Aranda v. Cardenas, 2 CA-CV 2006-0178.

Citation215 Ariz. 210,159 P.3d 76
Decision Date06 June 2007
Docket NumberNo. 2 CA-CV 2006-0178.,2 CA-CV 2006-0178.
PartiesDamian Orlando ARANDA, a single man, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. Diego CARDENAS, M.D., and Jane Doe Cardenas, husband and wife; Nes Arizona Inc., an Arizona corporation; Mt. Graham Regional Medical Center, Inc., an Arizona corporation; Jogeswar Rath, M.D., and Jane Doe Rath, husband and wife; and Medical Center of Eastern Arizona, P.C., an Arizona corporation, Defendants/Appellees.
CourtCourt of Appeals of Arizona

Jacoby & Meyers Law Offices, By Bonnie S. Dombrowski, Tucson, for Plaintiff/Appellant.

Carolyn Armer Holden and Scott A. Holden, Tempe, for Defendants/Appellees Cardenas.

Smith Law Group, By Christopher J. Smith and Eric J. Thomae, Tucson, for Defendant/Appellee Mt. Graham Regional Medical Center, Inc.

Slutes, Sakrison & Hill, P.C., By Tom Slutes, Tucson, for Defendants/Appellees Rath and Medical Center of Eastern Arizona, P.C.

OPINION

HOWARD, Presiding Judge.

¶ 1 In this wrongful death action, appellant Damian Aranda challenges the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of appellees Diego Cardenas, Jogeswar Rath, and Mt. Graham Regional Medical Center ("Mt.Graham"). He argues the trial court erred by applying the wrong legal standard for determining paternity in wrongful death cases and imposing the burden of proof on Aranda. He contends the evidence presented was sufficient to establish that he was the father of the unborn child that died. Finding a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding Aranda's paternity, we reverse.

Background

¶ 2 When reviewing a trial court's decision on a motion for summary judgment, we view the facts and all reasonable inferences from them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Link v. Pima County, 193 Ariz. 336, ¶ 12, 972 P.2d 669, 673 (App.1998). In September 2003, Rachel Lopez sought treatment at Mt. Graham and was treated by Cardenas and Rath. She was pregnant at the time, and ultimately, both she and her unborn baby died. This action, on behalf of a number of statutory beneficiaries of both Lopez and the unborn child,1 ensued in January 2005.

¶ 3 The defendants moved for summary judgment on Aranda's claim, arguing that he was not a statutory beneficiary of the unborn child because he could not prove his paternity of the child. Aranda argued there was sufficient evidence of his paternity to have a jury decide the issue. The trial court granted the motion. After denying Aranda's motion for reconsideration, the court entered judgment dismissing Aranda's claim. This appeal followed.

Application of Paternity Statutes

¶ 4 Aranda first contends the trial court erred in referring in its ruling to A.R.S. §§ 25-812 and 25-814 and in requiring deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) tests. Aranda argues A.R.S. §§ 25-801 through 25-818 ("the paternity statutes") do not apply to paternity determinations in wrongful death cases and instead contends the issue should "be decided under the Arizona Rules of Evidence." Cardenas, Rath, and Mt. Graham, on the other hand, argue that the presumptions and other requirements in the paternity statutes should apply to a paternity dispute in a wrongful death case. We review the trial court's decision de novo. See Tritschler v. Allstate Ins. Co., 213 Ariz. 505, ¶ 8, 144 P.3d 519, 523-24 (App.2006) (propriety of summary judgment reviewed de novo); see also Stein v. Sonus USA, Inc., 214 Ariz. 200, ¶ 3, 150 P.3d 773, 774 (App.2007) (applicability of statute reviewed de novo).

¶ 5 "In interpreting statutes, our central goal `is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature's intent."' Yarbrough v. Montoya-Paez, 214 Ariz. 1, ¶ 12, 147 P.3d 755, 759 (App.2006), quoting Washburn v. Pima County, 206 Ariz. 571, ¶ 9, 81 P.3d 1030, 1034 (App.2003). "`[T]he best and most reliable index of a statute's meaning is its language and, when the language is clear and unequivocal, it is determinative of the statute's construction."' City of Sierra Vista v. Dir., Ariz. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 195 Ariz. 377, ¶ 10, 988 P.2d 162, 165 (App.1999), quoting Janson v. Christensen, 167 Ariz. 470, 471, 808 P.2d 1222, 1223 (1991). "When an ambiguity exists, however, we attempt to determine legislative intent by considering `the statute's context, subject matter, historical background, effects and consequences, and spirit and purpose."' Hourani v. Benson Hosp., 211 Ariz. 427, ¶ 7, 122 P.3d 6, 10 (App.2005), quoting Zamora v. Reinstein, 185 Ariz. 272, 275, 915 P.2d 1227, 1230 (1996).

¶ 6 Wrongful death actions are governed by statute. A.R.S. §§ 12-611 through 12-613 ("the wrongful death statutes"). Section 12-612(A) provides: "An action for wrongful death shall be brought by and in the name of the surviving husband or wife, child, parent or guardian, or personal representative of the deceased person for and on behalf of the surviving husband or wife, children or parents." But the wrongful death statutes do not specify a procedure or standard of proof for proving paternity when the parties dispute it.

