Application of Ziegler, Patent Appeal No. 7613.
Decision Date | 06 October 1966 |
Docket Number | Patent Appeal No. 7613. |
Citation | 363 F.2d 885,150 USPQ 551 |
Parties | Application of Karl ZIEGLER, Heinz Breil, Erhard Holzkamp and Heinz Martin. |
Court | U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) |
Burgess, Dinklage & Sprung, Arnold Sprung, New York City, for appellants.
Joseph Schimmel, Washington, D. C., (Raymond E. Martin, Washington, D. C., of counsel) for the Commissioner of Patents.
Before RICH, Acting Chief Judge, and MARTIN, SMITH, and ALMOND, Judges, and Judge WILLIAM H. KIRKPATRICK.*
This is an appeal from the decision of the Patent Office Board of Appeals affirming the rejection of claims 1-8 in appellants' application1 entitled "Purification of Olefin Polymers." No claim has been allowed.
Appellants' invention relates to the purification of polyethylene, obtained by polymerization using a "Ziegler" catalyst, by washing with a C1-C4 alkanol. When polymerizing ethylene utilizing a "Ziegler" catalyst, a certain portion of the catalyst component may be retained in the polyethylene as an impurity. In accordance with the invention, this is washed out with the lower alcohol.
Claims 1-8 stand rejected as fully met (35 U.S.C. § 102) by Anderson et al. (Anderson), United States patent No. 3,012,023, filed January 25, 1955, issued December 5, 1961, the patent from which the rejected claims were copied in order to provoke an interference.
Claims 1 and 7 are illustrative2 and read:
Appellants rely on their application serial No. 469,059 (hereinafter '059), filed November 15, 1954, having an alleged convention date of November 17, 1953 for compliance with the requirements of Rule 204(b). The '059 application discloses washing polyethylene with methanol to remove the catalyst component. It was the examiner's position that the disclosure of methanol alone was insufficient to support the generic claims copied from Anderson and thus appellants were not entitled to the benefit, under 35 U.S.C. § 120, of the filing date of the '059 application as to such generic claims. That being so, the examiner held the claims unpatentable over Anderson and further stated that an interference with that patent was not in order since appellants had not met the requirements of Rules 201(b) and 205 (a)3 that the copied claims be "allowable" or "patentable" in the application before an interference is instituted. This court's decision in In re Rogoff, 261 F.2d 601, 46 CCPA 733, was cited as authority for the examiner's position.
At the same time, the examiner acknowledged that appellants' showing of an earlier date for species within the genus of the patent claims effectively met the requirements of Rule 204 (b)4 with respect to a prima facie showing, undoubtedly on the basis of the well settled proposition, set out in Kyrides v. Anderson, 121 F.2d 514, 28 CCPA 1336, that proof of priority as to a single species is enough to defeat an opposing interferant once an interference reaches the stage that only questions of priority and questions ancillary thereto can be considered.5
The Board of Appeals affirmed the examiner on the authority of In re Gemassmer, supra. Appellants seek to distinguish Rogoff and Gemassmer by contending that Rules 201(b) and 205(a) "* * * must be interpreted to read that save for the patent with which interference is sought the claim should otherwise be allowable to the applicant." Unless this gloss is placed on Rule 205 (a), according to appellants, a ridiculous situation exists whereby an interference could never be declared between a patent and a later filed application. Appellants state their position this way:
We cannot agree with appellants' interpretation of Rules 201(b) and 205(a) or that any impossible or unreasonable burden is being placed on appellants.6 In requiring that claims copied from a patent be patentable in the application, Rules 201(b) and 205(a) are manifestly calling only for a showing that the claims are patentable to appellants on the record without regard to the inter partes question of priority which can be determined only through interference proceedings. Appellants appear to argue that the patentability requirement of 201(b) and 205(a) encompasses a consideration of 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) but such is clearly incorrect. The Patent Office has long required that claims be patentable to the parties before an interference will be instituted. This practice was favorably commented upon by the Supreme Court in Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 528 n. 12, 86 S.Ct. 1033, 16 L.Ed.2d 69. The order of establishing patentability and...
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Shaffer Tool Works v. JOY MANUFACTURING COMPANY
...are patentable to the competing applicants. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 86 S.Ct. 1033, 16 L.Ed.2d 69 (1966), Application of Ziegler, 363 F.2d 885, 53 CCPA 1560. While each count may be a patentable claim it does not follow that each is a separate patent in all cases. Here for example, ......