Appeal of Upper Providence Police Delaware County Lodge No. 27 Fraternal Order of Police

• Decision Date: 22 May 1987
• Citation: 514 Pa. 501,526 A.2d 315
• Parties: , 127 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2627, 8 Employee Benefits Cas. 1881 In re Appeal of UPPER PROVIDENCE POLICE DELAWARE COUNTY LODGE # 27 FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE From Award of Arbitrators. Appeal of UPPER PROVIDENCE TOWNSHIP. 101 E.D. 1986
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 315

526 A.2d 315

514 Pa. 501, 127 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2627,

8 Employee Benefits Cas. 1881

In re Appeal of UPPER PROVIDENCE POLICE DELAWARE COUNTY

LODGE # 27 FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE From Award of

Arbitrators.

Appeal of UPPER PROVIDENCE TOWNSHIP.

101 E.D. 1986

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued Jan. 29, 1987.

Decided May 22, 1987.

[514 Pa. 503] D. Barry Gibbons, Media, for appellant.

Alexander A. DiSanti, Media, for appellee.

Before NIX, C.J., and, LARSEN, FLAHERTY, McDERMOTT, HUTCHINSON, ZAPPALA and PAPADAKOS, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT

LARSEN, Justice.

We granted allocatur in this case to address two issues: (1) the proper scope of review of an arbitration award under "Act 111," Act of June 24, 1968, P.L. 237, No. 111, 43 P.S. §§ 217.1-217.10 (Supp.1986) ("Collective Bargaining By Policemen Or Firemen"); and (2) whether the lower courts erred in reversing the award of the arbitrators which denied certain post-retirement hospital and medical benefits for 1984.

Upper Providence Township (Township) bargained collectively under Act 111 with the representative of its police, the Fraternal Order of Police, Delaware County Lodge Number 27 (FOP), in an attempt to reach a collective bargaining agreement for the calendar years 1983 and 1984. On December 22, 1982, an agreement was reached on all but one issue, as to which an impasse was declared and impasse arbitration was triggered under section 4 of Act 111, 43 P.S. § 217.4.

An arbitration panel was selected and the Township and the FOP submitted to the panel an extensive agreement on the agreed-to items, and a stipulation as to the one issue in dispute, the legality of the hospital and medical benefits that were currently being provided to retired bargaining unit members. The stipulation of the parties concerning this impasse issue reads as follows:

27. Medical After Retirement : Although the Upper Providence Police through their bargaining representative, Lodge # 27, Fraternal Order of Police, dispute the Township's attempt to bargain over this issue for 1983 and 1984 because of the Township's failure to identify this issue as "an issue in dispute" within the meaning of Act 111, the parties agree that the following benefit first agreed to in the 1976-77 collective bargaining agreement is deemed to be illegal by the Township :

The full hospital and medical benefits in effect at the time of retirement (whether for service or disability) to continue annually after retirement until death. These benefits shall be offset by any similar benefits received from the government or any other employer.

Although the Township deems this benefit to be illegal, the FOP # 27 believes that the Township should be estopped from asserting any possible illegality because this benefit has been renewed through two collective bargaining agreements and one arbitration award since it was first agreed to by the Township in 1976. The parties to this contract, however, agree to submit the issue of illegality of this benefit for the consideration of the Board of Arbitration. (emphasis added).

An arbitration hearing was conducted on December 12, 1982, and on December 23, 1982, two of the three arbitrators rendered the following award:

1. The attached Stipulation of the Parties dated December 22, 1982, concerning certain terms and conditions of employment of Policemen of the Township of Upper Providence for the calendar years 1983 and 1984, commencing January 1, 1983, is incorporated and made a part hereof.

2. For calendar year 1983 The full hospital and medical benefits in effect at the time of retirement (whether for service or disability) to continue annually after retirement until death. These benefits shall be offset by any similar benefits received from the government or any other employer.

3. For calendar year 1984:

The benefits set forth in number 2. above shall not be in effect for calendar year 1984.

While it is not apparent from this award (which was rendered without opinion), the stipulation of the parties and the dissenting opinion of arbitrator Rodger Mutzel, Esq., make it clear that a "majority of this panel has concluded that this benefit is illegal and therefore has refused to continue this benefit beyond 1983." (From arbitrator Mutzel's dissenting opinion at R. 23a.) (The parties to this appeal agree that the majority members of the arbitration panel reached their decision to deny post-retirement hospital and medical benefits for 1984 based on their determination that such benefits were illegal. See Opinion Announcing Judgment of the Court per Rogers, J., at 93 Pa.Cmwlth. 272, 502 A.2d 263 at 264.)

