Application of Haas, Appeal No. 78-536.

Decision Date30 June 1978
Docket NumberAppeal No. 78-536.
PartiesApplication of Howard C. HAAS.
CourtU.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA)

Stanley H. Mervis, Cambridge, Mass., attorney of record, for appellant.

Charles A. Wendel, Arlington, Va., Karl F. Jorda, Ardsley, N. Y., Harold C. Wegner, Arlington, Va., attorneys of record, for American Patent of Law Assn., amicus curiae, Earl L. Tyner, Arlington, Va., Harry E. Westlake, Jr., Rahway, N. J., of counsel.

Joseph F. Nakamura, Washington, D. C., for the Commissioner of Patents; Fred E. McKelvey, Washington, D. C., of counsel.

Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, BALDWIN, LANE and MILLER, Judges.

MARKEY, Chief Judge.

This appeal is from a decision of the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) Board of Appeals (board) affirming a final rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 121 of claims 7 and 8 of application serial No. 821,511, filed May 2, 1969, entitled "Novel Polymerization Initiators."1 We reverse and remand.

Invention

The invention is a group of benzoyl peroxides:

useful as initiators for polymerization of vinyl-containing compounds or monomers. Haas states: "The substituent X does not participate in the polymerization initiation, but it does introduce into the resulting polymer a reactive, terminal group at one or both ends of the resulting polymer chain. Thus, while the resulting polymers may have different utilities, all of the claimed compounds have the same utility i. e., polymerization initiators."

Claims 7 and 8 are the sole claims on appeal:

7. A compound of the formula wherein X is selected from the group consisting of a-monosubstituted chloro, bromo and fluoro alkyl groups containing from 1-3 carbon atoms, inclusive; and
8. The invention of claim 7 wherein X is selected from the group consisting of a -monosubstituted chloro alkyl groups containing from 1-3 carbon atoms, inclusive; and
Background

Haas comes before this court for the second time on the present application. In In re Haas, 486 F.2d 1053, 179 USPQ 623 (CCPA 1973) (Haas I), the examiner held claims 1 and 2 withdrawn from further consideration under 35 U.S.C. § 121 as drawn to "multiple patentable sic, patentably distinct inventions."2 This court held that "withdrawal" of a claim from consideration, under those circumstances, constituted a rejection reviewable by the board under 35 U.S.C. §§ 7 and 134, and by this court under 35 U.S.C. § 141. The decision of the board to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction was reversed, and the case was remanded for further action consistent with the opinion.

The board remanded the case to the examiner. The examiner rejected claims 1 and 2 "as improper Markush claims and for misjoinder of invention under 35 USC 121" because drawn to multiple "independent and distinct" inventions. Though initially arguing that claims 1 and 2 did not define "independent and distinct" inventions, Haas expressly abandoned that argument on appeal to the board and conceded "that his recited Markush group contains `multiple independent and distinct inventions' in the same sense that a generic term may contain multiple independent and distinct inventions." In view of that concession, the board stated: "The only question presented by this appeal is whether or not a single claim which includes a plurality of independent and distinct inventions is legally rejectable."3 The board answered affirmatively.

In its opinion, the board viewed the examiner's rejection as based on claiming an improper Markush group and misjoinder of invention under 35 U.S.C. § 121. In affirming the examiner's rejection as based on claiming an improper Markush group, the board said "whether or not there is a statutory basis for such a rejection is of no real concern, since such a rejection has basis at least in established judicial doctrine,"4 and that it was unnecessary to decide whether § 121 provided a basis for rejection. The board, nonetheless, proceeded to decide that question. In the board's opinion, § 121 did provide basis for rejection because "the statute * * * broadly permits the Commissioner, in his discretion, to refuse to grant a patent on an application containing two or more independent and distinct inventions."5 Additionally, the board entered rejections under 37 CFR 1.196(b) based upon § 102(b), § 112, first paragraph, and § 112, second paragraph. One board member, dissenting-in-part, stated that he did not agree that "independent and distinct inventions" were claimed, despite Haas' admission.

