Application of Miller
Decision Date | 13 May 1971 |
Docket Number | Patent Appeal No. 8444. |
Citation | 441 F.2d 689,169 USPQ 597 |
Parties | Application of William A. MILLER. |
Court | U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) |
S. Wm. Cochran, Washington, D. C., for the Commissioner of Patents. Joseph F. Nakamura, Washington, D. C., of counsel.
Before RICH, ALMOND, BALDWIN and LANE, Judges, and FORD, Judge, United States Customs Court, sitting by designation.
This appeal is from the decision of the Patent Office Board of Appeals affirming the examiner's rejection of claims 1, 2, and 4-18 in appellant's application serial No. 321,353, filed November 4, 1963 for ultrafine particles of polytetrafluoroethylene and a method for making them. We reverse.
Polytetrafluoroethylene (hereinafter "PTFE") is the plastic well known under the trademark "Teflon." We are told that it is sold commercially in both powdered and powdered ultrafine form and that the powdered ultrafine PTFE as is and the powdered PTFE after further comminution are used to fabricate shaped articles. PTFE powder does not melt and flow even when heated under pressure, but ultrafine PTFE particles can be shaped under high pressure in a mold to a preform sufficiently strong and coherent to be removed from the mold. The preform can then be heated in a furnace to a temperature at which sintering occurs, resulting in coalescence of the particles into usable articles of the same shape as the preform.
Appellant claims PTFE in finely powdered, non-fibrous form and a method of preparing the powdered product consisting of grinding the PTFE powder commercially available in a particular type of air mill which is concededly old for other purposes. Commercially available PTFE powder has been ground in other types of air mills into ultrafine, fibrous particles before premolding, but appellant maintains that grinding such powder in this particular type of air mill, which mills and classifies sequentially, rather than simultaneously as in the previously used air mills, results in non-fibrous, ultrafine PTFE powder with significantly improved preform strength (unsintered flex strength). This is said to be advantageous because it reduces scrap reworking due to cracking on removal from the mold. Claims 1 and 2 are reproduced as illustrative, with subparagraphing supplied and the recitations principally in controversy emphasized:
The references relied on are:
Finally, the flex strength limitation is indefinite because it "fails to recite the temperature of molding and the compositional characteristics of the material molded, which obviously will profoundly affect the preform strength."
OPINIONThe principal rationale for the section 112 rejection was simply that unsintered flex strength is a property of compacted preforms made from PTFE powder rather than a property of the powder itself, and that only properties of the powder, as a powder, could be used in defining the powder claimed. Appellant argues that the powder's capability of being compacted into a preform having at least the specified "unsintered flex strength" of the preforms is a property of the powder which may be used to define the powder.
The first sentence of the second paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112 requires only that claims "set out and circumscribe a particular area with a reasonable degree of precision and particularity." In re Moore, 439 F.2d 1232, 1235, 58 CCPA (1971). In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we will assume, as we said in Moore, that what the claims define is what the applicant regards as his invention. If those skilled in the art can tell whether any particular PTFE powder is or is not within the scope of a claim, the claim fulfills its purpose as a definition. As we remarked recently in reversing a section 112 rejection made on the ground that particular language was "functional" and thus "indefinite," "we are unable to see merit in any proposition which would require the denial of a claim solely because of the type of language used to define the subject matter for which patent protection is sought." In re Swinehart, 439 F.2d 210, 212, N. 4, 58 CCPA (1971). See also In re Wakefield, 422 F.2d 897, 904, 57 CCPA 959, 967 (1970) ( ).
In this case, it seems to us that those skilled in the art will be in no uncertainty concerning what subject matter falls within the scope of the claims. The claims in question...
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