Application of Shomberg
| Court | United States District Courts. 2nd Circuit. United States District Courts. 2nd Circuit. Southern District of New York |
| Writing for the Court | DIMOCK |
| Citation | 115 F. Supp. 336 |
| Decision Date | 21 August 1953 |
| Parties | Application of SHOMBERG. |
115 F. Supp. 336
Application of SHOMBERG.
United States District Court, S. D. New York.
August 21, 1953.
Max Schultz, New York City (Alan Y. Cole, Washington, D. C., of counsel), for petitioner.
Louis Steinberg, District Counsel U. S. Department of Justice Immigration & Naturalization Service, Brooklyn, N. Y., Max Blau, Attorney U. S. Department of Justice Immigration & Naturalization Service, New York City, for the United States.
DIMOCK, District Judge.
Petitioner in this naturalization proceeding filed his petition on December 22, 1952. At that time there was in force section 329(c) of the Nationality Act of 1940, as added by section 27 of the Internal Security Act of 1950, 8 U. S.C. § 729(c), which prohibited naturalization where there was outstanding a final finding of deportability and prohibited final hearing in naturalization if a deportation proceeding was pending. Petitioner was not, however, liable to deportation at that time and was therefore, so far as this provision for priority of deportation proceedings was concerned, eligible for naturalization. Two days later, nevertheless, on December 24, 1952, the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 went into effect and, by its section 241(a) (4), created as a new ground for deportation the commission at any time of two felonies involving moral turpitude. Petitioner had committed two such felonies, one in 1913 and one in 1915. Pursuant to that section deportation proceedings were begun against him on June 23, 1953, and they are now pending undetermined.
Petitioner, in spite of the provision for priority of deportation proceedings, makes this motion for an order that his petition for naturalization filed on December 22, 1952 be brought on for final hearing forthwith and that the deportation proceeding be stayed pending determination of the naturalization proceeding.
The provision for priority of deportation proceedings grew out of the fact that there were cases where an alien subject to deportation was nevertheless eligible for naturalization. This led to a race between the Attorney General and the alien, the Attorney General seeking to deport the alien and the alien seeking to obtain naturalization. See United States v. Waskowski, 7 Cir., 1947, 158 F.2d 962; United States ex rel. Walther v. District Director of Immigration & Naturalization, 2 Cir., 1949, 175 F.2d 693; Petition of Kavadias, 7 Cir., 1949, 177 F.2d 497. Congress in 1950 gave the clear track to the Attorney General by adopting the priority section providing against naturalization after issuance of a warrant of deportation and staying naturalization proceedings pending deportation proceedings. See United States ex rel. Jankowski v. Shaughnessy, 2 Cir., 1951, 186 F.2d 580, 582.
The provision for priority of deportation proceedings was continued in section 318 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1429, which, so far as important here, reads as follows:
"Sec. 318. * * * Notwithstanding the provisions of section 405(b) * * * no person shall be naturalized against whom there is outstanding a final finding of deportability pursuant to a warrant of arrest issued under the provisions of this, or any other Act; and no petition for naturalization shall be finally heard by a naturalization court if there is pending against the petitioner a deportation proceeding pursuant...
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Shomberg v. United States, No. 48
...hearing thereon cannot be delayed by reason of the pendency of the subsequently instituted deportation action. Both the trial court, 115 F.Supp. 336, and the Court of Appeals, 210 F.2d 82, decided against the petitioner. We granted certiorari, 348 U.S. 811, 75 S.Ct. 24, in order to determin......
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United States v. Shaughnessy, No. 187
...U.S.C. § 1429, as had the court below. Shomberg v. United States, 2 Cir., 210 F.2d 82, affirming Application of Shomberg, D.C.S.D.N.Y., 115 F.Supp. 336. 221 F.2d 581 We conclude that the preliminary application for the visa in September, 1952, was sufficient to bring Zacharias within § 405 ......
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Yanish v. Barber, Civ. A. No. 29013.
...D.C.D.Puerto Rico, 115 F.Supp. 434, affirmed United States v. Menasche, 1 Cir., 210 F.2d 809; Application of Shomberg, D.C.S.D.N.Y., 115 F.Supp. 336, affirmed Shomberg v. United States, 2 Cir., 210 F.2d 82; United States v. Matles-Friedman, D.C.E.D.N. Y., 115 F.Supp. One further indication ......
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Shomberg v. United States, No. 134
...in the district court on July 28, 1953, and now appeals from its denial by Judge Dimock in a reasoned opinion reported in D.C.S.D.N.Y., 115 F. Supp. 336. Initially the government seeks dismissal of this order as not appealable, arguing that it does not come within the provisions of 28 U.S.C......
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Shomberg v. United States, No. 48
...hearing thereon cannot be delayed by reason of the pendency of the subsequently instituted deportation action. Both the trial court, 115 F.Supp. 336, and the Court of Appeals, 210 F.2d 82, decided against the petitioner. We granted certiorari, 348 U.S. 811, 75 S.Ct. 24, in order to determin......
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United States v. Shaughnessy, No. 187
...U.S.C. § 1429, as had the court below. Shomberg v. United States, 2 Cir., 210 F.2d 82, affirming Application of Shomberg, D.C.S.D.N.Y., 115 F.Supp. 336. 221 F.2d 581 We conclude that the preliminary application for the visa in September, 1952, was sufficient to bring Zacharias within § 405 ......
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Yanish v. Barber, Civ. A. No. 29013.
...D.C.D.Puerto Rico, 115 F.Supp. 434, affirmed United States v. Menasche, 1 Cir., 210 F.2d 809; Application of Shomberg, D.C.S.D.N.Y., 115 F.Supp. 336, affirmed Shomberg v. United States, 2 Cir., 210 F.2d 82; United States v. Matles-Friedman, D.C.E.D.N. Y., 115 F.Supp. One further indication ......
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Nix v. Holland, No. 4564.
...course, does not purport to adjudicate the exact amount of indebtedness due by Archer to the plaintiff as between these parties, but the 115 F. Supp. 336 amount is substantial. Some time ago plaintiff offered to accept $6,000 from Archer in full of indebtedness, but this proposition was not......