Aponte Matos v. Toledo Davila

• Decision Date: 03 December 1997
• Docket Number: No. 97-1645,97-1645
• Parties: Rafael APONTE MATOS, et al., Plaintiffs, Appellants, v. Pedro TOLEDO DVILA, et al., Defendants, Appellees. . Heard
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

Page 182

135 F.3d 182

Rafael APONTE MATOS, et al., Plaintiffs, Appellants, v. Pedro TOLEDO DVILA, et al., Defendants, Appellees.

No. 97-1645.

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

Heard Dec. 3, 1997.

Decided Feb. 3, 1998.

Rafael Castro Lang, San Juan, PR, with whom Marlene Aponte Cabrera, Hato Rey, PR, was on brief for appellants.

Sylvia Roger-Stefani, Assistant Solicitor General, Guaynabo, PR, with whom Carlos Lugo-Fiol, Puerto Rico Solicitor General, San Juan, PR, and Edda Serrano-Blasini, Deputy Solicitor General, Guaynabo, PR, were on brief for appellees Toledo-Davila, Zapata, Ortz-Daz, and Fernandez.

John F. Nevares, San Juan, PR, with whom Lizzie M. Portela, Paul B. Smith, and Smith & Nevares were on brief for appellees Haddock, Torres-Lebrn, Laboy-Escobar, Coln, and Nieves-Domnguez.

Isabel Munoz Acosta, Assistant United States Attorney, Guaynabo, PR, with whom Guillermo Gil, United States Attorney, Hato Rey, PR, was on brief for appellees Plichta and Ilario.

Before SELYA, STAHL, and LYNCH, Circuit Judges.

LYNCH, Circuit Judge.

A Puerto Rican family whose home was searched under a warrant authorizing a weapons search sued the intruding Puerto Rican and federal officers and their supervisors on various claims of violation of civil rights. The district court dismissed all claims against all defendants in a series of summary judgment orders. One argument made by plaintiffs on appeal leads us to reinstate a portion of their case.

Plaintiffs claim that the Puerto Rican police officer, Ernesto Laboy-Escobar, who filed the affidavit and swore to facts in support of the search warrant lied in doing so, fabricating the "facts" asserted in order to establish probable cause. Plaintiffs' evidence presents genuine disputes of fact as to whether the material representations made by Laboy in the warrant application were true or were fabricated. It has long been well established that such a material fabrication violates the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment. Further, we have no doubt that officers reasonably understand that they may not lie in order to establish probable cause in a warrant application. If plaintiffs are able to prove their claim at trial, Laboy will not be protected by qualified immunity.

Accordingly, it was error to enter summary judgment in favor of Laboy on that claim. But plaintiffs have not made any showing that others assisted or even knew of the alleged falsehoods, nor have plaintiffs provided facts to support the claim that the search itself was unreasonable. For these and other reasons the dismissal of all other defendants and all other claims is affirmed.

I.

Entry of summary judgment is reviewed de novo and we take the facts in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. See Acosta-Orozco v. Rodriguez-de-Rivera, 132 F.3d 97, 98(1st Cir.1997).

On December 6, 1993, plaintiffs Cruz Mara Andino Serrano (Andino Serrano) and her daughter Mara Aponte Andino (Aponte Andino) were at home in Ro Piedras, Puerto Rico, when Aponte Andino noticed several unmarked cars approaching the house. A group of people emerged from the cars and began walking toward the house. One member of the group had an ax; none was uniformed. Plaintiffs believed they were about to be robbed. Without identifying themselves as police officers, the individuals broke down the door to the house with the ax and entered. Only after plaintiffs begged the people not to kill them did the officers identify themselves as police and show the two women a search warrant for the house. The warrant authorized a search of plaintiffs' home for weapons, and nothing else.

The officers conducted the search in an efficient and orderly fashion, without the use of force. Several officers questioned the two women inside about whether there were large sums of drug money hidden inside the house. FBI Agent Michael Plichta also attempted to search the computer files to find evidence of drugs or drug money, but could not gain access to any files. The entire search lasted two hours, and failed to turn up evidence of illegal weapons, drugs, drug money, or, indeed, of any criminal activity. Another daughter, Iris Teresa Aponte Andino (Iris Teresa), returned and tried to enter the house. An officer outside refused to let Iris Teresa through the blockade.

