Appeal of Edwards

Citation108 Pa. 283
PartiesAppeal of Edwards et al.
Decision Date02 February 1885
CourtPennsylvania Supreme Court

Before MERCUR, C. J., GORDON, PAXSON, TRUNKEY, STERRETT, and GREEN, JJ. CLARK J., absent

Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas, No. 1, of Philadelphia County: Of January Term, 1884, No. 249.

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Samuel W. Pennypacker, for the appellants.—The fallacy in the Auditor's reasoning was that he assumed the question to be the construction of an Act of Assembly, whereas the real question was the construction of a deed of trust. If the intention of the settlor is clearly expressed in the deed, and if that intention was a lawful one at the date of the deed, it must be followed. If she has given property to A. and A. is competent to take it, no Act of the legislature can give it to B. The settlor in her deed defined the capacity to take, among the possible children of her son Richard, and said that those of his children who should take her estate must be "lawfully begotten." There can not be any doubt as to the meaning of these words. They have been used in wills, deeds and other legal instruments from time immemorial, and never with any but the one signification. They mean that the person or persons whom they describe must be conceived in lawful wedlock. The Auditor has found as a fact that the appellee was not so born, and, therefore was outside of the limitations of the deed, but by a process of reasoning, which is very much like a trick of legerdemain, he has succeeded in reaching the conclusion that the appellee ought to have the estate. We concede the power of an Act of Assembly to legitimate, but we deny its power to change the settlements made in a preceding deed, and to give an estate to those whom the grantor has seen fit to exclude. Our position is supported, in principle, by McGunnigle v. McKee, 27 P. F. S., 81; Miller's Appeal, 2 Id., 113; Curtis v. Hewins, 11 Met., 294; Edmondson v. Dyson, 7 Ga., 512; Lee v. Shenkle, 6 Jones (N. C.) Law, 313; Kent v. Barker, 2 Gray, 535; Stevenson v. Sullivant, 5 Wheaton, 207; Bent v. St. Vrain, 30 Mo., 268; Remmington v. Lewis, 8 B. Monroe, 606.

A limitation in a deed or will to a "child" is confined to legitimate children: Cartwright v. Vawdry, 5 Ves. Jr., 534; Bagley v. Mollard, 1 Russ & My., 586. Any form of words that could be used would be rendered illusory, by the same fallacious reasoning as that by which the Auditor evaded the effect of the limitation to "lawfully begotten children." A provision for future illegitimate children is against the policy of the law, and void: Holt v. Sindrey, 7 L. R. Eq. 176; 2 Jarman on Wills, 250.

Moreover the Act of Assembly could not divest rights which had vested, by virtue of a resulting trust, immediately upon the execution of the deed of trust: Schafer v. Eneu, 4 P. F. S., 304; Bispham's Eq., § 87; Huston v. Hamilton, 2 Binn., 387; Sheaffer's Appeal, 8 Barr, 38; Norman v. Heist, 5 W. & S., 171; Killam v. Killam, 3 Wr., 121; Hinnershitz v. Bernard, 1 Har., 521.

James P. Townsend, for the appellee.—We contend that by virtue of the Act legitimating Thomas M. Wistar he became, in the eye of the law, a lawful child, vested with the same rights, as if, lawfully begotten he had been born in lawful wedlock. The efficiency of the Act to accomplish its purpose, he being the veritable son of Richard, makes his conception as lawful as his birth; to both were then imparted a quality of lawfulness in relation to the rest of society which had been withheld by restrictive legislation at the time of their actual occurrence, and in the legal exercise of its discretion the supreme power removed its own restriction. This does not change the settlements in the deed, and does no violence to the settlor's purpose: Killam v. Killam, 3 Wr., 120; Miller's Appeal, 2 P. F. S., 115; McGunnigle v. McKee, 27 Id., 81. The argument that the Act, if given the effect we claim for it, would divest vested rights, is unsound, because no resulting trust could arise at the date of the trust deed, nor until there is default of persons to take under its limitations. If Thomas M. Wistar had been born in lawful wedlock on the date of the Act, his title to take would not be disputed, yet the same argument would apply. Shaffer v. Eneu, cited by plaintiff in error, does not apply, as adopted children have not identity of blood with the adopting parent, nor does the Act relating to adoptions attempt the impossibility of making them children by blood. Here there is identity of blood; the law which places a disability upon a bastard, may remove the disability with the same effect as if it never existed: Johnson's Appeal, 7 Norris, 346.

Mr. Justice GREEN delivered the opinion of the court, February 2d, 1885.

The persons who take the fund in court for distribution, must do so as designated grantees under the deed from Elizabeth Wistar to Israel W. Morris in trust. The ultimate beneficiaries of the fee are there described as "lawfully begotten children or grandchildren" of Richard M. Wistar, who was the son of Elizabeth Wistar and the cestui que trust for life of the property which produced the fund in court. The question is whether the appellee Thomas M. Wistar is a "lawfully begotten" child of Richard M. Wistar. He is the illegitimate...

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9 cases
  • Com. v. Sutley
    • United States
    • Pennsylvania Supreme Court
    • October 7, 1977
    ...De Chastellux v. Fairchild, 15 Pa. 18; or order an illegitimate child to be regarded as legitimate under terms of prior deed: Appeal of Edwards, 108 Pa. 283; it may not change the effect of judgments or decrees previously rendered: Pennsylvania Company, etc., v. Scott, 346 Pa. 13, 29 A.2d I......
  • Friends of Pa. Leadership Charter Sch. v. Chester Cnty. Bd. of Assessment Appeals
    • United States
    • Pennsylvania Supreme Court
    • September 24, 2014
    ...Dechastellux v. Fairchild, 15 Pa. 18 ; or order an illegitimate child to be regarded as legitimate under terms of prior deed: Appeal of Edwards, 108 Pa. 283 ; it may not change the effect of judgments or decrees previously rendered: Pennsylvania Company, etc., v. Scott, 346 Pa. 13, 29 A.2d ......
  • In re Yates' Estate
    • United States
    • Pennsylvania Supreme Court
    • July 8, 1924
    ... ... assigned was, in both appeals, inter alia, decree, quoting ... The ... decree of the court below is affirmed, and each appeal is ... dismissed at the cost of appellant ... Daniel ... C. Donoughue, for Effie R. Foulke. -- The terms of the will ... giving the ... held an adopted child could neither be appointed to take, nor ... allowed to do so under the clause last quoted. Edwards' ... App., 108 Pa. 283, 290, and Morgan v. Reel, 213 Pa ... 81, 90, cite and approve the conclusion in Schafer v. Eneu, ... supra. To the same ... ...
  • In re McCausland's Estate
    • United States
    • Pennsylvania Supreme Court
    • January 2, 1906
    ...act of the legislature, cannot enable the claimant to take as a purchaser, under a limitation in the last will of Ann McCausland: Edwards' App., 108 Pa. 283; Schafer Eneu, 54 Pa. 304. The claimant is not the legitimate son of Jacob W. McCausland, begotten or born in lawful wedlock: Thomas v......
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