Apodaca v. Lueras.
Citation | 34 N.M. 121,278 P. 197 |
Decision Date | 15 May 1929 |
Docket Number | No. 3322.,3322. |
Parties | APODACAv.LUERAS. |
Court | Supreme Court of New Mexico |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Syllabus by the Court.
Section 4197, Code of 1915, requires the trial court, in cases heard without a jury, to make findings of fact and conclusions of law sufficiently specific to enable this court to review the action of the trial court; and findings too general to enable this court to test the correctness of the judgment below do not satisfy the requirements of the statute.
The term “ultimate fact,” as used with reference to findings, means the essential and determining facts on which the court's conclusion was reached; the basic and controlling facts, without finding which the court could not correctly apply the law in rendering judgment.
Application to the court to make specific findings of fact is, of itself, sufficient to put the trial court on notice that the applicant wishes to make and preserve his record for review and to negative any waiver of compliance with the statute.
Request for specific findings, even though rejected, amounts also to a request for compliance with the provisions of section 4197, supra.
Where trial court rejects all specific findings tendered, it is error for it to fail to make findings in conformity with the statute, although no other request was made than applicant's request for the rejected findings.
Appeal from District Court, Bernalillo County; Ryan, Judge.
Action by Jose Rafael Apodaca against Nepumuceno Lueras. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Reversed and remanded for a new trial.
Application to the court to make specific findings of fact is, of itself, sufficient to put the trial court on notice that the applicant wishes to make and preserve his record for review and to negative any waiver of compliance with the statute.
Brown & La Follette, of Albuquerque, for appellant.
Dennis Chavez, of Albuquerque, for appellee.
From a judgment in favor of plaintiff, appellee here, rendered by the trial court sitting without a jury, for the sum of $875 compensatory and $500 additional as punitive damages, by reason of personal injuries sustained in a collision between plaintiff's bicycle and defendant's automobile, defendant appeals.
Errors assigned by the appellant have been treated by him in his brief under four general headings, to wit: (a) That the plaintiff was guilty of negligence per se in riding his bicycle after dark without a light, in violation of a city ordinance. (b) That under the facts of this case, punitive damages should not have been awarded. (c) That the plaintiff's negligence was the sole and proximate cause of the injury. (d) That the trial court erred in failing to make findings of fact in this cause, after refusing the appellant's requested findings.
Appellant has briefed and argued all four of his points, while the appellee has confined his reply to (a), (b), and (c) only, and in his brief we find no mention made of (d), which is the decisive and vital question in this case, and a discussion of which will render examination of the other three questions unnecessary.
[1][2] In this case, where jury was waived, the learned trial judge made no findings whatever, but, after overruling the twenty requests of appellant for specific findings, entered judgment against the appellant for compensatory and punitive damages, as above stated. The only findings or conclusions which might be said to be contained in the judgment itself are in general terms, as follows:
“And the Court, knowing the law and the facts, orders that judgment be entered herein in favor of the plaintiff in accordance therewith.”
In Luna v. Cerrillos Coal Railroad Co., 16 N. M. 71, 113 P. 831, the only finding made was the general finding in the judgment, as we have in the present case. There, appellant had requested findings which the court had refused to make. In reversing the cause, the court said:
See, also, Morrow v. Martinez, 27 N. M. 356, 200 P. 1071; Merrick v. Deering, 30 N. M. 431, 236 P. 735; and Springer Ditch Co. v. Wright, 31 N. M. 460, 247 P. 270.
Tested by the foregoing authorities, what do we find in the case before us? First, we find an award of punitive damages in a substantial sum of money. An examination of the entire testimony discloses nothing which, on the face of the testimony, could justify such an award. But it may have been that the manner and demeanor of the witnesses as they gave their testimony caused the trial court to believe that maliciously inflicted injury was proven. How can we tell what was in the trial judge's mind as a result of the testimony, where he made no findings? Again, a question arose as to whether it was dark at the time of the accident, so as to make material the question of appellee's failure to carry a light on his bicycle. How dark was it? We cannot tell what the trial court believed about it without a finding on the question. As to both the above matters, and as to others, appellant tendered specific findings, which were refused. There the court stopped, without making findings sufficiently specific to enable us to examine into these matters. It is just such a condition of affairs that our statute was enacted to prevent. Section 4197, Codification of 1915, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:
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