Appeal of Staub

• Decision Date: 05 April 1895
• Citation: Appeal of Staub, 33 A. 615, 66 Conn. 127 (Conn. 1895)
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Appeal of STAUB.

33 A. 615

66 Conn. 127

Appeal of STAUB.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

April 5, 1895.

Appeal from superior court, Litchfield county; Robinson, Judge.

Sarah Peck claimed an allowance as widow of John Peck, deceased, during the settlement of his estate. From a decree of the probate court authorizing the allowance, Nicholas Staub appealed to the superior court, which reversed the decree of the probate court, and Sarah Peck now appeals. Affirmed.

Lyman D. Brewster, for appellant.

James Huntington and Frank W. Marsh, for appellees Staub and others.

TORRANCE, J. The principal questions in this case arise upon the following written agreement: "Marriage being contemplated between John Peck, of New Milford, in Litchfield county and state of Connecticut, and Sarah Cranston, of Brooklyn, in the state of New York, and after marriage said parties intend to reside in the state of Connecticut, and said Peck having passed the meridian of his days (the parties make the laws of the state of Connecticut to govern this agreement), and by the laws of said state the parties can make a binding contract regarding their property, and what portion each shall have in the estate of the other on his or her decease, which shall be in bar and room of the portion he or she would have in such estate if such agreement had not been made: Now, if said marriage occurs, this covenant and agreement, made by and between the parties, is as follows: Each of said parties covenant and agree to perform their obligations and duties with and towards the other, as the relation of husband and wife demands during the continuance of said marriage relation. Said John Peck covenants and agrees, if said Sarah Cranston survives him, to pay her the sum of two thousand dollars six months after his decease, with interest after it is payable, said amount to be paid by his administrator or executor, from his estate, which sum is to be in room and in lieu of dower and all other rights and interest and claims said Sarah would have had in the estate of said John Peck if this agreement had not been made. Said Peck also covenants and agrees, if he survives the said Sarah, not to claim or receive any part or interest in her estate, but he will give up all interest he would otherwise have therein, and that he will release and convey all such claim or interest to her devisees or heirs at law, on their request. And the said Sarah Cranston, if said marriage takes place, covenants and agrees, if she survives the said Peck, to receive said sum of two thousand dollars as herein agreed, with interest after payable, in lieu and as full payment for her dower right and of all other claim and interest she otherwise would have had in his estate, and that she will not claim or receive any other part or share of the estate of said John Peck after his decease, but she will release and convey all other claim, right, or interest she may or might have therein if this agreement had not been made, on the request of the devisees or heirs at law of said John Peck. But this agreement is not to, and shall not, prevent said John Peck from giving her during his lifetime or by his last will and testament such property and sums as he may choose, nor shall it prevent her from claiming and receiving all such property and sums so given besides said sum of two thousand dollars. In witness whereof, the parties have hereunto, and to a duplicate hereof, set their hands, the day of November 30th, 1887."

After the execution of this agreement, the parties thereto intermarried, and resided in New Milford, in this state, where John Peck died testate, leaving the aforesaid Sarah, his widow, surviving him. Pending the settlement of his estate in the court of probate, the widow applied for an allowance, under the provisions of section 604 of the General Statutes of this state. His executors and residuary legatee opposed the allowance, on the ground that the widow, by virtue of the provisions of said written agreement, was barred and estopped from claiming or receiving the same The court of probate held otherwise, and decreed to her an allowance. The case then came by appeal to the superior court, where several reasons of appeal were filed, but all of them were subsequently withdrawn, save the first, which reads as follows: "That on November 30, 1887, and previous to her marriage with said John Peck, deceased, the appellee made and executed a written contract with said deceased (a copy of which is hereto annexed, marked 'Exhibit A'), by virtue of which contract so entered into by said parties said widow is barred and estopped from claiming or receiving any allowance for her support from said estate by said court, or otherwise than as provided in said marriage agreement." To this reason of appeal the following demurrer was filed: "The appellee, Sarah Peck, widow of said John Peck, demurs to the first reason of appeal, because there is nothing in said antenuptial agreement, marked 'Exhibit A,' which bars, estops, or prevents the court of probate which granted said allowance to her from so doing, or which bars, estops, or prevents her from receiving the same as a matter of law or equity." The superior court overruled said demurrer, and ordered the widow to answer over, which she neglected and refused to do. Thereupon the court reversed the decree of the court of probate from which said appeal had been taken; and from that judgment the widow took the present appeal to this court.

The principal question in the case relates to the effect of the antenuptial contract upon the right of the widow to claim or receive an allowance....