Appeal of Paslay

• Decision Date: 09 August 1956
• Docket Number: No. 17199,17199
• Citation: 230 S.C. 55,94 S.E.2d 57
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: Appeal of R. B. PASLAY. In re Florence TURNER, Collie Gray, Moses Gray, Habard Gray, and David Gray, Petitioners-Respondents, v. Lillie BYARS, Willie Gray, Spencer Gray, Ollie Gray, Pleas Galloway, Eunice Williams, individually and as representatives of all that class of heirs, known and unknown, of Lillie Gray Howard, deceased, including children of deceased brothers and sisters of Lillie Gray Howard, and all other heirs of Lillie Gray Howard, deceased, Defendants.

Page 57

94 S.E.2d 57

230 S.C. 55

Appeal of R. B. PASLAY.

In re Florence TURNER, Collie Gray, Moses Gray, Habard Gray,

and David Gray, Petitioners-Respondents, v. Lillie BYARS, Willie Gray, Spencer Gray, Ollie Gray, Pleas

Galloway, Eunice Williams, individually and as

representatives of all that class of heirs, known and

unknown, of Lillie Gray Howard, deceased, including children

of deceased brothers and sisters of Lillie Gray Howard, and

all other heirs of Lillie Gray Howard, deceased, Defendants.

No. 17199.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Aug. 9, 1956.

Paslay & Paslay, Spartanburg, for appellant.

Shannon Henson, Spartanburg, for petitioners-respondents.

STUKES, Chief Justice.

This is an action for partition in which a lot of land in Spartanburg was sold by the Master on salesday in February, 1956, in the usual and customary manner and pursuant to decree of the court. When the Master offered the property after regular advertisement and during the usual hours of sale, appellant bid $450. There was no other bid and the property was struck off to appellant who is described in respondents' brief as 'a stranger to the original suit.' During the afternoon of the same day restraining order of the resident Circuit Judge was served upon appellant and upon the Master whereby the latter was restrained and enjoined from delivering deed of the property in accordance with the sale, and appellant was required to show cause on February 20 why the order should not be made permanent and the property again offered for sale by the Master.

The restraining order and rule to show cause were obtained upon verified petition of the respondents which set forth the facts stated above and that petitioners were prepared, through their attorney, to bid $1,000 or more for the property, which is its worth, and, quoting from the petition, the attorney 'made every reasonable effort to attend the sale, but due to mechanical failure of his automobile at a distance from the place of sale, he was unable to arrive at the place of sale before 11:25 A.M. on the day of sale.' It was further alleged in the petition that $450 is a grossly inadequate price for the property, which has a rental value of at least $30 per month, and consummation of the sale would result in irreparable loss to the owners of the property. Appellant and the Master made separate returns to the rule in which the regularity of the sale was set forth, and discharge of the rule and dissolution of the injunction were prayed.

Upon hearing the returns to the rule it was recited in the order of the court that the petitioners desired to submit testimony as to the value of the property upon the issue of the adequacy of the bid, and the matter was referred to the Master for the purpose of taking and reporting testimony as to the value of the property and the adequacy of the sale price.

The appeal is from the refusal of the court to adjudge the returns to the rule sufficient and dissolve the order enjoining the Master from making deed to the purchaser-appellant upon his compliance with the bid, and from the contrary order of reference.

The explanation of the failure of counsel to attend the sale, which is quoted above, is manifestly insufficient to set the sale aside. The function of judicial sales would be seriously impaired if persons claiming to have been intended bidders, or attorneys or other representatives of them, were heard to say that their means of transportation failed en route. Public interest and precedent dictate the fostering of the stability of judicial sales. Wingard v. Hennessee, 206 S.C. 159, 33 S.E.2d 390. Counsel did not pursue this point in his brief on appeal, and we need not labor it.

There is therefore left in the case only the attack upon the validity of the sale upon the ground of inadequacy of consideration--that the property is worth $1,000 or more, and the successful bid was $450; and it is well settled that mere inadequacy of price (unless it shock the conscience of the court) will not vitiate a judicial sale, in the absence of other factors for which the selling officer of the successful bidder was at least in part responsible, or participated. It is not contended that any such factor is present in this case; and the disparity between the sales price and the value of the property, as alleged in the petition, does not shock the conscience of the court. Some of our prior decisions, which sustain our conclusion, will be reviewed.

The question in Young v. Teague, 1830, Bailey Eq., 13, was whether a partition sale should be set aside upon a showing that one of the heirs was prevented by mistake from entering a bid of $600 more than the successful bid of $1,008, for which the land was struck off to an outsider, who was the higher bidder. The mistake was that the contesting heir and requested her counsel to bid for her to the amount of the appraised value of the land, which he said he would have done but thought that the last bid was by the heir's son. However, the heir was present and instructed her son to cease bidding. It was concluded that the heir and her son had simply, quoting, 'neglected their own interests, and now wish the Court to do for them what they ought to have done for themselves.' Contrary decree of Chancellor De Saussure was reversed.

The syllabus in Coleman v. Bank of Hamburg, 1848, 2 Strob.Eq. 285, is: 'Where unfair means have not been employed to prevent competition at sheriff's sales, inadequacy of price, however great, is no ground for setting them aside.' Land was sold under execution upon a bid of one dollar, subject to mortgage indebtedness of about $1,500 which was announced at the sale. In his circuit decree, Chancellor Dunkin said that he was well satisfied that the sale price of the equity of redemption was less than its value, but no witness attributed improper conduct at the sale to the purchaser, and inadequacy of price will not vitiate a sheriff's sale. One of the grounds of appeal was that the land, which was purchased for one dollar, subject to the mortgage, was proved to be worth five or six thousand dollars. The appeal was dismissed by opinion by Chancellor Dargan, in the course of which it was said: 'It is settled that where unfair means have not been employed to prevent competition at sheriff's sales, inadequacy of price, however great, is no ground for setting them aside. Whether wise or not, this is the law of South Carolina.'

Writing the opinion of the court upon appeal of Ramsay v. Sims, 1866, 12 Rich. Eq. 430, Chancellor Dunkin again said: 'Mere inadequacy of price, however startling, in the absence of all fraud, will afford no ground to impeach his purchase (at sheriff's sale).' Robinson v. Amateur Association, 1880, 14 S.C. 148, involved a sale in foreclosure under power contained in the mortgage. The property was sold at public auction for $400 and the purchaser later offered the property at auction and obtained bid of $850. One of the contentions of invalidity of the foreclosure sale was inadequacy of price, which was proved by the subsequent sale at more than double the price. The contention was overruled, and the court said: 'When a public sale is open and fair, in all respects free from fraud, mere inadequacy of price is not sufficient to set aside a sale, unless the inadequacy is such as to furnish evidence of fraud upon the part of the mortgagee, which is not alleged here.'

At a foreclosure sale of a tract of land in Colleton County, in Ex parte Alexander, 35 S.C. 409, 14 S.E. 854, 856, the property sold for ten dollars. The plaintiff in the foreclosure action vainly opposed confirmation of the sale by the Master, which was affirmed upon appeal in opinion by Chief Justice McIver. The plaintiff contended that the advertisement was insufficient (which was overruled) and he was thereby surprised and prevented from bidding the amount of the mortgage debt, as he intended; apparently he was not present at the sale. The opinion concluded as follows: 'If, then, there is no surprise, the fact that the land brought at the sale a very inadequate price affords no ground for relief; for it is well settled that that alone affords no grounds for assailing the validity of a public sale. There is no allegation, and certainly no proof, that there was the slightest fraud or concealment on the part either of the Master or the purchaser, but, on the contrary, the testimony shows that the sale...