Haas elected to carry on further prosecution before the examiner. 37 CFR 1.196(b). Following an amendment adding two claims numbered 6 and 7, the examiner finally rejected claims 1, 2, 6 and 7, inter alia, "as improper Markush claims and misjoinder under 35 USC 121." Other rejections included res judicata (claims 1 and 2), 35 U.S.C. § 132 (claims 6 and 7, new matter), and 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (claims 1, 2, 6 and 7). A claim 5, apparently originally allowed, was rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, because the board's § 1.196(b) rejection under § 112, first paragraph, of claims 1 and 2 applied to claim 5 as well. Haas proposed present claim 8 in an after-final amendment, 37 CFR 1.116, entered by the examiner with the understanding that claim 8 stood rejected for the same reasons applied to claims 5, 6 and 7.

On appeal, under a heading "35 USC 121 Rejection," the board stated: "This rejection, as acknowledged by the appellant, raises the same issues as were involved in the Examiner's rejection under 35 USC 121 involved in the previous appeal." Noting that Haas had not raised any additional arguments and relied upon arguments made in the previous appeal, the board affirmed the rejection "for the reasons given by us in the previous appeal." The board proceeded to reverse the § 132 rejection, the res judicata rejection, and the § 102(b) rejection as to claims 7 and 8, but affirmed the § 102(b) rejection as to claims 1, 2, 5 and 6, and affirmed the § 112, first paragraph rejection of claims 1, 2, 5 and 6. The board further entered a 37 CFR 1.196(b) rejection of claims 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, and 8 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph. The dissenting board member in the previous appeal filed a concurrence again expressing his opinion that the claims, particularly claims 7 and 8, did not recite independent and distinct...

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8 cases
  • In re Harnisch, Appeal No. 79-614.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA)
    • 12 Junio 1980
    ...appealed claims under 35 U.S.C. § 121. Citing our decisions in In re Weber, 580 F.2d 455, 198 USPQ 328 (CCPA 1978), and In re Haas, 580 F.2d 461, 198 USPQ 334 (CCPA 1978), decided subsequent to the examiner's rejection, the board stated that "35 U.S.C. § 121 does not form the basis for reje......
  • Bayer Aktiengesellschaft v. Duphar Intern. Research B.V., 84-600
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Federal Circuit
    • 28 Junio 1984
    ...based on section 121 have since been ruled to be improper. In re Weber, 580 F.2d 455, 198 USPQ 328 (CCPA 1978); In re Haas, 580 F.2d 461, 198 USPQ 334 (CCPA 1978).5 Prior art patents cited during prosecution include, inter alia, the following:6 Section 285 states:Sec. 285. Attorney feesThe ......
  • Godtfredsen v. Banner, Civ. A. No. 79-1555.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Columbia
    • 5 Septiembre 1980
    ...was a matter "not ancillary" to priority. 5 Plaintiffs rely on In re Weber, 580 F.2d 455 (Cust. & Pat.App.1978) and In re Haas, 580 F.2d 461 (Cust. & Pat.App.1978) which held that a claim in a patent application may not be rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 121 on the basis that it contains indepen......
  • Application of Weber
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA)
    • 30 Junio 1978
    ... ...         Appellants contend that the examiner's action in withdrawing claims 8-13, 16, 17, 20, 22 and 23 from consideration as drawn to nonelected inventions constitutes a rejection under the holding of In re Haas, 486 F.2d 1053, 179 USPQ 623 (CCPA 1973), and, therefore, the board improperly found a lack of jurisdiction. We do not agree. Clearly our decision in In re Hengehold, 58 CCPA 1099, 440 F.2d 1395, 169 USPQ 473 (1971), disposed of the theory that a restriction requirement and the subsequent action ... ...
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