Appeal of Hopkins

• Decision Date: 20 April 1905
• Parties: Appeal of HOPKINS.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

60 A. 657

77 Conn. 644

Appeal of HOPKINS.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

April 20, 1905.

Case Reserved from Superior Court, Hartford County; John M. Thayer, Judge.

Application by Sheldon Hopkins for a reappraisal of the estate of Mary Frances Hopkins, deceased. From an order of the probate court granting the reappraisal, and the decree fixing the amount of the succession tax, Woolsey R. Hopkins, administrator with the will annexed of the decedent, appealed to the superior court, and on demurrer to the reasons of appeal and filing of an agreed statement of facts the case was reserved for the advice of the Supreme Court of Errors. Superior court advised to sustain the demurrer and affirm the probate order.

On May 18, 1898, and October 11, 1898, Mary Frances Hopkins duly executed her last will and testament and codicil thereto, describing herself as a resident of the city of Stamford, state of Connecticut. She died August 27, 1899, a resident of and domiciled in Connecticut. The executors named in her will were her sons, Woolsey and Sheldon Hopkins, and William G. Verplanck. Woolsey Hopkins and William G. Verplanck resided in New York, and Sheldon Hopkins resided in Connecticut. On October 21, 1902, the will and codicil were exhibited and proved in the court of probate for the district of Stamford in the manner hereinafter set forth; and on January 3, 1903, the surviving executors named in the will having been duly cited to appear and qualify in said court as executors, and having refused and neglected so to do, the court appointed Woolsey R. Hopkins, husband of the testatrix, administrator with the will annexed. On January 28, 1903, said administrator filed an inventory. Said inventory contained the following items: Real estate at Stamford (appraised at $50,000); shares of stock, Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, the certificate of said stock being at Stamford at testatrix's death (appraised at $20,790); personal effects (appraised at $5,538); Cash on deposit at Stamford, $3,093.04—and also contained items of the testatrix's other personal property, stated in a separate list with explanations. These items consisted of cash and credits on deposit in New York, $10,536.27; shares in the capital stock of corporations organized under the laws of Connecticut, New York, and other states and of the United States; bonds of such corporations; shares of stock of unincorporated associations; notes of residents of other states than Connecticut secured by mortgage on land in such state; unsecured notes of residents of other states; and bonds of the state of North Carolina— which stock and other securities were appraised at $794,458.79. The evidences of ownership in the personal property appraised at this sum were kept in New York by the testatrix at the time of her death. All the items in said inventory were appraised by appraisers appointed by the court of probate. Subsequently, and within four months after the grant of administration in this state, upon the application of Sheldon Hopkins, a person interested in said estate, said court ordered a reappraisal of said estate, pursuant to statute, which was duly made and accepted and approved by the court; the total valuation being $884,416.10. On April 18, 1903, said administrator applied to the court of probate to fix the amount of the succession tax due the state; and on November 19, 1903, by decree of that date, said court fixed the amount of the succession tax at $4,872.18. From this order and decree said administrator appealed to the superior court. The reasons of appeal assigned are: (1) The act of 1897 (Laws 1897, p. 901, c. 201), under which the decree was passed, is void. (2) Section 5 (page 902) of said act is void. (3) Because the court of probate, in the order appealed from, found that estate of the testatrix of the value of $850,889.50 was subject to the state succession tax, notwithstanding it appears from the agreed statement of facts that part of the property so found subject to tax was not within the jurisdiction of the state, and none of said property, except the real estate, passed by will or by the inheritance laws of Connecticut, within the meaning of the succession tax act. The appellee, Henry F. Gallup, treasurer of the state, demurred to the third reason of appeal, and thereupon the superior court, by the agreement and at the request of all the parties, reserved the cause for the advice of this court as to what Judgment should be rendered therein.

