Application of Ludtke
Decision Date | 06 May 1971 |
Docket Number | Patent Appeal No. 8513. |
Citation | 169 USPQ 563,441 F.2d 660 |
Parties | Application of William P. LUDTKE and George J. Sloan, Jr. |
Court | U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) |
S. Wm. Cochran, Washington, D. C., for the Commissioner of Patents. Edward E. Kubasiewicz, Washington, D. C., of counsel.
Before RICH, ALMOND, BALDWIN and LANE, Judges, and SKELTON, Judge, Customs Court, sitting by designation.
This is an appeal from the decision of the Patent Office Board of Appeals, adhered to on reconsideration, affirming the rejection of claims 1-7 of appellants' application entitled "Sequential Opening Parachute."1 No claims have been allowed.
The invention relates to a parachute canopy which will sequentially open and thus gradually decelerate. The result of such sequential opening is the reduction of the opening shock force on the parachute and on the load being carried by it. Appellants' parachute canopy is shown, in the fully opened form, in Fig. 1:
The canopy is constructed of a plurality of circumferentially complete panels (15, 17, and 19) of fabric material maintained separated by tie lines (27). The size of the spaces or gaps (21 and 23) between the panels is such that the outwardly disposed panel will sequentially deploy as the parachute's velocity of descent is reduced by the deployment of the prior inwardly disposed panels. This operation is achieved by spacing apart each panel a distance which provides a lower critical velocity, i. e., the velocity at which panel inflation occurs, for each outwardly disposed panel.
Claim 1 is illustrative:
Claims 2-7 add various minor details, such as the shape of the panels, etc. Except for claim 7, which is specifically directed to a parachute canopy using ribbon fabric for the panels, the claims on appeal have not been considered individually either by the Patent Office or by appellants.
The first problem it is necessary to settle is what grounds of rejection are before us and which references are involved in those rejections. In the final action, the examiner rejected claims 1-6 under 35 U.S.C. § 102 as anticipated by either Ball,2 Mallory,3 Eckstrom4 or Menget.5 Claim 7 was rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over either Ball, Mallory, Eckstrom, or Menget in view of Sepp, Jr.6 In his Answer, the examiner stated that claims 1-6 "have been rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102 as anticipated by the Menget reference" and that claim 7 "has been rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Ball or Menget each in view of Sepp, Jr." For reasons which become readily apparent, we reproduce the board's opinion in full:
Not too surprisingly, appellants requested reconsideration, inquiring as to whether new grounds of rejection were being made and, if so, what they were. Appellants assumed that the rejection of claims 1-6 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 was a new ground, but they weren't sure which references or combination of references were involved or how the references were being applied. In addition, appellants felt that some of the board's language implied that at least claim 1 was rejectable using Mallory alone (apparently under 35 U.S.C. § 102, although § 102 was never mentioned by the board), which would also be a new ground of rejection since Mallory was not listed by the examiner in his Answer as a reference being relied upon. In re Flint, 330 F.2d 363, 51 CCPA 1230 (1964); In re Corbin, 136 F.2d 713, 30 CCPA 1238 (1943). Likewise, although 35 U.S.C. § 112 was not mentioned, appellants felt that the board intended rejections thereunder (again at least for claim 1) as being based upon an insufficient disclosure and containing functional language. The board's response to appellants' request for reconsideration was:
We will consider only the rejection of claims 1-6 under 35 U.S.C. § 102 as anticipated by Menget and the rejections of claim 7 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Menget or Ball each in view of Sepp, Jr. (Sepp). These rejections were clearly set forth in the examiner's Answer; the board did not expressly reverse them, and therefore they are properly before us. In re Wagenhorst, 64 F.2d 780, 20 CCPA 991 (1933). We will not consider the numerous other possible rejections, which may or may not have been relied on, since we do not think appellants were adequately notified of the reasons for those rejections as required by procedural due process and 35 U.S.C. § 132. In re Hughes, 345 F.2d 184, 52 CCPA 1355 (1965); see In re Jacobson, 407 F.2d 890, 56 CCPA 982 (1969). We can see at least eighteen possible rejections (two § 112 rejections, one § 102, and 15 § 103 rejections, taking the various possible combinations of the references into consideration) in the board's opinion. None of these possible rejections was spelled out with any degree of particularity whatsoever, and we certainly can understand appellants' confusion in regard thereto. In addition, the solicitor would also have us consider the three § 102 and three § 103 rejections in the examiner's final rejection, even though they were dropped in the Answer. Appellants have attempted in their brief to guess at what the various rejections were and to respond to them. The fact that they have done so does not...
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