Aquino v. City of Charlotte

• Decision Date: 28 June 2022
• Docket Number: 3:21-cv-00618-FDW-DSC
• Parties: AIMEE IRENE AQUINO, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF CHARLOTTE and SPENCER B. MERRIWEATHER III, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of North Carolina

AIMEE IRENE AQUINO, Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF CHARLOTTE and SPENCER B. MERRIWEATHER III, Defendants.

No. 3:21-cv-00618-FDW-DSC

United States District Court, W.D. North Carolina, Charlotte Division

June 28, 2022

ORDER

Frank D. Whitney, United States District Judge

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendant Spencer Merriweather's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. (Doc. No. 10). This motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for disposition by the Court. For the reasons stated herein, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction is GRANTED IN PART solely to the extent it seeks dismissal of Plaintiff's claim for damages against Merriweather under the First Amendment and otherwise DENIED IN PART; and Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

Taking the allegations in the Complaint, (Doc. No. 1), as true, the following background is relevant to disposition of these motions. Plaintiff is a police officer who works for the Charlotte Mecklenburg Police Department (“CMPD”). Id. at 2. In 2014, one of her former colleagues filed suit against her alleging libel, slander, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 8. The jury found her liable for slander, and the City of Charlotte (the “City”) subsequently settled the

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case and paid the settlement on her behalf. Id. Relying on CMPD, the City, and the then-district attorney's assurances that her employment was secure, she declined to appeal the jury verdict. Id.

In November 2018, Defendant Spencer Merriweather (“Merriweather”) wrote a letter (the “Giglio letter”) to CMPD Chief Kerr Putney advising the Chief that the District Attorney's office would no longer use Plaintiff as a witness in criminal or traffic cases because of the slander verdict. Id. at 9. The CMPD then determined she could no longer perform her job-related duties, suspended her without pay, and cited her to the Civil Service Board for termination. Id. at 10. Instead of terminating her, the Civil Service Board suspended her for ninety days and reinstated her employment. Id. Since her reinstatement, “CMPD has limited [Plaintiff] to working in the capacity of a civilian in non-emergency police services . . . [and] is requiring [her] to retake the state exam and retake many classes at the police academy before CMPD will reissue . . . her badge, firearm, or uniform.” Id. at 11. The Giglio letter remains in place. Id.

On November 12, 2021, Plaintiff filed the present case against Merriweather and the City seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against both and damages from the City. (Doc. No. 1). She asserts that Defendants' actions violated her procedural and substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, her First Amendment rights, and her rights under Article I, §§ 1 and 19 of the North Carolina Constitution. Id. at 14-23. She also sues the City for breach of contract. Id. at 23. Merriweather now moves to dismiss all claims against him. (Doc. No. 10).

II. JURISDICTION

Merriweather asserts that sovereign immunity bars Plaintiff's federal law claims against him. (Doc. No. 11, pp. 8-10). He further argues that “principles of absolute prosecutorial

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immunity” counsel the Court to dismiss these claims. Id. at 10. Both arguments fail. Sovereign immunity does not bar federal law actions against state officials for prospective relief. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677 (1974) (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)). “Conjunctive relief requiring a state official ‘to conform his future conduct of that office to the requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment' is prospective in nature.” Wicomico Nursing Home v. Padilla, 910 F.3d 739, 748 (4th Cir. 2018) (quoting Edelman, 415 U.S. at 664). Here, Plaintiff requests that the Court declare her right to further process and issue an injunction requiring Merriweather to provide further process in the future. (Doc. No. 1, pp. 24-25). Thus, she requests prospective relief, and sovereign immunity does not bar her claims.

Prosecutorial immunity applies only to actions for damages, not to actions for injunctive or declaratory relief. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976); Nivens v. Gilchrist, 444 F.3d 237, 250 (4th Cir. 2006). Therefore, prosecutorial immunity does not bar Plaintiff's claims against Merriweather for injunctive and declaratory relief.

The Complaint purports to state a cause of action against both Defendants for violation of Plaintiff's First Amendment rights; however, Plaintiff does not explicitly state a request for relief against Merriweather on this claim. (Doc. No. 1, pp. 20-21). To the extent she does request damages from Merriweather in connection with her First Amendment claim, sovereign immunity precludes the Court from exercising jurisdiction. See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W.Va. Dep't of Health & Hum. Res., 532 U.S. 598, 609 n.10 (2001). Therefore, dismissal of this claim is appropriate. See Zito v. N.C. Coastal Res. Comm'n, 8 F.4th 281, 283 (4th Cir. 2021) (affirming dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to state sovereign immunity), cert. denied, 142 S.Ct. 465, 211 L.Ed.2d 283 (2021).

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III. FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM

Merriweather next argues that Plaintiff's procedural due process claims, substantive due process claim, and claims under the North Carolina Constitution must be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Doc. No. 11, pp. 11-25). Rule 12(b)(6) provides that a claim may be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In conducting a Rule 12(b)(6) inquiry, the court must determine if the pleader's allegations constitute “a short and plain statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief” pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2). To survive a motion to dismiss, the factual...