The material facts, in addition to the facts above recited, which appear in the agreed statement of facts, are these: First. The will, upon application of one of the executors, was admitted to probate on October 7, 1899, by the surrogate's court in the county and state of New York. All the executors named in the will duly qualified as executors in said surrogate's court. They removed to New York the certificate of stock in the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey and the money on deposit in Stamford, and transferred to the legatee named in the will the personal effects at Stamford, and proceeded with the administration and settlement of the whole personal estate of the testatrix in New York, under the letters testamentary granted by said surrogate's court. They paid the claims of all creditors who proved their claims in accordance with the order of notice made by said surrogate's court, and there are no claims of unpaid creditors now known, unless the claim of the State Treasurer to the succession tax. They paid the expenses of administration at New York. They paid the legatees under the will in money and by distribution of the assets, except the residuary legatees, and this action was approved by the surrogate's court, which ordered a distribution of the residue in accordance with the provisions of the will, and in pursuance of this order they have distributed the residue, except about $3,000, which remains in their hands. All this was done before the appointment of an administrator by the Stamford court of probate. Second. The executors paid the United States succession tax upon the whole estate of the testatrix, amounting to $11,128.82, and paid the New York state transfer tax which is imposed upon the transfer by will or inheritance of property which is within that state when the decedent is a nonresident of the state at the time of his death, amounting to $5,228.28. Property of the estate, being capital stock of corporations created under other laws than those of the state of New York and of national banks located elsewhere than in said state, being of the appraised value of $239,866.25, was not included as subject to said transfer tax, and no death duty of any kind was paid in respect to said property, except through the payment of the United States tax. Third. The testatrix in her will disposes of all her property. She gives the real estate in Connecticut to her husband for life, and upon his death the same, or the proceeds, if the whole or any part thereof shall have been sold by her executors, to her lineal descendants. She gives securities to the value of $200,000 to her executors, to pay over the income to her husband during his life, and upon his death to divide the principal among her lineal descendants. She disposes of the rest and residue of her property in varying forms for the benefit of her three children and their issue, except 21 small bequests, aggregating about $5,000, and a life interest in $20,000, given to her son-in-law. The beneficial interest in her whole property (except that in the small legacies and life estate mentioned) goes to her husband and her lineal descendants. Fourth. The will was proved before the Stamford court of probate upon the petition of the testatrix's husband, by filing and recording in said court an exemplified copy of the will and of the record of the proceedings proving the same in New York and with the letters testamentary issued thereon. Woolsey R. Hopkins, in his petition to the court of probate for the appointment of an administrator with the will annexed, asked the court to grant him administration in respect to any unadministered property that might be within the jurisdiction of the court, to the end that a suitable inventory might be filed showing the property subject to the succession tax due the state, and that said tax might be fixed and paid. It was stipulated by the parties that the agreed statement of facts shall form part of the reasons of appeal.

Robert A. Fosdick, for appellant William A. King, Atty. Gen., for the State.

HAMERSLEY, J. (after stating the facts). The act of 1897 (Laws 1897, p. 901, c. 201), "providing for a succession tax" (Revision 1902, §§ 2367-2377), was fully considered in the recent cases of Nettleton's Appeal, 76 Conn. 235, 56 Atl. 565, and Gallup's Appeal, 76 Conn. 617, 57 Atl. 699. These cases were appeals from the same probate order fixing the succession tax in the same estate, and constitute substantially one case. The decisions then rendered did not turn upon the peculiar condition of the particular estate in settlement, but did turn upon the construction and effect of the act in its essential features, and settled its meaning and legal effect as respects these features. This determination involved a consideration of all the provisions of the act in their relation to the conclusion reached, and substantially controls the disposition of the claims advanced in the present case.

The act does not provide for the taxation of any property left by a decedent, nor of any person interested in his estate. "The act imposes death duties, and prescribes their amount and the machinery convenient for their collection." A "death duty," as thus used, is an exaction by the state, to be collected from the property left by a deceased person while in its custody, prescribed upon the occasion of his death, and the consequent devolution of his property, by force of its laws. The...