AP Hopkins Corp. v. Studebaker Corp., Onan Division

• Decision Date: 15 May 1974
• Docket Number: No. 73-1611.,73-1611.
• Citation: 496 F.2d 969
• Parties: A. P. HOPKINS CORPORATION, a Michigan corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STUDEBAKER CORPORATION, ONAN DIVISION, a Michigan corporation, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

496 F.2d 969 (1974)

A. P. HOPKINS CORPORATION, a Michigan corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STUDEBAKER CORPORATION, ONAN DIVISION, a Michigan corporation, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 73-1611.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued February 5, 1974.

Decided May 15, 1974.

Philip A. Gillis, Detroit, Mich., for plaintiff-appellant.

Carson C. Grunewald, Detroit, Mich., for defendants-appellees; Bodman, Longley, Bogle, Armstrong & Dahling, Detroit, Mich., on brief.

Before McCREE, MILLER and ENGEL, Circuit Judges.

WILLIAM E. MILLER, Circuit Judge.

This action was instituted in the court below by appellant, A. P. Hopkins Corporation, against appellees, Studebaker Corporation, Onan Division, Carroll-Stuart Corporation, Arthur B. Stuart, Stewart R. Kaufman and Harry M. Hennequin, to recover trebel damages for alleged violations of federal antitrust laws. 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1 et seq.

Studebaker Corporation, Onan Division, is a manufacturer of engine driven generators, parts and accessories, which are sold throughout the country to selected distributors. Appellant had been a distributor of Onan products from 1958 to 1965, in the eastern half of lower Michigan, selling both plants (generators) and parts. Its distributorship, however, was terminated by Onan on May 28, 1965, effective July 1st of that year. It was succeeded by appellee, Carroll-Stuart Corporation, as the Onan distributor in the same area. Appellee, Arthur Stuart, was one of the incorporators of the Carroll-Stuart Corporation, and appellees, Kaufman and Hennequin, were former employees of the appellant who became employees of Carroll-Stuart upon its formation as an Onan distributor. The gravamen of appellant's claim was that in cancelling the distributorship Onan entered into a conspiracy with appellees and others to destroy appellant as a competitor of Carroll-Stuart. In order to effectuate the alleged conspiracy appellant claimed that there were four "means adopted" by the appellees:

(1) Interference by Onan with appellant\'s customers and contracts;

(2) The hiring away of appellant\'s employees by Carroll-Stuart;

(3) The illegal refusal of appellees and Onan\'s agents and distributors to sell Onan products to appellants; and

(4) The alleged imposition by Onan of illegal territorial restrictions upon its distributors.

The action was tried by the district judge without a jury. The proceeding occupied 16 trial days and involved 20 witnesses and a large number of exhibits. The transcript of the trial, excluding a number of depositions which were introduced in evidence, extended to 1,967 pages. After the case was briefed and argued and proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law were submitted, the district judge rendered an exhaustive memorandum opinion (consisting of 36 pages), dated December 29, 1972, in which he analyzed with meticulous care and in great detail all of the contentions of the appellant and concluded that the claim of antitrust violations was not supported by the evidence. Accordingly, judgment was entered dismissing the action. More specifically, the district judge in his opinion found that while there was some conflict in the evidence the appellant had failed to meet its burden of proof in the establishment of a conspiracy in violation of the antitrust laws.

After a careful examination of the entire record, including the comprehensive opinion of the district judge, we are of the view that his findings of fact are not clearly erroneous, and that his conclusions of law are consistent with apposite and controlling decisions of the Supreme Court.

Indeed, other than the general contention that the district court's findings of fact relative to the alleged conspiracy, and the alleged means for effectuating it, were clearly erroneous, (a contention which apparently is not seriously advanced on appeal) the appellant makes only two contentions. First, it is contended that the district court, having reserved ruling pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on the appellee's motion to dismiss at the conclusion of the appellant's case, erroneously dismissed the action at the conclusion of all of the proof in the case by considering only the proof offered by the appellant without taking into account the entire evidence at the trial. For its position on this point appellant relies upon A & N Club v. Great American Insurance Co., 404 F.2d 100, 104 fn. 3, (CA6, 1968); King & Shuler Corp. v. Petitioning Creditors, 427 F.2d 689, 690 (CA9, 1970); and United States v. Doyle, 468 F.2d 633 (CA10, 1972). We are in agreement with the proposition of law advanced by the appellant that under such circumstances the trier of facts should look to the entire evidence in deciding the case on its merits. Also we agree that there are isolated statements in the district court's opinion which may be interpreted as indicating that the court looked only to the evidence introduced by the appellant in its final disposition of the action. Yet, when the lengthy opinion is scrutinized in its entirety, it is evident that the court did in fact consider all of the evidence in the case. Thus, after finding that the evidence was insufficient to establish an antitrust conspiracy, the court stated:

In addition we note that defendants\' case was supportive of this result. As indicated above in the statement of facts, much of the testimony introduced by defendants gave additional business reasons for the decisions of these distributors to discontinue sales to plaintiff. Thus, in considering the case upon all the evidence we reach the same conclusion.

In any event,...