Aponte v. Fischer
| Decision Date | 20 April 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 14-CV-3989 (KMK),14-CV-3989 (KMK) |
| Parties | FELIX APONTE, Plaintiff, v. BRIAN FISCHER, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Appearances:
Felix Aponte
Stormville, NY
Pro se Plaintiff
Michael J. Keane, Esq.
Barbara Kathryn Hathaway, Esq.
New York State Office of the Attorney General
New York, NY
Pro se Plaintiff Felix Aponte ("Plaintiff"), currently incarcerated at Green Haven Correctional Facility ("Green Haven"), brings this Action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against Defendants, alleging that he was illegally detained in state prison outside of his criminal sentence term. 1 Before the Court is Defendants'Motion for Summary Judgment (the "Motion"). (See Not. of Mot. (Dkt. No. 115).) For the reasons explained herein, the Motion is partially granted and partially denied.
The following facts are taken from Defendants' statement pursuant to Local Civil Rule 56.1, (see Defs.' Local Rule 56.1 Statement in Supp. of Mot. ( ) (Dkt. No. 117)), the exhibits submitted by Defendants, (Decl. of Nigel Joseph in Supp. of Mot. ("Joseph Decl."); Decl. of Noreen Hart in Supp. of Mot. ("Hart Decl."); Decl. of Kristina M. Lennon in Supp. of Mot. ("Lennon Decl."); Decl. of Michael J. Keane, Esq. in Supp. of Mot. ("Keane Decl."); Decl. of Charles Quackenbush in Supp. of Mot. ("Quackenbush Decl.") (Dkt. Nos. 118-22)), as well as Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint ("SAC"), (see SAC), and are recounted in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the non-movant, see Wandering Dago, Inc. v. Destito, 879 F.3d 20, 30 (2d Cir. 2018). Defendants have sent the required Local Rule 56.2 Notice to Plaintiff. (See Dkt. No. 116.)2
On February 28, 2018, this Court, following Defendants' Motion To Dismiss the SAC, issued an Opinion & Order (the "2018 Opinion") holding that Plaintiff had stated a claim as to Plaintiff's alleged due process violations and false imprisonment claims for the period between May 2, 2008 and June 20, 2008. (See Op. & Order ("2018 Op.") 24-25 (Dkt. No. 86).)3 Accordingly, the Court recites the facts necessary to adjudicate those claims only.
On May 5, 2000, pursuant to an April 25, 2000 guilty plea, Plaintiff was sentenced to a maximum determinate term of eight years of incarceration in New York State Supreme Court for New York County. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 2; see also Keane Decl. Ex. F ("Pl.'s Sentence & Commitment") (Dkt. No. 121-6); DOCCS, Inmate Information, http://nysdoccslookup.doccs.ny.gov (last visited Feb. 21, 2020) (DIN # 00A2739) (hereinafter "Pl.'s DOCCS Profile").) At the time Plaintiff was sentenced, New York Penal Law § 70.45(1) ("Jenna's Law") was in place, which requires a court to impose, in addition to a determinate sentence, "an additional period of post-release supervision." N.Y. Penal Law § 70.45(1). However, at the time that Plaintiff was sentenced, Jenna's Law did not require judges to explicitly state the mandatory term of post-release supervision ("PRS") at sentencing. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 4.) In 2008, however, following rulings from both state and federal courts declaring the practice unconstitutional, Jenna's Law was amended to replace a provision that indicated that sentences would automatically include PRS terms with the current provision that requires judges to articulate and explicitly impose a PRS term at sentencing. ( )
In 2000, at Plaintiff's sentencing, the judge did not specifically articulate a PRS period, and no PRS was documented in the hearing minutes. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 5 (citing SAC ¶¶ 10-12).) Plaintiff's Sentence and Commitment did not document a PRS term, either. (See Pl.'s Sentence & Commitment.) After his conviction, Plaintiff was transferred from Rikers Island to Downstate. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 7; see also Pl.'s DOCCS Profile.) On May 30, 2000, after enteringDownstate, DOCS calculated Plaintiff's sentence. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 8.)4 Plaintiff's sentence was calculated to include both the eight-year determinate term pronounced at his sentencing and an automatic five-year term of PRS mandated by Jenna's Law. (Id. (citing Hart Decl. ¶ 5).) DOCS treated the legislatively-mandated PRS term as automatically appended to the sentence of imprisonment, without confirming whether the PRS term had been separately pronounced at sentencing. (Id. ¶ 9.) Plaintiff's expiration date of his determinate term was estimated to be February 13, 2008. (Id. ¶ 10.) DOCS assumed a tentative conditional release eligibility date of December 21, 2006 and calculated that the end of Plaintiff's automatically imposed five-year PRS term would be approximately January 16, 2012. (Id. (citing Hart Decl. ¶¶ 5-6).)
