Application of Citron
Decision Date | 23 January 1964 |
Docket Number | Patent Appeal No. 7030. |
Citation | 51 CCPA 869,326 F.2d 418 |
Parties | Application of Robert R. CITRON. |
Court | U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) |
James H. Littlepage, Washington, D. C. (Herman Hersh, Ooms, McDougall & Hersh, Chicago, Ill., of counsel), for appellant.
Clarence W. Moore, Washington, D. C. (Raymond E. Martin, Washington, D. C., of counsel), for Commissioner of Patents.
Before WORLEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, MARTIN, SMITH, and ALMOND, Judges.
This appeal is from the decision of the Patent Office Board of Appeals affirming the rejection of all claims remaining in appellant's application serial No. 163,787 filed May 23, 1950, for "Method of Implanting Cancer Tissue."
This same application with the same claims (plus others now abandoned) was before us in appeal No. 6276 which we decided January 22, 1958, 251 F.2d 619, 45 CCPA 773, and we refer to the opinion therein to explain the subject matter of the invention.
Subsequent to our former decision, the following events occurred. March 26, 1958, the Patent Office issued a notice of allowance which the Issue and Gazette Branch shortly withdrew on April 9, stating that the examiner would explain the reasons. April 22 the examiner sent appellant a letter in the nature of an office action stating that the application had been reconsidered, citing four new references, and rejecting all claims on the ground of unpatentability over the new references for various reasons. October 3 appellant cancelled some claims and amended others and on April 1, 1959, received a final rejection. October 1, 1959, appeal was taken to the Board of Appeals. November 27 appellant cancelled four claims. On March 28, 1962, the board affirmed the examiner's rejection of all pending claims as unpatentable over the references. This appeal followed.
Appellant's first challenge is to the effect that the Patent Office has subjected him to "double jeopardy" and urges us to refuse to permit the Patent Office to reopen this case. He complains that the board completely ignored the same plea. It was so clearly within not only the right but the duty of the Patent Office to do what it did that we would follow the board's treatment of the question but for the fact that appellant devotes nearly half of his brief to it, so as to call at least for summary consideration.
The principles and the law involved were fully treated by the Court of Appeals, District of Columbia, in The Jeffrey Mfg. Co. v. Kingsland, Comr.Pat., 86 U.S.App.D.C. 13, 179 F.2d 35.1 Appellant discusses this case at length, suggesting that it is "bad law." We do not agree that that opinion states "bad law." We do, however, find three of appellant's assumptions to be seriously in error. The first is that in our former decision in this case we held that the application at bar contained "patentable subject matter" and the other two are that we held the application to be "allowable," thus "directing the United States Patent Office to issue a patent." In deciding appeals from the board in patent cases we do none of these things. All we do is pass on the propriety of rejections brought before us for review. These cases are not of the type in which the concept of "double jeopardy" has any applicability.
While appellant may have just cause for complaint that the Patent Office should have operated more effectively in finding the closest prior art, which appears to have been available to it all during the prosecution, and in citing it early in the prosecution, this is of no moment whatever in deciding appellant's legal right to the appealed claims in the face of the new prior art now that it has been cited.
The Patent Office no longer relies for any purpose on any of the references which we considered in our former opinion and held collectively not to be a proper basis for rejection. The newly cited references are:
A review of appellant's specification brings to the fore the fact that he regarded as his invention broadly the improvement on the known method of simply introducing live cancer tissue into a laboratory animal which resided in "injecting into the peritoneal cavity of each animal a suspension of mechanically irritant particles and therewith or thereafter subjecting the animal to an intraperitoneal injection of cancer tissue." The supposed advantages were to increase the number of successful transplants or "takes" and a more rapid rate of growth of the cancer tissue. He described his preferred method of carrying out this invention by a single example after which he pointed out in his specification:
On the basis of the new references, the Patent Office position is recapitulated by the solicitor's brief as follows:
"* * * the Patent Office position is that (a) none of the references constitutes an anticipation, (b) that Jones et al. is the most pertinent reference in that it positively teaches injecting irritant particles followed by an injection of cancer tissue, (c) that repeated injection of irritant particles involves a mere duplication of steps without change of function, especially since after the injection of irritant particles by Jones et al., `the irritant particles were already present, and the quantity is not critical\', and (d) that Jones or Kline would suggest to one of ordinary skill in the art that the injection of irritant particles, taught by Jones et al., be repeated as often as desired."
Later on, the solicitor's brief states:
"In fact, it is quite clear that the failure to include irritant particles along with the second recited injection is all that keeps Jones et al. from constituting a complete anticipation of the method of claim 13."2
We have read the new references and have considered appellant's arguments relating thereto. We feel that the board was correct in its conclusions as expressed in the following excerpt from its well-reasoned opinion:
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