Aptos Seascape Corp. v. County of Santa Cruz

Decision Date23 December 1982
Citation138 Cal.App.3d 484,188 Cal.Rptr. 191
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
PartiesAPTOS SEASCAPE CORPORATION, Plaintiff, Cross-defendant and Appellant, v. The COUNTY OF SANTA CRUZ et al., Defendants, Cross-complainants and Appellants. Civ. 46963.

Dennis J. Kehoe, G. Dana Scruggs, III, Adams, Levin, Kehoe, Bosso, Sachs & Bates, Santa Cruz, Peter L. Townsend, Garrison, Townsend, Hall, Orser & Park, San Francisco, for plaintiff, cross-defendant and appellant.

Clair A. Carlson, County Counsel, James M. Ritchey, Asst. County Counsel, Santa

Cruz, for defendants, cross-complainants and appellants.

T. Roy Gorman, Chief Counsel, California Coastal Com'n, San Francisco, for amicus curiae.

SCOTT, Associate Justice.

The County of Santa Cruz (County) and others appeal from a judgment in an inverse condemnation action awarding Aptos Seascape Corporation (Seascape), a California corporation, over $3,000,000. The County also appeals from an adverse judgment on its cross-complaint, which alleged an implied dedication to the public of certain of Seascape's beach property.

The Facts

Seascape owns approximately 110 acres of real property in Santa Cruz County, bounded by the Southern Pacific Railroad tracks, Monterey Bay, Camp St. Francis, and an existing residential tract. 1 The 110 acres include approximately 40 acres which are above the 100-foot contour line (the "benchlands"), and approximately 70 acres below that contour line. The 70 acres include a beach about a mile long, arroyos, and a line of cliffs, or palisades. It is the 70 acres which are at issue here, and they will be referred to as the "Subject Property." The benchlands include three parcels, designated parcels A, B, and C. Before the property was purchased, it was zoned unclassified. As a condition of its purchase, it was rezoned; the 110 acres were zoned residential, with a commercial hotel use allowed on one section of the benchlands.

In 1967 the County adopted the Aptos General Plan (Plan), which indicated that the subject property should remain as open space, or beach and palisades, ravines and forests. According to the Plan, benchlands parcels A and C would be zoned medium density residential (maximum 6 units per acre), and parcel B, medium high density residential (maximum 8 units per acre), with a hotel as an alternate use. The Plan also stated that although development on beaches should be prohibited, compensating higher densities should be permitted on other portions of property in the same ownership. The Plan proposed formation of a new planned community district in the area in part to implement the award of compensating densities. No such district has ever been formed.

In March 1971 Seascape submitted a tentative subdivision map for the 110-acre parcel. In response, the board of supervisors enacted an interim emergency zoning ordinance to preclude Seascape from further processing any land use proposals until the County completed its study of the area. The application for the map was denied as inconsistent with the Plan. The interim zoning ordinance was extended three times.

Seascape submitted no other formal map or subdivision applications. It did, however, informally submit a development proposal to the planning commission. Although the commission took no action on that plan, it recommended to the board of supervisors a rezoning which would in effect have prohibited development on the subject property, but which would have increased the density recommended by the Plan for benchlands parcels A and C, and allowed a hotel on parcel C.

The County rejected that recommendation. In December 1972 it adopted ordinance 1800, zoning the subject property as U-BS, (unclassified--special building site area regulations) and the benchlands R-1-6-PD (one family residence--planned development district: 6,000 sq. ft. minimum site area).

On March 27, 1973, the County board adopted a Parks, Recreation and Open Space Plan (PROS), which designated the subject property as "acquisition only--immediate action--low priority." In 1974 the County adopted a new Aptos General Plan, in which the property is designated as "Open reserve; park-playground."

In June 1973 Seascape filed a first amended complaint for damages, inverse condemnation and declaratory relief against the County, and others. Seascape alleged that by rezoning, the County deprived it of all reasonable use of certain of its real property, in effect taking that property without paying just compensation. Seascape sought damages of $23,000,000 for the property allegedly taken, $12,000,000 for severance damage to adjacent property, and a declaration invalidating the zoning ordinance. The County cross-complained for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that a part of Seascape's property had been impliedly dedicated to the public.