On January 16, 2007, Plaintiff was given conditional release to PRS to serve the remainder of his sentence on parole. (Id. ¶ 11.) Upon release, Plaintiff signed a Certificate of Release indicating that the maximum expiration date of his determinate term was February 13, 2008, and that the maximum expiration date of his PRS was January 16, 2012. (Id.; see also Joseph Decl. Ex. A ("Cert. of Release") (Dkt. No. 118-1).) Defendants aver that the terms and conditions to which a parolee may be subject are the same, regardless of whether a parolee is categorized as "conditional release to parole" or under PRS. (Joseph Decl. ¶ 10.) Although "conditional release" refers to obtaining parolee status within an imprisonment term, "PRS" refers to parolee status after the imprisonment term has ended. (Id.) According to Defendants, the "day-to-day experience of parolees is not materially different whether one is serving either kind of parole supervision." (Id.)
Three weeks after his release, Plaintiff was arrested in Kings County for two felonies and two misdemeanors. Plaintiff was charged with eight violations of the terms and conditions of his parole. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 13; see also Joseph Decl. Ex. C ("PRS Violation Not. & Report") (Dkt. No. 118-1).) Plaintiff appeared before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") for a hearing on June 12, 2007, where the ALJ determined that he should be sent to the Willard Drug Treatment Center ("DTC") for a voluntary program. Plaintiff refused to enter Willard and was then subject to another hearing before an ALJ on July 30, 2007. There, the ALJ decided that Plaintiff would be given a delinquent time assessment of 12 months. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶¶ 15-16; July Parole Revocation Decision Not. 0033, 0035.) At the time that Plaintiff was reincarcerated, pursuant to DOCCS records, Plaintiff's original sentence had a maximum determinate term of June 6, 2008 and a PRS term that would expire in 2013. (See Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 16; Lennon Decl. ¶ 3.) Over the following year, Plaintiff was transferred out of Willard and housed at other DOCS facilities until June 4, 2008, when he was sent to Rikers Island. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 17.) Plaintiff was allegedly transferred to Rikers because his sentencing court had ordered Plaintiff to appear for a resentencing hearing to correct the earlier failure to pronounce his five-year PRS term during his 2000 sentencing. (Id.)5 Although Plaintiff was ordered to appear for his resentencing before the maximum expiration date of June 6, 2008, Plaintiff was somehow not actually resentenced until June 20, 2008. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶¶ 19-21.) Therefore, Plaintiff wasdetained for 14 days beyond the maximum expiration date of his judicially-imposed determinate term for a violation of his PRS terms solely for the purpose of being resentenced. (Id. ¶ 26.)
The June 20, 2008 rehearing culminated in a vacatur of the sentence imposed in 2000, and a resentencing of eight years imprisonment with three years PRS to be imposed nunc pro tunc to the original arrest date of February 14, 2000. (See Keane Decl. Ex. I ("2008 Resentencing Order") (Dkt. No. 121-9).) The 2008 Resentencing Order also instructed DOCS to calculate the new term of imprisonment, plus the PRS, without accounting for the current violation of the administratively-imposed PRS period. (See id.) The newly calculated term was a term of imprisonment that expired on February 13, 2008, and a term of PRS that was estimated to expire on January 16, 2010. (Lennon Decl. ¶ 6.)
Defendants also put forth facts averring that a number of individual Defendants were not occupying any professional role of relevance during the actionable time period of May 2 to June 20, 2008. For example, Leclaire was employed as Acting Commissioner of DOCS between Goord's retirement and Fischer's assumption of that role, i.e., between August 2006 and January 2007. (Quackenbush Decl. ¶¶ 4-6.) Goord had retired from his position as Commissioner of DOCS by August 2006. (Id. ¶ 6.) Evans did not begin working as Chair of Parole until 2009. (Id. ¶ 7.) Dennison retired as Chair of Parole in 2004. (Id. ¶ 8.) Ellis, who was the Executive Director of Parole, is averred not to have been "in a position that involved him in duties related to PRS." (Id. ¶ 9.) Lastly, although Defendants acknowledge that Alexander was the Chair of Parole during the relevant time period, they claim that he was not involved in any PRS-related issues because, during the relevant time period, Plaintiff was in the custody of "New York City DOCS." (...
To continue reading
Request your trial