APPLICATION OF WILSON JONES COMPANY, Patent Appeal No. 7213.

• Decision Date: 05 November 1964
• Docket Number: Patent Appeal No. 7213.
• Citation: 337 F.2d 670,52 CCPA 805
• Parties: Application of WILSON JONES COMPANY.
• Court: U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA)

52 CCPA 805, 337 F.2d 670 (1964)

Application of WILSON JONES COMPANY.

Patent Appeal No. 7213.

United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals.

November 5, 1964.

I. Walton Bader, New York City, for appellant.

Clarence W. Moore, Washington, D. C. (George C. Roeming, Washington, D. C., of counsel), for the Commissioner of Patents.

Before RICH, Acting Chief Judge, and MARTIN, SMITH, and ALMOND, Judges, and Judge WILLIAM H. KIRKPATRICK.^*

SMITH, Judge.

On April 13, 1960, appellant filed applications for registration of two marks on the Principal Register: GRAY LINE SNAP-A-WAY SPEED LETTERS (Serial No. 95,028), in the particular configuration reproduced in the margin,¹ and SPEED MESSAGE (Serial No. 95,027), both for "Letter Forms for Rapid Correspondence." The examiner, sustained by the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (see 137 USPQ 910), held that section 2(d) of the Trademark Act of 1946 (15 U.S.C. § 1052) precluded registration of either mark, citing as a reference a registration of the mark "SPEED-LETTER," in the configuration shown below,² for "Stationery — Namely, Inter-Office Letters Sets." This appeal followed.

In this proceeding we are required only to decide whether appellant's marks so resemble the reference mark as to be likely, when applied to appellant's goods, to cause confusion, mistake or deception.

The board held, and we agree, that the goods mentioned in the reference registration and those of appellant are competitive in character. The board further stated:

"With regard to the marks, the term `SPEED LETTERS\', which constitutes an essential, and is visually the most prominent, feature of applicant\'s composite mark, is identical to the mark of the registrant, and applicant\'s mark `SPEED MESSAGE\' conveys substantially the same commercial impression. Under these circumstances, it is our considered opinion that the contemporaneous use of these marks for the specified goods would be quite likely to cause confusion or mistake or deception of purchasers."

We would qualify this statement only by pointing out that the mark SPEED LETTERS is not identical with the reference mark, since the reference mark is in the singular and incorporates the lightning flash design as shown in footnote 2, supra. Otherwise, we are in full agreement. When appellant's marks and the reference mark are considered as entities, there are obviously specific differences. However, the essential similarities between them and the reference mark are easily their most significant features. We think these similarities are such that the ordinary purchaser would be likely to be confused as to the source or origin of the goods on which the marks are used.

Appellant asserts that there is presently in effect a license agreement with the owner of the reference mark, under which agreement appellant is entitled to use the mark SPEED LETTER for letter forms for rapid...