Appeal of School Dist. of Borough of Braddock Hills

• Decision Date: 20 December 1971
• Docket Number: No. 150,150
• Citation: 445 Pa. 343,285 A.2d 880
• Parties: Appeal of the SCHOOL DISTRICT OF the BOROUGH OF BRADDOCK HILLS from the Plan of Organization of Administrative Units Approved by the State Board of Education Pursuant to ActAppeal of SCHOOL DISTRICT OF the BOROUGH OF EDGEWOOD, Intervenor.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 880

285 A.2d 880

445 Pa. 343

Appeal of the SCHOOL DISTRICT OF the BOROUGH OF BRADDOCK

HILLS from the Plan of Organization of

Administrative Units Approved by the

State Board of Education

Pursuant to Act No. 150.

Appeal of SCHOOL DISTRICT OF the BOROUGH OF EDGEWOOD, Intervenor.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Dec. 20, 1971.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 7, 1972.

Robert A. Rundle, Wright & Rundle, Pittsburgh, Norman I. White, J. Thomas Menaker, McNees, Wallace & Nurick, Harrisburg, for appellant.

John R. Smith, Pittsburgh, John D. Killian, Killian, Gephart & Snyder, Robert F. Seaker, Deputy Atty. Gen., Dept. of Justice, Harrisburg, Joseph U. Esper, John B. Nicklas, Jr., Pittsburgh, for appellee.

Before JONES, EAGEN, O'BRIEN, ROBERTS, POMEROY, and BARBIERI, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT

ROBERTS, Justice.

The Act of July 8, 1968, P.L. ---, 24 P.S. §§ 2400.1 et seq. (Act 150), establishes a comprehensive three step procedure for the formulation and adoption of plans for school district reorganization. Initially, each county board of school directors is directed to prepare and submit such a plan to the State Board of Education. The State Board in turn reviews each plan and either approves or amends it. Finally, any school district which considers itself aggrieved by a plan approved by the State Board may appeal to the court of common pleas of the county where the school district is located.

The present appeal raises two issues: (1) whether there is any right of appeal from an order of the court of common pleas made pursuant to Act 150; and (2) whether the court of common pleas in this particular instance erred in rejecting the plan approved by the State Board. For reasons appearing below, we hold that an appeal does lie from a decision of the court of common pleas and that the court of common pleas did err in the instant case.

The present appeal arises as follows: On October 7, 1968, the Allegheny County Board of School Directors adopted a plan of school district reorganization for Allegheny County and submitted it to the State Board of Education pursuant to Act 150. The plan provided, inter alia, for the creation of a Unit 38, comprised of the School Districts of the Boroughs of Swissvale and Braddock Hills, and a Unit 40, consisting of the School District of the Borough of Edgewood alone.

Although it had operated jointly with the Swissvale School District since 1965, the Braddock Hills School District petitioned the State Board of Education, requesting that proposed Units 38 and 40 be merged into one unit. The Edgewood School District was granted leave to intervene, and hearings were conducted by the State Board on February 11 and May 9, 1969. On the latter date, the State Board rendered an adjudication dismissing Braddock Hills' petition and approving separate Units 38 and 40 as established by the County Board.

On June 9, 1969, Braddock Hills appealed the State Board's decision to the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County and Edgewood was again permitted to intervene. Upon motion of the State Board, Swissvale was joined as a necessary party but did not file any pleadings or otherwise participate in the proceedings. Instead, its counsel informed the court that Swissvale was neutral with respect to the challenged reorganization plan. Additional evidence was taken at a hearing held on March 16, 1970, and on June 1, 1970, the court of common pleas entered an order reversing the adjudication of the State Board and directing that all three school districts be merged into one unit.

By per curiam order of April 16, 1971, the Superior Court affirmed the decision of the court of common pleas with Judge Montgomery filing a dissenting opinion joined in by Judge Cercone. See Edgewood Borough School District Appeal, 218 Pa.Super. 157, 279 A.2d 343. We thereafter granted allocatur and supersedeas, and this appeal followed.

