Aragon v. Wal-Mart Stores E., LP

• Decision Date: 15 February 2013
• Docket Number: No. 2:11CV00047AGF.,2:11CV00047AGF.
• Parties: Benny ARAGON, Plaintiff, v. WAL–MART STORES EAST, LP, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri

924 F.Supp.2d 1066

Benny ARAGON, Plaintiff,
v.
WAL–MART STORES EAST, LP, et al., Defendants.

No. 2:11CV00047AGF.

United States District Court,
E.D. Missouri,
Northern Division.

Feb. 15, 2013.

[924 F.Supp.2d 1067]

Russell C. Purvis, Montee Law Firm, P.C., St. Joseph, MO, for Plaintiff.

Robbye Hill Toft, Law Offices of Robert J. Hayes, St. Louis, MO, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM and ORDER
AUDREY G. FLEISSIG, District Judge.

This personal injury action is before the Court on the motion of Defendants Wal–Mart Stores East, LP (“Wal–Mart”) and Pallet Companies, Inc., d/b/a IFCO Systems,

[924 F.Supp.2d 1068]

N.A. (“IFCO”) for summary judgment on the claims of Plaintiff Benny Aragon. For the reasons set forth below, this motion will be granted.

Background

The pleadings, depositions, and affidavits on file demonstrate the following relevant facts, except as otherwise noted:

This case involves a claim for damages by Plaintiff, a truck driver, against Wal–Mart and IFCO, for injuries Plaintiff suffered when the truck doors were opened to unload pallets that had been loaded onto the truck. Plaintiff has been a truck driver for over thirty years and has driven a variety of trucks during that time. At the time of the accident in question, he was under contract to J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc., (“J.B. Hunt”) to pick up a box trailer containing shrink-wrapped pallets of reusable plastic containers from the Wal–Mart distribution facility in Moberly, Missouri, and to deliver the trailer to IFCO's washing facility in Bolingbrook, Illinois.

Defendants have established by affidavit ¹ that pursuant to a written agreement between IFCO and Unyson Logistics (“Unyson”), Unyson “brokered” ² J.B. Hunt and others to transport IFCO's reusable containers between Wal–Mart distribution centers, IFCO washing facilities, and Wal–Mart's produce suppliers. Doc. No. 55, Campbell Aff. at ¶¶ 4–7. The agreement incorporated certain “Carrier Guidelines” specifying that box trailers used to transport pallets have either two load locks or two straps to secure the load. Id. The terms of a pricing agreement between Unyson and J.B. Hunt incorporated the Carrier Guidelines, and Defendants assert that Plaintiff, as a contractor for J.B. Hunt, was required to haul the box trailer in accordance with the terms of the Carrier Guidelines. Id. at ¶¶ 7–8.

Despite his many years of trucking experience, prior to this incident, Plaintiff had never hauled pallets under contract with J.B. Hunt, and had never hauled plastic pallets. Plaintiff had hauled wooden pallets for other brokers, and testified in deposition that he had secured the pallets with load locks, but had not used straps. The parties agree that J.B. Hunt trailers generally have straps to secure the load, although Plaintiff testified that he did not know whether the particular trailer he was carrying on October 7, 2010, had straps or whether they comported with the requirements of the Carrier Guidelines.

The parties disagree about whether Plaintiff was given any instructions about securing the load. Defendants assert that Plaintiff was told to use the straps that attached to the clips to secure the load. Plaintiff states that neither J.B. Hunt, Wal–Mart, nor IFCO gave him instructions about securing the load of pallets.

On October 7, 2010, Plaintiff arrived at Wal–Mart's Moberly, Missouri distribution center, received the pickup number for his delivery, and located the box trailer he was to drive to Bolingbrook, Illinois. Before Plaintiff arrived at the Moberly facility, the box trailer had been loaded by Defendant IFCO. Defendants assert that trailers loaded with plastic pallets were never sealed at Wal–Mart distribution centers. Plaintiff asserts that the load was sealed with a “yellow seal” when he first hooked it to his trailer.

