Application of Larsen, Patent Appeal No. 6686.
Decision Date | 24 October 1961 |
Docket Number | Patent Appeal No. 6686. |
Citation | 292 F.2d 531 |
Court | U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) |
Parties | Application of Aubrey A. LARSEN. |
Laurence & Laurence, Washington, D. C. (Dean Laurence and Herbert I. Sherman, Washington, D. C., of counsel) for appellant.
Clarence W. Moore, Washington, D. C., (R. E. Martin, Washington, D. C., of counsel) for the Commissioner of Patents.
Before WORLEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, MARTIN, and SMITH, Associate Judges, and Judge WILLIAM H. KIRKPATRICK.1
This is an appeal from the decision of the Board of Appeals of the United States Patent Office affirming the rejection by the Primary Examiner of claims 11 to 20, inclusive, and 22 of appellant's application, No. 653,289, for a patent on organic compounds and processes of preparing them. All the appealed claims are directed to processes, the claims to the compounds having been allowed.
Since the issue is essentially one of law, the scope of the claims is not material, and it is unnecessary to reproduce any claim here.
The claimed processes involve the production of esters of substituted benzoic acids by reacting an alkali metal salt of such an acid and an appropriate halohydrin or epoxide. The compounds reacted are conceded to be old. The Taub et al. patent shows the production of an ester by reacting an appropriate alkali metal salt of a substituted benzoic acid and a halohydrin. The Guest patent discloses the use of an epoxide for esterification of the benzoic acid derivative and, as noted by the board, was relied on mainly in connection with claim 22 which involves the use of an epoxide.
The issue presented here, therefore, is whether a process for making a patentable compound is, ipso facto, a patentable process.
There is substantial discussion in the briefs here as to whether the claimed processes would be obvious in view of the prior art, but, as we understand the board's decision, the principal basis of rejection is that appellant's invention resides solely in the product and is not properly defined by the process claims. This appears from the following statement in the board's opinion:
While the entire record of appellant's application has not been presented here, it is clear from the examiner's answer to the appeal that the allowance of the claims to the compounds was based on the fact that they possessed unique, and presumably unexpected, properties. Since there was nothing to indicate that the compounds, when made, would have these properties, it was not obvious to make the compounds. In such a case the allowance of claims to the compounds must depend on the proposition that it was unobvious to conceive the idea of producing them, within the meaning of Title 35 U.S.C. § 103.
Under these circumstances, however, the inventive concept is that of the compounds themselves. When they have been conceived, the processes by which they may be prepared may or may not be obvious. If, as is the case here, such processes, given the idea of the compound, are obvious then it is apparent that the invention resides in the compounds per se and is not properly defined as a process.
The fallacy of appellant's contention that "if a product be patentable, a claim to a process for producing such product is patentable" is apparent upon considering the not infrequent situations in which a new product may be made by any one of several obvious processes. It seems clear that in such a case each of those obvious methods could not properly be considered patentable, and yet there is logically no more reason for allowing claims to any one than to the others. The fact that an applicant sees fit to disclose a particular one of the processes should have no bearing on its patentability.
A case in point is Wirebounds Patents Co. et al. v. H. R. Gibbons Box Co., 7 Cir., 25 F.2d 363, 365. In holding the method claims there involved unpatentable, the court said:
* * * "
Another situation somewhat similar to the instant one was involved in In re Kulieke, 277 F.2d 948, 951, 47 CCPA 943. There claims had been allowed on a railway coupler knuckle of specific construction and appellant sought the allowance of claims on a core mold assembly designed for casting the coupler. In refusing the claims on the ground that the invention resided solely in the coupler, the court said:
While that case relates to the mold for making a product rather than a process of making it, the same reasoning is applicable in both cases. When the sole inventive concept resides in the product the claims should be limited to product claims.
Appellant relies heavily on decisions in Canada and Great Britain which allegedly hold process claims allowable under circumstances similar to those of the instant case. We have repeatedly held that, in view of the differences between foreign patent laws and those of the United States, the allowance of patent claims in foreign countries is not pertinent to the question whether similar claims should be allowed here; In re Guinot, 76 F.2d 134, 22 CCPA 1067; In re Kleine Pfannenstiel, and Matthaes, 83 F.2d 928, 23 CCPA 1216; and In re Kluter, 92 F.2d 906, 25 CCPA 730. No reason appears for reaching a different conclusion here.
This is not a case in which it is doubtful whether the invention resides in the process or the product. Clearly the invention lies in the compounds themselves, by whatever process produced, and we agree with the board that the allowance of claims to a particular, although obvious, method of producing them which happens to be disclosed in appellant's application would not constitute a proper definition of appellant's invention.
In view of the foregoing conclusion it is unnecessary to consider the extensive arguments advanced in the briefs as to what is meant by the expression "that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made" in 35 U.S.C. § 103.
The decision is affirmed.
Affirmed.
I reach the conclusion to affirm on the basis only of the following reasoning.
If we analyze patentability in the terms provided for us by Congress, we have to apply the prerequisites of novelty, utility, and unobviousness to the subject matter claimed, which is a process.
Utility can be disposed of because it has not been questioned by the Patent Office, and properly so because one could not very well contend that a process by which a product can successfully be made has no utility.
Novelty we have, not in the sense of manipulative procedures, but only in a selection of known compounds to be reacted. The examiner admits the presence of novelty. So far as manipulation is concerned, all the claims call for is "reacting." It is not new in chemistry to react two inherently reactive compounds. It has not been shown, however, that the art discloses reacting A with B, to simplify the subject matter of the claimed processes, so we must admit there would be novelty in doing so.
Would it be obvious to react A with B? Here lies the crux of the problem. I agree with the examiner that "applicant obtains exactly what the art teaches will be obtained" and I do not understand that applicant denies it, in the sense of the exact product obtained. But, he says, the art does not suggest reacting A with B — the admittedly known materials reacted by what applicant admits is "a known type reaction procedure." We are asked, however, to give weight to "the material acted upon and...
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