The FOP appealed from the award of the arbitrators denying these benefits for 1984 to the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County. ¹ By order of January 26, 1984, that court dismissed the FOP's appeal, finding that it had no jurisdiction over the matter. However, the lower court granted the FOP's petition for reargument, held a rehearing, and issued a supplemental opinion on June 15, 1984, reversing its previous order. This opinion held that the court had jurisdiction to hear the FOP's appeal, that it could review the arbitration award for errors of law, and that the arbitrators committed an error of law in revoking the post-retirement benefits because such benefits "are legal and irrevocable, once given."

The Township appealed that determination to the Commonwealth Court which affirmed on December 4, 1985, with Judge Rogers authoring the opinion announcing the judgment of the court, Judge Blatt concurring in the result only, and Judge Doyle filing a concurring and dissenting opinion. Judge Rogers held that the court of common pleas had jurisdiction to hear an appeal of an award of arbitrators under Act 111 and the City of Washington v. Police Department of Washington, 436 Pa. 168, 259 A.2d 437 (1969). (In City of Washington, this Court held that, despite the language of Act 111 that the determination of a board of arbitrators "shall be final on the issue or issues in dispute ... [and] No appeal therefrom shall be allowed to any court....", 43 P.S. § 217.7(a), nevertheless the courts have jurisdiction to review Act 111 arbitration awards in the nature of narrow certiorari. Such review is limited to questions concerning (1) the jurisdiction of the arbitrators; (2) the regularity of the proceedings; (3) an excess in exercise of the arbitrators' powers; and (4) constitutional questions. City of Washington, supra at 174, 259 A.2d at 441; Guthrie v. Borough of Wilkinsburg, 508 Pa. 590, 597, 499 A.2d 570, 573 (1985)). Accepting the argument of the FOP, Judge Rogers further held that the Act 111/City of Washington scope of review of an arbitration award had been expanded by the Uniform Arbitration Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 7301-7320, to permit a court to review the award for errors of law and to require the reviewing court to "modify or correct the award where it is contrary to law." 502 A.2d at 265. Judge Rogers then affirmed the trial court's determination that the arbitrators had committed an error of law in denying post-retirement hospital and medical benefits for 1984, albeit on somewhat different reasoning than the trial court. 502 A.2d at 266-67.

In his concurring and dissenting opinion, Judge Doyle disagreed with the conclusion that the Uniform Arbitration Act had expanded or modified the Act 111/City of Washington scope of review and with the conclusion that an arbitration award may be reviewed for errors of law. He agreed with Judge Rogers, however, that the arbitration award denying the contested benefits for 1984 should be reversed, not because the arbitrators had committed an error of law but because the award was an illegal diminishment of benefits and, therefore, in excess of the arbitrators' powers.

We granted the Township's petition for allowance of appeal. Although we disapprove of the reasoning and conclusion of the lower courts regarding the scope of review of an arbitration award under Act 111, we will affirm the reversal of the elimination of post-retirement hospital and medical benefits for 1984 on the grounds that, as Judge Doyle correctly observed, such award was in excess of the arbitrators' powers.

The Township initially asserts that there is no "general right of appeal from an award of arbitrators" under Act 111, and that the court of common pleas had no jurisdiction to review the arbitration award in this case. We may quickly dispose of this argument which, once again, confuses the issue of subject matter jurisdiction with issues concerning the proper exercise of that jurisdiction. As we have noted, and as the Township concedes, policemen may seek judicial review of an Act 111 arbitration award in the nature of narrow certiorari to determine whether the arbitrators had jurisdiction, the regularity of the proceedings, whether the arbitrators exceeded their powers and authority, and constitutional questions. This right of review by way of narrow certiorari was predicated in City of Washington upon our former Supreme Court Rule 68 1/2, but subsequent cases of this Court have made it clear that, although "Rule 68 1/2 has since been repealed, we will retain the stated scope of review." Township of Moon v. Police Officers of Township of Moon, 508 Pa. 495, 500 n. 4, 498 A.2d 1305 (1985). Whether the review of the award is called an appeal, certiorari, or something else, a court of common pleas has jurisdiction to review an Act 111 arbitration award. It is not the label attached to the pleadings and papers but the subject matter of the case or controversy that governs the right to lodge an appeal or seek review, and dictates the proper court in which to seek such review. See Pa.R.A.P. Rules 1102-03 (Improvident Appeals and Improvident Petitions for Allowance of Appeal) and Rules 1503-04 (Improvident Appeals or Plenary Actions and Improvident Petitions for Review). The court of common pleas obviously had subject matter jurisdiction to review the...