Appelby v. State

• Decision Date: 11 May 1943
• Docket Number: 27679.
• Parties: APPELBY et al. v. STATE.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

48 N.E.2d 646

221 Ind. 544

APPELBY et al. v. STATE.

No. 27679.

Supreme Court of Indiana

May 11, 1943

Rehearing Denied June 24, 1943.

See 49 N.E.2d 533.

Appeal from Randolph Circuit Court; John W. Macy Judge.

Andrew Jacobs, of Indianapolis, and Ben Meyers, of Chicago, Ill., for appellants.

James A. Emmert, Atty. Gen., Frank E. Coughlin, Deputy Atty. Gen., and David W. Dennis, of Richmond, for appellee.

SHAKE Judge.

The appellants were convicted on an indictment charging them and twenty-three others with resisting and obstructing peace officers by use of dangerous and deadly weapons. Errors are assigned upon the overruling of appellants' motion to quash the indictment, motion in arrest of judgment, and motion for a new trial.

Under the first two assignments it is contended that the indictment is insufficient to charge a public offense on account of its failure to allege that the peace officers were known by the appellants to be such. The statute upon which the prosecution was based is as follows:

'Whoever shall forcibly assault, resist, oppose, obstruct, prevent, impede or interfere with any peace or police officer of this state, or any person assisting him, while such officer is arresting or attempting to arrest any person, or while such officer is engaged in the execution of any of the duties of such peace or police officer, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not to exceed one hundred dollars ($100) or imprisoned in the county jail or Indiana State Farm not more than six (6) months, or both; and whoever shall draw, use or attempt to use a firearm, deadly or dangerous weapon, or commit a bodily injury upon any peace or police officer of this state, or upon any person assisting such peace or police officer, while assaulting, resisting, opposing, obstructing, preventing, impeding or interfering with any peace of police officer, when such officer is arresting or attempting to arrest any person, or while such officer is engaged in the execution of any of the duties of such officer, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, upon conviction thereof, shall be imprisoned in the state prison for a period of one (1) year.' Acts 1929, ch. 101, § 1, p. 310, § 10-1005, Burns' 1942 Replacement, § 2525, Baldwin's 1934.

In charging a crime it is not necessary to allege guilty knowledge on the part of the defendant, unless such knowledge is an ingredient of the definition of the offense. State v. Freeman, 1842, 6 Blackf. 248, 27 Am.Jur., Indictments and Informations, § 69, p. 632; State v. Cornish, 66 N.H. 329, 21 A. 180, 11 L.R.A. 191. Since the above statute does not embrace the element of knowledge it was not necessary to allege it. The indictment followed the language of the statute and that is sufficient.

The appellants' motion for a new trial occupies forty-five (45) of the six hundred sixty-eight (668) pages of their printed brief. Sixty-six (66) separate and distinct legal propositions are presented for our determination. We cannot bring ourselves to believe that the framers of our State Constitution had any such situation in mind when they enjoined upon us the obligation to 'give a statement in writing of each question arising in the record', Art. 7, § 5, or when they imposed upon the General Assembly the duty to provide for 'the speedy publication of the decisions' of this court. Art. 7, § 6. At the risk of being charged with failing to meet our responsibilities, we feel obliged to limit our consideration of this case to what appear to be the principal contentions. We have pointed out in the past that one prejudicial error clearly presented is enough to accomplish a reversal by this court. Weer v. State, 1941, 219 Ind. 217, 36 N.E.2d 787, 37 N.E.2d 537.

Complaint is made of the refusal of the trial court to permit the jury to see an exhibition of a newsreel movie film depicting the scene at the commission of the alleged crime. When objection was made to the offer of this exhibit the court conducted a preliminary inquiry in chambers and out of the presence of the jury. The record discloses that the film was excluded because its sequence and chronology had been destroyed by cutting and rearrangement. Still-life photographic prints made from the movie film were admitted, however.

The law keeps pace with scientific advancement, and movie films have been recognized as possessing evidentiary value under proper circumstances. Morris v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours, 346 Mo. 126, 139 S.W.2d 984, 129 A.L.R. 352, 361. A motion picture film is but a series of still photographs (32 C.J.S., Evidence, § 709) capable of being displayed so as to simulate action. The fact that the continuity of the film in controversy had been disturbed was enough to warrant its exclusion (15 Ind.Law Journal 408, 434), but this did not affect the probative value of the individual prints made therefrom, which were admitted. We think the court's action was proper.

During the course of the trial...