Appeal of Dattilo
| Decision Date | 07 March 1950 |
| Citation | 136 Conn. 488,72 A.2d 50 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | Appeal of DATTILO. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut |
James F. Rosen, New Haven, Gerald W. Brownstein, New Haven, for appellant.
Lyman H. Steele and Frank W. Flood, Assistant Attorney General, William L. Hadden, Attorney General as amici curiae1
Before MALTBIE, C. J., and BROWN, JENNINGS, DICKENSON and BALDWIN, JJ.
This is an appeal from a decision of the Superior Court at a domestic relations session sustaining an order of the Juvenile Court denying an application to revoke the commitments of three children of the appellant. The only claim made by her which justifies any extended discussion is that the trial court had no right to consider certain reports made to the Juvenile Court by its investigators and sent to the Superior Court with the file of the case.
The rules of the Superior Court expressly provide, with reference to a hearing on an appeal from the Juvenile Court: 'Such case histories and records of investigations as are in the possession of the juvenile court shall be admissible in evidence * * * and any party adversely interested may require the presence for cross-examination of any persons whose report is before the court. * * *' Practice Book, c. 26A, § 2(c). The trial court, acting under this rule, did consider the reports. We could dispose of the contention of the appellant on the ground that at the hearing of the case before the Superior Court not only did she not object to such action by the trial court, as the court has found, but, as an examination of the evidence made necessary by attacks on the finding shows, her attorney expressly stated that he had no objection. The question raised upon the appeal is, however, one of such general concern as regards appeals in juvenile cases that we have decided to consider it.
In the revision of the statutes consequent upon the adoption of the constitution of 1818, the Supreme Court of Errors was given power to make such rules of practice for the regulation of that court and of the Superior Court 'as shall be deemed most conducive to the administration of justice.' Statutes 1821, p. 137, § 5. The statute remained in force until 1855. Statutes 1854, p. 265, § 12. In 1855 the rulemaking power was taken from the judges of the Supreme Court of Errors and vested in an assembly of the judges of the Superior Court; they were authorized to 'make all necessary and proper rules, not contrary to law, for the trial of causes and other proceedings in said superior court'; and they were directed to make such rules 'as shall promote dispatch in the business of said court, and secure, as far as possible, at every term, the completion of the business thereof.' Public Acts 1855, c. 26, §§ 9, 13; See Public Acts 1859, c. 64, § 6. Except for the last clause, this provision was continued in effect until 1899. General Statutes, Rev.1875, p. 43, § 16; Rev.1888, § 772. The Practice Act of 1879 contained a provision authorizing the judges at their annual or other meetings to make such orders and rules as might be necessary 'to give full effect to the provisions of this act.' Public Acts 1879, c. 83, § 33. This provision was omitted from the Revision of 1888, apparently because the broader terms of § 772 in that revision were deemed sufficient to cover the matter. In 1899 an act was passed which in the first section gave the judges of the Superior Court authority at their annual meeting to make all orders and rules necessary and proper to give full effect to the Practice Act and in the second section provided for their printing and distribution to attorneys. Public Acts 1899, c. 5. The act contained no repealing provision. In the Revision of 1902, however, the broad authority of the judges to make rules contained in § 772 of the 1888 revision was omitted and the provisions of the 1899 act were inserted, with the addition of authority to the judges to 'make other rules for the dispatch of business in said court.' General Statutes, Rev.1902, § 467. That is the present statutory situation as regards the general rule-making power of the judges of the Superior Court. General Statutes, § 7655.
As used in the statute of 1855, the word 'dispatch' was clearly intended to have the meaning of a speedy disposition of matters in the court. Webster's New International Dictionary (2d Ed.). The revisers in 1902 were confronted with two laws then on the statute books, § 772 of the Revision of 1888, and chapter 5 of [136 Conn. 492] the Public Acts of 1899. The first gave the judges of the Superior Court the power to 'make all necessary and proper rules for proceedings in the Superior Court.' The second gave them authority only to make rules to give effect to the Practice Act, with an added provision as to their printing and distribution. Apparently recognizing the limited extent of the power given in the latter statute as compared to the broader authority contained in the Revision of 1888, the revisers added to the provision of the 1899 act something not previously in it, the authority to 'make other rules for the dispatch of business.' It is presumed that revisers do not intend to change the law unless an intent to do so is apparent. Bassett v. City Bank & Trust Co., 115 Conn. 393, 400, 161 A. 852; Columbus industrial Bank v. Miller, 125 Conn. 313, 319, 6 A.2d 42. The intent of the words added in the 1902 revision was evidently to continue the broader rule-making power contained in the 1888 revision; and the word 'dispatch' was clearly used with the significance 'accomplishment.' 3 Oxford Dictionary, Pt. 1, p. 479, 'Dispatch' (5). In short, the statutes now give the judges of the Superior Court authority not only to make rules to carry out the provisions of the Practice Act but also, in the words of the 1855 act, to 'make all necessary and proper rules, not contrary to law, for the trial of causes and other proceedings in said superior court.'