[924 F.Supp.2d 1069]

Plaintiff hooked the assigned box trailer to his tractor, and drove the trailer to the gate of the Wal–Mart distribution facility. At the gate, the Wal–Mart security guard broke the seal on the load and either Plaintiff or the guard opened the right-hand rear door of the trailer. The security guard and Plaintiff looked inside, but it is undisputed that neither the security guard nor Plaintiff opened the left-hand side of the trailer. Plaintiff asserts that when the right-hand side of the trailer was open, he could see that the pallets were shrink-wrapped and did not notice any defects in the packing of the pallets. Plaintiff also testified that he could see neither straps nor load locks securing the pallets.

After Plaintiff and the security guard viewed the load of pallets through the right-hand door of the trailer, one of them placed another seal on the load. Defendants, by affidavit, contend that Plaintiff was given a bill of lading and a seal to apply to the doors of the trailer and that Plaintiff sealed the load after he and the guard had viewed it through the right-hand rear door. Defendants further assert that the purpose of providing a non-locking seal is not to keep a driver from gaining access to the load, but to serve as an acknowledgement by the driver that he is responsible for the load. Plaintiff testified that he was uncertain whether he or the security guard applied the seal to the load. Plaintiff asserts, however, that the purpose of the non-locking seal is to demonstrate that the driver has not been in contact with, or altered the cargo.

Plaintiff drove the sealed load from the Wal–Mart Distribution Center in Moberly, Missouri to Bolingbrook. He did not inspect or secure the load at any point during the 380 mile trip from Moberly to Bolingbrook. Defendants assert that Plaintiff easily could have opened the sealed doors of the trailer during this trip. Plaintiff disputes this assertion, contending that he was not permitted to break the seal on a trailer during transport and would face repercussions if he had done so.

When Plaintiff arrived at the Bolingbrook location, around 1:30 p.m. on October 7, 2010, the load was still sealed. A supervisor from IFCO checked the trailer for the seal, and Plaintiff and/or the supervisor broke the seal to open the load. As Plaintiff opened the left-hand rear trailer door, falling pallets and the trailer doors knocked him down, injuring him and breaking his leg.

Summary Judgment Standard

Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment shall be entered “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” The burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of material fact rests on the movant. Wingate v. Gage Cnty. Sch. Dist., No. 34, 528 F.3d 1074, 1078–79 (8th Cir.2008). Nevertheless, a nonmovant may not rest upon mere denials or allegations, but must instead designate the specific facts sufficient to raise a genuine issue for trial. See Crossley v. Georgia–Pacific Corp., 355 F.3d 1112, 1113 (8th Cir.2004). “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence ... will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [nonmoving party].” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Self-serving, conclusory statements, without more, are not sufficient to defeat summary judgment. Armour and Co., Inc. v. Inver Grove Heights, 2 F.3d 276, 279 (8th Cir.1993). Moreover, the requirement, on a motion for summary judgment, that facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party applies only if there is a genuine dispute as to those facts.

[924 F.Supp.2d 1070]

Gibson v. American Greetings Corp., 670 F.3d 844, 853 (8th Cir.2012) (quoting Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1042 (8th Cir.2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Finally, in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court may not invade the province of the jury. “Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge.” Id.

Arguments of the Parties

Defendants first assert that Plaintiff's alleged failure to comply with the regulations set forth in 49 CFR § 392.9 constitutes negligence per se and mandates a judgment in their favor as a matter of law. In the alternative, Defendants assert that IFCO, the loader of the pallets, did not owe the driver a duty of care with respect to the pallets because the applicable regulations require the driver to assure himself that the load is properly secured. Defendants further contend that on the basis of Plaintiff's observation of the load at Moberly, Plaintiff knew or should have known that it was not secured. Finally, Defendants assert that Plaintiff failed to carry out his duty to secure the load either before leaving Moberly or at some point during the trip to Bolingbrook.

Plaintiff contends that there are genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment here. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that the defect in loading was not observable at the time he and the security guard viewed the pallets at Moberly. He contends that he believed the load was secure because he observed the shrink wrapped pallets through the right hand door. In addition, Plaintiff asserts that because IFCO loaded the truck, IFCO was responsible for the safety of the load. Plaintiff finally asserts that the sealing of the load required by Wal–Mart precluded him from discovering or rectifying the defect during the course of his trip to Bolingbrook.

Discussion

As a federal court sitting in diversity, the Court is required to apply the substantive law of the state whose law...