Apple Grp., Ltd. v. Granger Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals

Decision Date17 June 2015
Docket NumberNo. 2014–0301.,2014–0301.
Citation41 N.E.3d 1185,144 Ohio St.3d 188,2015 Ohio 2343
Parties APPLE GROUP, LTD., Appellant, v. GRANGER TOWNSHIP BOARD OF ZONING APPEALS et al., Appellees.
CourtOhio Supreme Court

Berns, Ockner & Greenberger, L.L.C., Sheldon Berns, Benjamin J. Ockner, and Gary F. Werner, Beachwood, for appellant.

Dean Holman, Medina County Prosecuting Attorney, and Brian M. Richter, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellees.

Brosius, Johnson & Griggs, L.L.C., Donald F. Brosius, Peter N. Griggs, Columbus, and Jennifer L. Huber, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Ohio Township Association.

LANZINGER

, J.

{¶ 1} This zoning case involves the interpretation of a single statutory phrase. We are asked to determine whether R.C. 519.02

requires a township to adopt a "comprehensive plan" separately from its zoning resolution. We hold that a comprehensive plan pursuant to R.C. 519.02 may be included within a township's zoning resolution and need not be a separate and distinct document. Furthermore, a zoning resolution is enacted in accordance with a comprehensive plan, as required by R.C. 519.02, if it (1) reflects current land uses, (2) allows for change, (3) promotes public health and safety, (4) uniformly classifies similar areas, (5) clearly defines district locations and boundaries, and (6) identifies the use or uses to which each property may be put.

I. Case Background

{¶ 2} Appellant, Apple Group, Ltd. ("Apple"), purchased 88 acres of undeveloped land in Granger Township ("Granger") in May 2006. The property was zoned R–1 residential, which permits the construction of single-family and two-family homes on a minimum lot size of two acres. Granger's zoning resolution also provides for an R–2 residential district that allows two to three dwelling units per acre if they can be serviced by central water and sanitary sewers at the time of development. Because Apple sought to develop a subdivision consisting of 44 single-family homes situated on approximately one-acre lots on its property, it applied to appellee Granger Township Board of Zoning Appeals ("BZA") for 176 variances, four variances for each of the 44 proposed lots.1 The BZA denied the variance application.

{¶ 3} Apple filed an administrative appeal, and the BZA's decision was affirmed by the Medina County Court of Common Pleas. The court found that the BZA's decision was supported by a preponderance of the evidence and that the request for variances was in reality an attempt to rezone the land to a new district unlike the R–1 or R–2 residential districts, a request that the BZA was not authorized to grant. Apple also filed a complaint for declaratory judgment, seeking a declaration that Granger's zoning resolution establishing the R–1 zoning classification is unconstitutional and beyond the authority delegated to Granger in R.C. Chapter 519. A magistrate issued a decision denying Apple's claims. With respect to the constitutional claim, the magistrate concluded, "Granger Township's desire to maintain the rural character of its land is a legitimate governmental goal, which may be regulated by its zoning resolution." In denying Apple's claim that Granger exceeded its authority in enacting the zoning resolution without enacting a separate comprehensive plan, the magistrate concluded, "The zoning resolution itself meets the statutory requirement of a comprehensive plan, because it has the essential characteristics of a comprehensive plan; it encompasses all geographic parts of the community and integrates all functional elements." The common pleas court adopted the magistrate's findings, and Apple appealed to the Ninth District Court of Appeals.

{¶ 4} At the court of appeals, Apple argued that the trial court's declaration that Granger had complied with R.C. 519.02

's requirement that a zoning resolution be adopted in accordance with a comprehensive plan was in error and was against the manifest weight of the evidence. The court of appeals concluded that the township's failure to enact a separate comprehensive plan did not mean it lacks authority to adopt a zoning resolution. The court reasoned that the purpose of the requirement in R.C. 519.02 for a comprehensive plan is to prevent piecemeal zoning and ensure that someone purchasing property will be able to determine in advance how the property may be used. The appellate court rejected Apple's argument that a zoning ordinance cannot constitute a comprehensive plan and concluded that the trial court's decision that Granger's zoning resolution constitutes a comprehensive plan pursuant to R.C. 519.02 was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

{¶ 5} An appeal was taken to this court, and we accepted Apple's two propositions of law:

For purposes of a township's exercise of its statutory zoning power, the "zoning plan" that R.C. Chapter 519 empowers townships to adopt by resolution, which includes the zoning regulations and a zoning map, is not identical to or a substitute for the "comprehensive plan" identified in R.C. 519.02

, with which R.C. 519.02 requires the "zoning plan" to be "in accordance."