Even if this were not so, it was within the power of the judges to make the particular rule in question. Apart from legislative authority, courts acting in the exercise of common-law powers have an inherent right to make rules governing procedure in them. In re Hien, 166 U.S. 432, 436, 17 S.Ct. 624, 41 L.Ed. 1066; McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 266, 35 S.Ct. 783, 59 L.Ed. 1300; Woodbury v. Andrew Jergens Co., 2 Cir., 61 F.2d 736, 737; note, 110 A.L.R. 22; 14 Am.Jur. 355 et seq. That right is an inheritance from the common-law practice in England. People v. Callopy, 358 Ill. 11, 14, 192 N.E. 634. That the courts of this state, without any legislative authority, may make rules of procedure appears from a decision of the Supreme Court made in 1807. Terry v. Capen, 3 Day 495.
The statute authorizing an appeal to the Superior Court from a decision of the Juvenile Court does not state the nature and scope of the proceeding and contains only a single provision as to procedure. General Statutes, § 2815. That provision authorizes the judge holding the session of the Superior Court at which such an appeal is heard to order an investigation to be made by a qualified probation officer or county investigator whose written report is admissible in evidence subject to the right of any party to require him to appear for cross-examination. The purpose of the provision clearly is to authorize the court, in an appeal which involves the custody of infants, to adopt a procedure which would not be proper in an ordinary court action; it was obviously intended to be an extension of, not a limitation upon, the power of the court in such cases. The provisions of the statute fall far short of establishing a procedure for the orderly disposition of such appeals. Even lacking statutory authority, it would be...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Heiberger v. Clark
...v. Mitchell, 78 Conn. 536, 548, 63 A. 433. Irrespective of legislation, the rule-making power is in the courts. In re Appeal of Dattilo, 136 Conn. 488, 492, 72 A.2d 50. The great weight of authority elsewhere accords with this principle. Brydonjack v. State Bar, 208 Cal. 439, 443, 281 P. 10......
-
Adams v. Rubinow
...to exercise such power is dependent for its efficacy, upon the acquiescence of the constitutional court involved. In re Appeal of Dattilo, 136 Conn. 488, 492, 72 A.2d 50. Manifestation of such acquiescence may, although it need, not, take the form of the adoption of the statutory rule as a ......
-
State v. Hughes
...they may have altered the form of their statement. City of Norwalk v. Daniele, 143 Conn. 85, 87, 119 A.2d 732; In re Appeal of Dattilo, 136 Conn. 488, 492, 72 A.2d 50. The language of the statute as revised or the legislative intent to change the former statute must be clear before it can b......
-
State v. Clemente
...of action distinct from that of the legislative and executive departments.' In 1950 it was further delineated by In re Appeal of Dattilo, 136 Conn. 488, 492, 72 A.2d 50, which held that courts have an inherent power, independent of statutory authorization, to prescribe rules to regulate the......
-
The Scope of Procedural Rule-making in Connecticut: Further Confusion in State v. James and Bartholomew v. Schweizer
...legislature possesses all the power it had before 1818, save for those which the constitution expressly proscribes. 39 136 Conn. 486, 492, 72 A.2d 50 (1950). 40 Before 1950, there prevailed an understanding that "[t]he legislature unquestionably has the power to enact laws relating to proce......
-
2008 Connecticut Appellate Review
...222, 232, 140 A.2d 863(1958), held that the judiciary had exclusive control over court procedure, citing In re Dattilo,136 Conn. 488, 492, 72 A.2d 50 (1950), which said no such thing. See Wesley W. Horton, The History Of The Connecticut Supreme Court, 172-73, 191-92, 307-08 (2008)(discussin......