Apodaca v. Lueras.

Citation34 N.M. 121,278 P. 197
Decision Date15 May 1929
Docket NumberNo. 3322.,3322.
PartiesAPODACAv.LUERAS.
CourtSupreme Court of New Mexico

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Syllabus by the Court.

Section 4197, Code of 1915, requires the trial court, in cases heard without a jury, to make findings of fact and conclusions of law sufficiently specific to enable this court to review the action of the trial court; and findings too general to enable this court to test the correctness of the judgment below do not satisfy the requirements of the statute.

The term “ultimate fact,” as used with reference to findings, means the essential and determining facts on which the court's conclusion was reached; the basic and controlling facts, without finding which the court could not correctly apply the law in rendering judgment.

Application to the court to make specific findings of fact is, of itself, sufficient to put the trial court on notice that the applicant wishes to make and preserve his record for review and to negative any waiver of compliance with the statute.

Request for specific findings, even though rejected, amounts also to a request for compliance with the provisions of section 4197, supra.

Where trial court rejects all specific findings tendered, it is error for it to fail to make findings in conformity with the statute, although no other request was made than applicant's request for the rejected findings.

Appeal from District Court, Bernalillo County; Ryan, Judge.

Action by Jose Rafael Apodaca against Nepumuceno Lueras. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Reversed and remanded for a new trial.

Application to the court to make specific findings of fact is, of itself, sufficient to put the trial court on notice that the applicant wishes to make and preserve his record for review and to negative any waiver of compliance with the statute.

Brown & La Follette, of Albuquerque, for appellant.

Dennis Chavez, of Albuquerque, for appellee.

SIMMS, J.

From a judgment in favor of plaintiff, appellee here, rendered by the trial court sitting without a jury, for the sum of $875 compensatory and $500 additional as punitive damages, by reason of personal injuries sustained in a collision between plaintiff's bicycle and defendant's automobile, defendant appeals.

Errors assigned by the appellant have been treated by him in his brief under four general headings, to wit: (a) That the plaintiff was guilty of negligence per se in riding his bicycle after dark without a light, in violation of a city ordinance. (b) That under the facts of this case, punitive damages should not have been awarded. (c) That the plaintiff's negligence was the sole and proximate cause of the injury. (d) That the trial court erred in failing to make findings of fact in this cause, after refusing the appellant's requested findings.

Appellant has briefed and argued all four of his points, while the appellee has confined his reply to (a), (b), and (c) only, and in his brief we find no mention made of (d), which is the decisive and vital question in this case, and a discussion of which will render examination of the other three questions unnecessary.

[1][2] In this case, where jury was waived, the learned trial judge made no findings whatever, but, after overruling the twenty requests of appellant for specific findings, entered judgment against the appellant for compensatory and punitive damages, as above stated. The only findings or conclusions which might be said to be contained in the judgment itself are in general terms, as follows:

“And the Court, knowing the law and the facts, orders that judgment be entered herein in favor of the plaintiff in accordance therewith.”

In Luna v. Cerrillos Coal Railroad Co., 16 N. M. 71, 113 P. 831, the only finding made was the general finding in the judgment, as we have in the present case. There, appellant had requested findings which the court had refused to make. In reversing the cause, the court said:

“The findings made amount to no more by way of information to this Court than would a verdict of not guilty, if the case had gone to a jury. We should have to search through the record of upwards of four hundred pages, to determine whether it contains anything which will support the judgment of the District Court, and, having done that, we should still be in the dark as to whether what we might conclude to be the determining facts are those which the trial court treated as such; or, in other words, whether we are reviewing the findings of fact really made by the trial court, or substituting others made by ourselves. In effect, the findings made are conclusions of law from the facts which must have been found by the trial court in order to reach the conclusions announced, but which are not disclosed. * * * We conclude, then, that this court must either retry the case on all the evidence in the record, or remand it for specific findings of fact. Even if we were disposed to take the former course, and had the right to take it, it would not be just to the parties, since we should lack the great aid to judgment on the value of evidence, as to material facts in the case, which the trial court had through the presence before it of the witnesses as they gave the evidence.”

See, also, Morrow v. Martinez, 27 N. M. 356, 200 P. 1071; Merrick v. Deering, 30 N. M. 431, 236 P. 735; and Springer Ditch Co. v. Wright, 31 N. M. 460, 247 P. 270.

Tested by the foregoing authorities, what do we find in the case before us? First, we find an award of punitive damages in a substantial sum of money. An examination of the entire testimony discloses nothing which, on the face of the testimony, could justify such an award. But it may have been that the manner and demeanor of the witnesses as they gave their testimony caused the trial court to believe that maliciously inflicted injury was proven. How can we tell what was in the trial judge's mind as a result of the testimony, where he made no findings? Again, a question arose as to whether it was dark at the time of the accident, so as to make material the question of appellee's failure to carry a light on his bicycle. How dark was it? We cannot tell what the trial court believed about it without a finding on the question. As to both the above matters, and as to others, appellant tendered specific findings, which were refused. There the court stopped, without making findings sufficiently specific to enable us to examine into these matters. It is just such a condition of affairs that our statute was enacted to prevent. Section 4197, Codification of 1915, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:

“Upon the trial of any question of fact by the court, its decision must be given in writing and filed with the clerk in the cause, and in such decision the court shall find the facts and give its conclusions of law pertinent to the case, which must be stated separately, but the finding of facts and the giving of conclusions of law may be waived by the several parties to the issue, by suffering default or by failing to appear at the trial, or by consent in writing, or by oral consent in open court, entered in the record. And upon the trial of any cause by the court, without a jury in common law cases, each party shall have the right to make all objections and take all exceptions that he might have made or taken, as if the...

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18 cases
  • Galvan v. Miller
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of New Mexico
    • August 26, 1968
    ...* * *' Thompson v. Zachry Co., supra; Brundage v. K. L. House Construction Company, 74 N.M. 613, 396 P.2d 731 (1964); Apodaca v. Lueras, 34 N.M. 121, 278 P. 197 (1929). E. E. Miller argues that although the trial court mentioned 'influence' several times in its findings, the only reference ......
  • Brundage v. K. L. House Const. Co.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of New Mexico
    • November 16, 1964
    ...Paulos v. Janetakos, 46 N.M. 390, 129 P.2d 636, 142 A.L.R. 1237; Star Realty v. Sellers, 73 N.M. 207, 387 P.2d 319; Apodaca v. Lueras, 34 N.M. 121, 278 P. 197. The workmen's compensation statute prescribes as a condition to a compensable injury that it arise out of and in the course of the ......
  • State Nat. Bank of El Paso v. Cantrell.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of New Mexico
    • June 22, 1942
    ...of Town of Torreon v. Garcia et al., 32 N.M. 124, 252 P. 478; De Lost v. Phelps Dodge Corporation, 33 N.M. 15, 261 P. 811; Apodaca v. Lueras, 34 N.M. 121, 278 P. 197; Harris & Maldonado v. Sperry, 35 N.M. 52, 290 P. 1022; Moore v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 36 N.M. 153, 9 P.2d 692; Lopez v. To......
  • Tabet Lumber Co. v. Chalamidas
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of New Mexico
    • October 1, 1971
    ...of a direct finding to the contrary. State Nat. Bank of El Paso, Tex. v. Cantrell, 46 N.M. 268, 127 P.2d 246 (1942); Apodaca v. Lueras, 34 N.M. 121, 278 P. 197 (1929). If these two decisions are still valid, it would seem that the trial court should have made findings of fact in connection ......
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