A township's zoning regulations, adopted by resolution under R.C. Chapter 519, are, standing alone, insufficient as a matter of law to establish that such regulations are "in accordance with a comprehensive plan," as R.C. 519.02 requires.

See 139 Ohio St.3d 1404, 2014-Ohio-2245, 9 N.E.3d 1062

. In short, Apple argues that a comprehensive plan must be enacted separately and apart from zoning regulations.

II. Legal Analysis

{¶ 6} "Zoning" is "the government's ‘regulation of the character and intensity of real estate uses through police power.’ [American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers, The Dictionary of Real Estate Appraisal 332 (1984) ]." Developers Diversified Ltd. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 84 Ohio St.3d 32, 36, 701 N.E.2d 975 (1998)

. In Ohio, the authority of a township to enact zoning ordinances derives not from the township's inherent authority or the Ohio Constitution, but from the General Assembly. Torok v. Jones, 5 Ohio St.3d 31, 32, 448 N.E.2d 819 (1983), citing Yorkavitz v. Columbia Twp. Bd. of Trustees, 166 Ohio St. 349, 142 N.E.2d 655 (1957).

{¶ 7} R.C. Chapter 519 sets forth the method by which townships may regulate land use. R.C. 519.02(A)

grants authority to a township's board of trustees to regulate the size and location of buildings and other structures and the use of land for residences or other purposes:

Except as otherwise provided in this section, in the interest of the public convenience, comfort, prosperity, or general welfare, the board by resolution, in accordance with a comprehensive plan, may regulate the location of, set back lines for, and the uses of buildings and other structures * * * and the uses of land * * * in the unincorporated territory of the township, and may establish reasonable landscaping standards and architectural standards excluding exterior building materials in the unincorporated territory of the township.

(Emphasis added.)

{¶ 8} Apple's appeal does not challenge the reasonableness of Granger's zoning resolution but only whether the township's resolution may also function as its comprehensive plan. According to Apple, a comprehensive plan must be created first to assure the public that the township's zoning has been properly considered. Apple argues that a zoning resolution must implement the comprehensive plan. Granger argues that its Revised Zoning Resolution is the comprehensive plan identified in R.C. 519.02

. The parties thus disagree over the meaning of the phrase "in accordance with a comprehensive plan."

A "Comprehensive Plan"

{¶ 9} There is no standard definition for "comprehensive plan" in the context of zoning law. The original Standard Zoning Enabling Act ("SZEA"), which the United States Department of Commerce issued in 1922 as a model for state legislation enabling and limiting local zoning power, included a requirement that zoning decisions be made "in accordance with a comprehensive plan." Hirokawa, Making Sense of a "Misunderstanding of the Planning Process": Examining the Relationship Between Zoning and Rezoning Under the Change–or–Mistake Rule, 44 Urb.Law. 295, 299 (2012)

. However, "[t]he term ‘comprehensive plan’ was not defined in the SZEA, and so both its purpose and confines of legal sufficiency have not been well understood or enforced." Id. at 300. The view of the majority of states adopting the SZEA language is that "comprehensive planning requires some form of forethought and reasoned consideration, as opposed to a separate plan document that becomes an overarching constitution guiding development." Sullivan & Richter, Out of the Chaos: Towards a National System of Land–Use Procedures, 34 Urb.Law. 449, 454 (2002). A minority of states view the comprehensive plan as "an independent document separate from the comprehensive zoning ordinance." Benintendi, Comment, The Role of the Comprehensive Plan in Ohio: Moving Away from the Traditional View, 17 U.Dayton L.Rev. 207, 217 (1991).

{¶ 10} While R.C. Chapter 519 offers detailed instructions on how townships are to adopt or amend zoning plans or resolutions, it does not define the term "comprehensive plan" or offer any specific guidance on the standard to be used to establish one. But we have considered the phrase "in accordance with a comprehensive plan," as used in R.C. 519.02

, and stated indirectly what it was not in Cassell v. Lexington Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 163 Ohio St. 340, 127 N.E.2d 11 (1955). There, we held:

A township zoning regulation, which provides merely that a section of a township, one square mile in area, shall be zoned for farming, residential, commercial and recreational uses, and which does not specify therein which portions of said section may be used for any or all of such purposes or is not accompanied by a map designating such use areas, is not adopted in accordance with a comprehensive plan.

Id., paragraph two of the syllabus. Thus, by...

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