Application of Mott
Decision Date | 12 August 1976 |
Docket Number | Patent Appeal No. 76-568. |
Citation | 539 F.2d 1291 |
Parties | Application of James D. MOTT. |
Court | U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) |
John H. Dodge, II, Pravel & Wilson, Charles W. Hanor, Houston, Tex., attorneys of record, for appellant, James B. Gambrell, New York City, of counsel.
Joseph F. Nakamura, Washington, D.C., for Commissioner of Patents, John W. DeWhirst, Washington, D.C., of counsel.
Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, BALDWIN, LANE and MILLER, Judges.
This appeal is from the decision of the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) Board of Appeals (board) affirming the rejection of claims 39, 42, 44, 46, 50, and 57 of appellant's application serial No. 256,194, filed May 23, 1972,1 entitled "Pressure Operated Safety Valve with Lock Means." Other claims have been allowed. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
Appellant describes the general nature of his invention in his brief:
This invention relates to a control fluid pressure responsive safety valve for use in hydrocarbon producing wells to preclude hydrocarbons escaping from the well and polluting the surrounding environment in the event of damage to the well head by shutting in the production tubing below the well head. * * * Despite the apparent complexity of the patent drawings, the essence of valve operation is the reciprocating movement of an operator sleeve that is normally biased upwardly to effect valve closure and which is shifted downwardly by application of increased control fluid pressure to open the valve.
We need reproduce only claims 42, 44, and 46, and the rejected (but unappealed) claims from which they depend, in light of the rejections below:
The application on appeal is related to another application by appellant, serial No. 368,840 ('840) (not of record here), but is apparently not a parent, continuation, or continuation-in-part of that application, and it does not have the same disclosure. The '840 application contains claims copied, both verbatim and in modified form, from a patent to Taylor, No. 3,696,868, issued October 10, 1972, on an application filed December 18, 1970. These copied claims are identical to those on appeal. The '840 application has an effective filing date which is apparently subsequent to Taylor's. Although none of these matters is before us as part of the record certified by the PTO, cf. 35 U.S.C. §§ 143, 144, CCPA Rule 4.2, appellant and the solicitor base their positions on these matters as did the examiner and the board, so we shall take them as facts in this appeal.
An interference was declared between Taylor and the '840 application on one count. (No. 98,609.) The record contains papers relating to appellant's motion in the interference under Rule 231(a), 37 CFR 1.231(a),2 to substitute the application here on appeal for the '840 application. No decision has yet been made on this motion, and interference has been suspended, to await resolution of this appeal. Appellant's desire to retain the copied claims in both applications until the motion to substitute is decided is the prime motivation for this appeal.
All the appealed claims were rejected by the examiner on the ground of same-invention type double patenting, 35 U.S.C. § 101, on the corresponding claims in the '840 application.
The examiner relied on Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 822.013 in his second rejection of the claims and explained in the Examiner's Answer:
Applicant has received one or more actions on each set of claims and it appears that the applications and claims have had due consideration. Applicant is placing an excessive burden on the office by continuing prosecution of numerous sets of claims and consequently the double patenting rejection should be sustained.
The board agreed and in apparent recognition of the provisional nature of the rejection indicated, pursuant to Rule 196(c), 37 CFR 1.196(c), that appellant could overcome the rejection by cancelling the corresponding claims from the '840 application.
Claims 42, 44, and 46, which are verbatim copies of Taylor's claims, were rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112 as lacking sufficient supporting disclosure and under 35 U.S.C. § 132 for new matter (the appealed claims were put in the application by amendment). The § 112 rejections are based on the description requirement of § 112, first paragraph,4 as enablement and disclosure of best mode have not been questioned. The § 132 rejections are on the same basis.
On claim 42 the board found that the limitation "locking means * * * spaced from the operating means and then movable to a position engaging the operating means," is not supported in appellant's disclosure because he only discloses locking means in contact, i. e., not "spaced from," the operating sleeve of the valve when not activated by well pressure. The board held that claim 42 has to be construed in light of the disclosure in Taylor, where it originated, which shows a physical spacing between the locking means and the operating sleeve in all embodiments.
On claim 44 the examiner and the board found that the specification does not support the limitation "means at the surface for controlling control fluid pressure conducted through said control fluid conductor means to the valve in response to predetermined conditions." The board rejected appellant's contention that under In re Hawkins, 486 F.2d 569, 179 U.S.P.Q. 157 (Cust. & Pat.App.1973), he was entitled to rely on a statement in the specification referring to several U.S. patents as showing examples of "Ball-type safety valves * * * which have also been used in an attempt to provide automatic closing of wells to prevent well blowouts." The board said that these patents were cited only to show conventional ball-type safety valves and did not disclose means for controlling the fluid which acted "in response to predetermined conditions" as required by the claim. Since claim 44, like claim 42, depends from claim 40, the board also affirmed the rejection of claim 44 for the same reasons given for claim 42.
The examiner and the board found claim 46 to lack supporting disclosure for the limitation "in response to predetermined conditions of flow through the flow conductor and at the well surface," for the reason that appellant did not disclose controlling flow in response to surface conditions.
The board also entered a new ground of rejection on claims 40, 41, 43, and 45, inter alia, as anticipated by U. S. Patent No. 2,998,077, issued August 29, 1961, to Keithahn. Although these claims are not on appeal, this rejection is relevant to some of appellant's arguments concerning the § 112 and § 132 rejections.
OPINIONAs to this rejection, appellant argues, first, that his pending related application is not a "patent equivalent" which can properly afford the basis for a double patenting rejection and, second, that the facts of this case demonstrate "good and sufficient reason," under Rule 78(b), 37 CFR 1.78(b),5 for the PTO's not requiring elimination of the claims from one of his applications. As authority for the first proposition appellant relies on In re Hammell, 332 F.2d...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc.
...skilled in the art the information that the applicant has invented the specific subject matter later claimed." Id. at 914. 7. In re Mott, 539 F.2d 1291 (CCPA 1976). "The issue under this heading is whether appellant's specification, construed in light of the knowledge of those skilled in th......
-
Plastic Container Corp. v. Continental Plastics of Oklahoma, Inc.
...patentee was in possession of the claimed subject matter at the time of the filing of the application. In re Mott, 539 F.2d 1291, 1296-97, 190 U.S.P.Q. 536, 541 (Cust. & Pat.App.1976); In re Smythe, 480 F.2d 1376, 1382, 178 U.S.P.Q. 279, 284 (Cust. & Pat.App.1973). For essentially the same ......
-
Ak Steel Corp. v. Sollac & Ugine
...enabled by the patent specification at the time of the patent application, not at the time the patent is challenged. In re Mott, 539 F.2d 1291, 1296 (Cust. & Pat.App. 1976). In other words, the issue is what was known by an ordinary person skilled in the art as of the patent application fil......
-
W.L. Gore & Associates, Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., s. 83-613
...USPQ 293, 296-97 (CCPA 1957), and Sec. 112 speaks as of the application filing date, not as of the time of trial. In re Mott, 539 F.2d 1291, 1296, 190 USPQ 536, 541 (CCPA 1976). There was no evidence and no finding that those skilled in the art would have found the specification non-enablin......