)(a). It governs "employers." Under subsection 1(b), the state and its political subdivisions are to be considered employers for its purposes. M.C.L. § 15.361(b); M.S.A. § 17.428(1)(b). The act forbids employers from retaliating against employees who report, or are about to report, violations of the law. M.C.L. § 15.362; M.S.A. § 17.428(2).
Section 3 describes the steps to be taken by employees who believe that their employers have not complied with the act:
(1) A person who alleges a violation of this act may bring a civil action for appropriate injunctive relief, or actual damages, or both within 90 days after the occurrence of the alleged violation of this act.
(2) An action commenced pursuant to subsection (1) may be brought in the circuit court for the county where the alleged violation occurred, the county where the complainant resides, or the county where the person against whom the civil complaint is filed resides or has his or her principal place of business.
(3) As used in subsection (1), "damages" means damages for injury or loss caused by each violation of this act, including reasonable attorney fees. [M.C.L. § 15.363; M.S.A. § 17.428(3).]
Section 4 delineates the potential remedies that are available to a successful claimant:
A court, in rendering a judgment in an action brought pursuant to this act, shall order, as the court considers appropriate, reinstatement of the employee, the payment of back wages, full reinstatement of fringe benefits and seniority rights, actual damages, or any combination of these remedies. A court may also award the complainant all or a portion of the costs of litigation, including reasonable attorney fees and witness fees, if the court determines that the award is appropriate. [M.C.L. § 15.364; M.S.A. § 17.428(4).]
The foremost rule of statutory construction is to discern and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. Murphy v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co., 447 Mich. 93, 98, 523 N.W.2d 310 (1994). See also Nation v. WDE Electric Co., 454 Mich. 489, 494, 563 N.W.2d 233 (1997). If statutory language is clear and unambiguous, lawmakers must have intended the meaning they clearly expressed, and the statute must be enforced as written. No further construction is required or permitted. Tryc v. Michigan Veterans' Facility, 451 Mich. 129, 135, 545 N.W.2d 642 (1996). See also Western Michigan Univ. Bd. of Control v. Michigan, 455 Mich. 531, 565 N.W.2d 828 (1997).
There is no express provision in the Whistleblowers' Protection Act specifying whether an action brought under it is to be tried before a jury or before a judge sitting without a jury. On the basis of this silence, the dissent would hold that no jury right is available in Whistleblowers' Protection Act actions. The dissent suggests that the Legislatures failure to specifically state that a jury right exists means the Legislature did not intend Whistleblowers suits to be tried by a jury. We disagree both with the rule suggested by the dissent and the dissent's analysis of the jury issue.
The rule suggested by the dissent is inappropriate in this case. It could be used alternatively to support a conclusion that the jury right is given, or that it has been withheld. As the dissent suggests, it is clear the Legislature knows how to expressly provide that an action is to be tried to a jury. It is also clear that the Legislature knows how to provide that an action is to be tried to a judge. For example, in the Employee Right to Know Act, 2 the Legislature specifically stated that the court was to "award" damages. One could apply the dissent's rule to the case at hand and legitimately reach the opposite conclusion from the dissent's: given that the Legislature knew how to provide that the court should "award" damages, but did not, it did not intend for a judge to decide that issue.
Defendants argue that the Legislature's use of "court" rather than "court or jury" is determinative. We disagree. What is important in understanding the Legislature's intent is not that it used the word "court" instead of "jury," but, rather, what it provided that the "court" should do. The Legislature described the court's role in WPA actions in terms of "render[ing] a judgment," not in terms of "awarding damages." The expressions are not interchangeable; "awarding damages" and "render[ing] a judgment" have different meanings.
When a court renders a judgment, it is entering an order based on previously decided issues of fact. 3 "Rendering judgment" does not mean the judge is making a determination of the entitlement of a party to an award of actual damages. Instead, it is the procedural step the judge takes after the factfinder has made that determination. 4
The difference in the terms is made clear by the statute itself. The WPA provides that the court is to "award attorney fees." Deciding the entitlement to an award of attorney fees has traditionally been the job of a judge, not a jury. Because the act provides that the court should award attorney fees, it is clear that the Legislature intended that a judge should decide whether a party is entitled to fees, and in what amount.
The defendants in the case before us argue that the remedies available in § 4 of the act indicate that a judge, rather than a jury, should decide factual issues. Section 4 empowers a court to order any of several equitable remedies: reinstatement, back pay, reinstatement of fringe benefits and seniority, or a combination of them.
Defendants argue that the act provides for an equitable proceeding, only. They urge the Court to adopt the reasoning of a federal district court that construed all actions under the Ohio Whistleblowers' Protection Act to be equitable proceedings. Rheinecker v. Forest Laboratories, Inc., 813 F.Supp. 1307 (S.D.Ohio, 1993). Defendants and amici curiae urge that the use of the word "court" in § 3 of the act is determinative. 5 This, too comes from Rheinecker, because the court there opined that the legislature would have used the word "jury" had it intended a jury to hear claims under the act. However, as the court stated, its decision was based not only on the absence of the word "jury," but, also, on the remedies that the...
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