Appeal of Bremson Data Systems, Inc., Matter of
|968 P.2d 267,25 Kan.App.2d 496
|27 March 1998
|In the Matter of the Appeal of BREMSON DATA SYSTEMS, INC., from Orders of the Board of Tax Appeals for the State of Kansas
|Court of Appeals of Kansas
Syllabus by the Court
1. The legislature has provided a statutory method for seeking judicial review of a decision from the Kansas Board of Tax Appeals (BOTA).
2. When a statutory method has been furnished by the legislature for seeking judicial review, the statutory method must be followed or the reviewing court is without jurisdiction.
3. As a condition precedent to seeking judicial review of a BOTA order, an aggrieved party must first move for reconsideration of that order with BOTA. Failure to do so will preclude judicial review of that order.
William E. Waters, of Division of Property Valuation, Kansas Department of Revenue, for appellant.
Robert G. Scott, of Neill, Scott, Terrill & Embree, L.L.C., of Lenexa, for appellee.
Before GERNON, P.J., and GREEN, J., and TIMOTHY E. BRAZIL, District Judge, assigned.
This is an appeal by the Division of Property Valuation of the Kansas Department of Revenue (PVD) from a judgment of the trial court vacating an order of the Kansas Board of Tax Appeals (BOTA). PVD challenges not only the trial court's judgment determining the economic life of certain computers used by Bremson Data Systems, Inc. (Bremson), but also the trial court's jurisdiction to vacate BOTA's order. Because we agree that the trial court lacked jurisdiction in this matter, we dismiss.
Bremson, a corporation located in Johnson County, relies heavily on computers to perform its business. In valuing Bremson's computers for tax purposes, the Johnson County Appraiser (Appraiser) determined that Bremson's computers and computer-related equipment had a 6-year economic life. Bremson appealed to BOTA, challenging the economic life determined by the Appraiser.
Because the appeal to BOTA involved a conflict between the property valuation guidelines of PVD and the guidelines used by the Appraiser, BOTA granted Bremson's request to join PVD as a party. BOTA noted that the guidelines of the PVD had a 5-year economic life for computers. BOTA pointed out that absent some justification to deviate from the guidelines of PVD, the Appraiser was required to use the PVD guidelines.
Although BOTA stated that the evidence indicated that the actual economic life of the computers was closer to 3 to 4 years, BOTA refused to follow Bremson's request to adopt a 3-year period. BOTA reasoned that if it granted Bremson's request, this would result in inequality between Bremson and similarly situated taxpayers, particularly those taxed according to PVD guidelines. Applying this rationale, BOTA determined that because article 11, § 1(a) of the Kansas Constitution required uniformity in taxation, Bremson's computers had an economic life of 5 years.
Bremson moved for judicial review of BOTA's order. The trial court reversed BOTA's decision, finding that the Kansas Constitution did not preclude BOTA from granting Bremson's requested relief, and remanded the case to BOTA for proceedings consistent with its decision.
On remand, BOTA determined, and the parties agreed, that further evidentiary hearings were unnecessary. Next, BOTA reconsidered its factual findings and again concluded that a 5-year economic life should be utilized for Bremson's computer equipment.
Significantly, Bremson failed to move for reconsideration of BOTA's second order. Instead, Bremson moved for writ of mandamus in the trial court. Finding that BOTA could not be sued, the trial court dismissed the action. Next, Bremson moved the trial court to vacate BOTA's second order and for entry of a supplemental mandate. The trial court granted this motion, finding that BOTA's second order was inconsistent with the trial court's mandate. In vacating BOTA's second order, the trial court found that BOTA's original analysis was valid and concluded that personal computing equipment had an economic life of 4 years.
First, we must determine whether the trial court ever acquired jurisdiction of the appeal from BOTA's second order. PVD earlier moved to dismiss Bremson's motion to vacate BOTA's second order, claiming that the trial court lacked jurisdiction. PVD claimed that court review was precluded because Bremson failed to exhaust its administrative remedies when it neglected to move for reconsideration of BOTA's second order. Finding that Bremson was not required to move for reconsideration of BOTA's second order, the trial court denied PVD's motion.
PVD repeats this argument on appeal. In support, PVD cites In re K-Mart Corp., 232 Kan. 387, 393, 654 P.2d 470 (1982), where our Supreme Court stated that "before an appeal may be taken under the statute from an order of the BOTA, a motion for rehearing must be filed and upon failure to file such a motion, the district court does not acquire jurisdiction of any attempted appeal from the BOTA order." Moreover, K.S.A. 74-2426(b) states: "No final order of [BOTA] shall be subject to review pursuant to subsection (c) unless the aggrieved party first files a petition for reconsideration of that order with [BOTA] in accordance with the provisions of K.S.A. 77-529 and amendments thereto."
In addition, K.S.A. 77-529(a) provides in part
These statutes set out a method for seeking judicial review of a decision from BOTA.
Bremson argues that K-Mart is distinguishable as it did not involve an administrative order on remand. Bremson further...
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IN RE TAX EXEMPTION APPLICATION OF RENO TOWNSHIP, 83,163.
...order is normally fatal to any appeal. In re K-Mart Corp., 232 Kan. 387, 393, 654 P.2d 470 (1982); In re Tax Appeal of Bremson Data Systems, Inc., 25 Kan. App.2d 496, 968 P.2d 267, rev. denied 265 Kan. 885 In this case, the Township clearly was the aggrieved party from BOTA's original order......