Court trial was held in November 1977. Among its findings, the court found: (1) the Subject Property has always been treated by the County as a parcel separate from the benchlands, and is a "de facto separate parcel"; (2) the only reasonable use that can be made of the Subject Property is for residential purposes; (3) the effect of ordinance 1800 is to allow no development at all on the Subject Property, and to allow a maximum density of one site per 6,000 square feet on the benchlands, with no compensating higher densities permitted; (4) the County does not intend to grant Seascape any compensating higher densities on the benchlands in the future; (5) the County has precluded all reasonable use of the Subject Property and has therefore taken the property to preserve it as open space; (6) Seascape has fully exhausted all available administrative remedies, and any additional attempt to petition the County for relief would be futile; (7) just compensation in the amount of $3,150,000 (the fair market value of the Subject Property as of December 5, 1972) is due and owing to Seascape. 2

The court ordered entry of an alternative judgment. As an alternate means of compensation, and in lieu of payment of damages, the judgment granted Seascape compensating higher densities of 40 residential units on its benchlands and 160 residential units on its uplands, "in addition to any other uses and densities that the benchlands and uplands ... may otherwise yield, which underlying uses and densities are herein referred to as 'Base Densities.' Said Base Densities shall be reasonable and shall not be reduced for the purpose of avoiding the effect of this Judgment." Upon issuance of building permits by the County and substantial construction by Seascape, Seascape was to convey an open-space easement in perpetuity for the subject property to the County. If Seascape had not received all of the compensating higher densities called for within five years from the date of entry of the judgment, it was to be paid the full damage award. If it had received some but not all of those compensating densities, it was to be paid $15,750 for each unit not received within the five-year period. This alternative was at the option of the County, which was to (1) file a written notice of acceptance within 60 days of the date of the filing of the entry of judgment, accompanied by a resolution of the board authorizing acceptance, and (2) enact enabling ordinances within that time period. The alternate was void if not exercised. The County did not elect the alternative, and instead appealed from the judgment. Seascape's Complaint 3

I

In March 1979, two months after judgment was entered in this case, the California Supreme Court held that a landowner who alleges that a zoning ordinance has deprived him of substantially all use of his land, in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and article I, section 19 of the California Constitution, may attempt to invalidate the ordinance as excessive regulation through declaratory relief or mandamus, but may not sue in inverse condemnation for damages. (Agins v. City of Tiburon (1979) 24 Cal.3d 266, 273, 157 Cal.Rptr. 372, 598 P.2d 25, affd. on another ground, Agins v. Tiburon (1980) 447 U.S. 255, 100 S.Ct. 2138, 65 L.Ed.2d 106.)

The County first argues that in light of Agins, the judgment awarding damages must be reversed. Seascape contends that Agins is inapplicable because its discussion of the availability of inverse condemnation was dictum, which has "evaporated" with the United States Supreme Court's decision in San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. San Diego (1981) 450 U.S. 621, 101 S.Ct. 1287, 67 L.Ed.2d 551.

In Agins plaintiffs owned five acres of unimproved land in Tiburon, which they acquired for residential development. The city adopted widespread zoning modifications, designating plaintiffs' land for one-family dwellings and open-space uses. As applied to plaintiffs' five acres, the zoning would permit a maximum of five dwelling units or a minimum of one. The city filed a complaint in eminent domain to acquire the property as open space, but then abandoned those proceedings. Plaintiffs did not make any application to use the property. Instead, they filed a complaint in inverse condemnation and for declaratory relief, alleging the adoption of the ordinance completely destroyed the value of their property. A demurrer was sustained without leave to amend.

The California Supreme Court affirmed. "[T]he need for preserving a degree of freedom in the land-use planning function, and the inhibiting financial force which inheres in the inverse condemnation remedy" persuaded the court that on balance, mandamus or declaratory relief rather than inverse condemnation was the appropriate remedy. (Agins, supra, 24 Cal.3d at pp. 276-277, 157 Cal.Rptr. 372, 598 P.2d 25.) The court then concluded that plaintiffs had not established their entitlement to declaratory relief. "[A] zoning ordinance may be unconstitutional and subject to invalidation only when its effect is...

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23 cases
  • Grupe v. California Coastal Com.
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals
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    ...open to public use--Seacliff State Beach to the north and Seascape Beach to the south. (See, Aptos Seascape Corp. v. County of Santa Cruz (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 484, 500, at fn. 7, 188 Cal.Rptr. 191.) The beach above the mean high tide line in front of the Beach Drive enclave, however, is pr......
  • First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, California, 85-1199
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    ...286 (1897); Heist v. County of Colusa, 163 Cal.App.3d 841, 851, 213 Cal.Rptr. 278, 285 (1984); Aptos Seascape Corp. v. Santa Cruz, 138 Cal.App.3d 484, 505-506, 188 Cal.Rptr. 191, 204-205 (1982). (None of these cases specifically ad- dressed the argument that Art. X, § 4 allowed the public t......
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    ...be characterized as prescriptive or attributed to neighborly accommodation”]; Aptos Seascape Corp. v. County of Santa Cruz (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 484, 501, 188 Cal.Rptr. 191.)5 To 205 Cal.Rptr.3d 289 counter the idea of license a plaintiff must show open, substantial use of private property.......
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3 books & journal articles
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