In May of 1995, Aponte Andino, Andino Serrano, Rafael Aponte Matos (Andino Serrano's husband), and Iris Teresa filed this action for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and against the federal officials under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971). They alleged violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches.

Plaintiffs sued two groups of defendants. The first group is composed of the state and federal line officers who participated in the search: Puerto Rican Police Officers Ernesto Laboy-Escobar, Ernesto Torres Lebrn, Jimmy Coln, Zulma Fernandez, Ivan-Nieves Domnguez, and FBI Agent Michael Plichta. Plaintiffs alleged that these defendants violated plaintiffs' right to be free from unreasonable searches by fabricating facts to obtain the search warrant, conducting a search that exceeded the scope of the warrant, and using excessive force in carrying out the search. ¹

Plaintiffs sued the second group of defendants, the supervisors, alleging that they failed adequately to train and supervise the first group of defendants. This group of defendants included both state and federal supervisors: Puerto Rico Police Department (PRPD) Superintendent Pedro Toledo-Davila, PRPD Supervisor Carlos Haddock, PRPD Auxiliary Superintendent of Inspection and Disciplinary Affairs Jose Zapata, PRPD Lieutenant Juan Ortz-Daz, and FBI Director Lewis Freeh and an unidentified FBI supervisor named "Ilario." Plaintiffs alleged that these defendants knew that the officers involved in the search had records of violence, and that the supervisors had callously disregarded plaintiffs' constitutional rights by inadequately supervising their subordinates.

All defendants moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. On December 13, 1995, the district court granted in part Agent Plichta's motion for summary judgment, dismissing the claim that Plichta engaged in a "pretextual" search of plaintiffs' home. On May 29, 1996, the court entered partial judgment dismissing plaintiffs' claim that Plichta exceeded the scope of the warrant by searching plaintiffs' computer files. On July 22, 1996, the court entered partial judgment dismissing plaintiffs' claim against the unnamed federal supervisor "Ilario." On April 4, 1997, the court dismissed all the remaining claims against all defendants on qualified immunity grounds. Plaintiffs appeal all of these dismissals.

II.

Our review of the district court's grant of summary judgment is de novo. See St. Hilaire v. City of Laconia, 71 F.3d 20, 24 (1st Cir.1995). We will affirm if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In order to overcome defendants' motions for summary judgment, plaintiffs must come forward with "specific, provable facts which establish that there is a triable issue." Febus-Rodriguez v. Betancourt-Lebron, 14 F.3d 87, 91 (1st Cir.1994). For a dispute to be "genuine," there must be sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable trier of fact to resolve the issue in favor of the non-moving party. See United States v. One Parcel of Real Property, 960 F.2d 200, 204 (1st Cir.1992).

Qualified immunity protects both federal and state officials from liability for damages in a civil rights action if "a reasonable officer could have believed [his actions] to be lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information the [acting] officer[ ] possessed." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3040, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). There are two aspects to this standard. The first inquiry is whether the constitutional right asserted by plaintiffs was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. The second, if the right was clearly established, is whether a reasonable officer in the same situation would "have understood that the challenged conduct violated that established right." Hegarty v. Somerset County 53 F.3d 1367, 1373 (1st Cir.1995) (quoting Burns v. Loranger, 907 F.2d 233, 235-36 (1st Cir.1990)). If the first level of the analysis yields a determination that the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established at the relevant time, then we need not proceed to the second prong; there is qualified immunity. See Soto v. Flores, 103 F.3d 1056, 1064-65 (1st Cir.1997).

A. The Use of False Statements to Obtain a Search Warrant

In 1978, the Supreme Court held in Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978), that the use of false statements to obtain a warrant, where the false statements are necessary to the finding of probable cause, violates the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. As the Franks Court noted, the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment itself contemplates the affiant's truthfulness:

[N]o warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation.

438 U.S. at 164, 98 S.Ct. at 2681 (quoting U.S. Const. amend. IV).

Franks involved a challenge to a warrant in a criminal proceeding and set forth the elements of a challenge: there must be allegations of deliberate falsehood or of reckless disregard for the truth on the part of the affiant; these allegations must be supported by an affidavit or sworn or otherwise reliable statements; the allegations must point specifically to the portion of the warrant application claimed to be false and must have a statement of supporting reasons; and the material that is...