We are confronted preliminarily in this appeal with appellee Braddock Hills' contention that there is no right of appeal from an order of the court of common pleas made pursuant to Act 150. In so arguing, appellee refers to the last sentence of Section 5 of the Act, 24 P.S. § 2400.5, which declares that the order of the court of common pleas 'shall be a final order.' We are unpersuaded that the quoted language in any way precludes further appellate review.

Article V, Section 9, of the Pennsylvania Constitution, P.S., provides that 'there shall also be a right of appeal from a court of record or from an administrative agency to a court of record or to an appellate court, the selection of such court to be as provided by law. . . .' This new constitutional mandate was implemented in part by the Act of December 2, 1968, P.L. ---, No. 351, 12 P.S. §§ 1111.1 -.2. Section 1 of that Act provides that '(e)xcept as provided in section 2 (pertaining to orders already appealable by statute) there shall be a right of appeal under this act from A final order, decision, judgment, or sentence of a court of record to an appellate court as provided by section 9 of Article V of the Constitution. The aforesaid appeal shall be taken to the Superior Court, unless otherwise provided by statute. . . .' (Emphasis added.) We think it clear that Article V, Section 9 and the Act of December 2, 1968, together establish a right of appeal from a final order of the court of common pleas pursuant to Act 150, and we further conclude that such an appeal prior to the effective date of the Appellate Court Jurisdiction Act of 1970 was properly taken in the first instance to the Superior Court. See Plains Township School District Appeal, 438 Pa. 294, 265 A.2d 358 (1970). ^*

Having determined that appellant Edgewood does have a right of appeal, we may turn to an assessment of its contention that the court of common pleas erred in amending the reorganization plan approved by the State Board.

In considering this issue we are faced at the outset with an apparent ambiguity in the text of Act 150. Section 5 of the Act begins by affording a right of appeal to the court of common pleas 'by petition setting forth that such approval (by the State Board) is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,' but goes on to grant to the court of common pleas the ostensibly broader power to amend the plan 'as the court, in its discretion, shall find necessary or advisable.' All parties to this appeal agree, as indeed they must, that the latter language must be read in conjunction with the former, and so viewing the statute we are of the opinion that the correct interpretation of Section 5 is that a court may not amend a plan of reorganization unless it finds that the State Board has abused its discretion or has acted arbitrarily, capriciously or otherwise not in accordance with law.

This interpretation not only satisfies the rule that a statute must be construed as a whole so as to give effect to all of its language, Lynch v. Owen J. Roberts School District, 430 Pa. 461, 469, 244 A.2d 1, 5 (1968), but also comports with settled principles of law concerning the scope of judicial review of administrative action. As noted in Blumenschein v. Pittsburgh Housing Authority, 379 Pa. 566, 109 A.2d 331 (1954):

'By a host of authorities in our own and other jurisdictions it has been established as an elementary principle of law that courts will not review the actions of governmental bodies or asministrative tribunals involving acts of discretion, in the absence of bad faith, fraud, capricious action or abuse of power; they will not inquire into the wisdom of such actions or into the details of the manner adopted to carry them into execution. It is true that the mere possession of discretionary power by an administrative body does not make it wholly immune from judicial review, but the scope of that review is limited. . . . That the court might have a different opinion or judgment in regard to the action of the agency is not a sufficient ground for interference; Judicial discretion may not be substituted for Administrative discretion. . . .'

Id. at 572--573, 109 A.2d at 334--335 (emphasis in original).

Moreover, such judicial deference to the administrative determination is particularly appropriate in reviewing the approval of school reorganization plans by the State Board of Education. In Chartiers Valley Joint Schools v. Allegheny County Board of School Directors, 418 Pa. 520, 211 A.2d 487 (1965), we had occasion to comment upon the nature of the School Reorganization Act of 1963, P.L. 564, 24 P.S. §§ 2--202, et seq., the original and materially similar predecessor of Act 150:

'To achieve the Legislature's announced objectives, the Act establishes a detailed procedure which utilizes local school officials and other experts in the field of education at various local, district, and county levels in the...