¶ 7 The paternity statutes prescribe the procedure and standards for proving paternity in a paternity proceeding. Section 25-814 lists four situations in which a man is presumed to be the father of a child. Those presumptions may only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence. § 25-814(C). Additionally, § 25-807(C) provides that "[t]he court, on its own motion or on motion of any party to the proceedings, shall order the mother, her child or her children and the alleged father to submit to the drawing of blood samples or the taking of [DNA] probe samples, or both." If the results of this testing

indicate that the likelihood of the alleged father's paternity is ninety-five percent or greater, the alleged father is presumed to be the parent of the child and the party opposing the establishment of the alleged father's paternity shall establish by clear and convincing evidence that the alleged father is not the father of the child.

§ 25-807(D). The statutes also provide a method for a man to voluntarily acknowledge paternity, § 25-812, as well as a default determination of paternity where an alleged father does not appear or respond or does not submit to genetic testing as ordered. See § 25-813.

¶ 8 The wrongful death statutes do not mention the paternity statutes or prescribe a standard or procedure for proving paternity. Neither do the paternity statutes state that they apply to wrongful death proceedings or even to all cases in which paternity is in dispute. Based on the statutory language alone, we cannot determine whether the legislature intended to apply the standards in the paternity statutes to paternity determinations in wrongful death cases. Accordingly, we must look to "`context, subject matter, historical background, effects and consequences, and spirit and purpose."' Hourani, 211 Ariz. 427, ¶ 7, 122 P.3d at 10, quoting Zamora, 185 Ariz. at 275, 915 P.2d at 1230.

¶ 9 The context of the statutes provides some initial guidance. The paternity statutes appear in title 25, chapter 6, article 1. Both chapter 6 and article 1 are entitled "Maternity and Paternity Proceedings." These titles suggest the legislature intended statutes contained therein to relate specifically to maternity and paternity proceedings. See Pleak v. Entrada Prop. Owners' Ass'n, 205 Ariz. 471, ¶ 7, 73 P.3d 602, 605 (App.2003) ("[A]lthough title and section headings of statutes are not law, we may look to them for guidance."), aff'd, 207 Ariz. 418, 87 P.3d 831 (2004); Cochise County v. Borowiec, 162 Ariz. 192, 195, 781 P.2d 1379, 1382 (App.1989) (construction of venue provisions "aided by a review of the article headings"). And the language of the paternity statutes suggests they are specific to those proceedings. See, e.g., §§ 25-801 (jurisdiction in maternity and paternity proceedings); 25-802 (venue in maternity and paternity proceedings); 25-803 (parties who may institute paternity proceedings); 25-806 (procedures for instituting maternity or paternity proceedings); 25-807(A) (precedence of maternity and paternity proceedings); 25-809(A) (judgment shall include support obligation). The wrongful death statutes appear in title 12 and include no reference to the standards in the paternity statutes.

¶ 10 In addition to occupying different portions of the code, the wrongful death statutes and the paternity statutes serve different purposes. In Hurt v. Superior Court, 124 Ariz. 45, 601 P.2d 1329 (1979), our supreme court declined to require a separate paternity proceeding to establish paternity in a wrongful death action. Id. at 48-49, 601 P.2d at 1332-33. In doing so, it noted that the purpose of the paternity statutes "appear[ed] to be to provide financial support for the child from the natural parent." Id. at 48, 601 P.2d at 1332; see also Hall v. Lalli, 194 Ariz. 54, ¶¶ 13-14, 977 P.2d 776, 780-81 (1999) (discussing child's and state's interests in paternity determination); Hoyle v. Superior Court, 161 Ariz. 224, 227, 778 P.2d 259, 262 (App.1989) ("Historically, the purpose of a paternity action was to prove that the defendant was the child's father so that he could be required to contribute to the child's support.").

¶ 11 The purpose of the wrongful death statutes, however, is to provide procedures for compensating survivors for the loss of the deceased. See Summerfield v. Superior Court, 144 Ariz. 467, 476, 698 P.2d 712, 721 (1985) ("In enacting the wrongful death statute in 1887, and in returning to its terms under the present statute, the legislature explicitly recognized the legal right of the survivors to be compensated for their loss resulting from the victim's death."); Katz v. Filandro, 153 Ariz. 601, 604, 739 P.2d 822, 825 (App.1987) (noting "legislative intent to allow full recovery for survivors"). The different purposes of the statutes suggest no legislative intent that the paternity statutes apply to paternity determinations in wrongful death cases.

¶ 12 We note...

To continue reading

Request your trial
29 cases
  • Hatch Dev., LLC v. Solomon
    • United States
    • Arizona Court of Appeals
    • June 21, 2016
    ...motions for reconsideration here pertained to the prior summary judgment rulings, which are subject to de novo review. See Aranda v. Cardenas , 215 Ariz. 210, 212, ¶¶ 3–4, 159 P.3d 76, 78 (App. 2007) (reviewing the grant of summary judgment de novo after trial court had also denied a motion......
  • Grand v. Nacchio
    • United States
    • Arizona Court of Appeals
    • September 29, 2009
    ... ... See Aranda v. Cardenas, 215 Ariz. 210, ¶ 9, 159 P.3d 76, 80 (App.2007) ("`[A]lthough title and section headings of statutes are not law, we may look to them ... ...
  • Montgomery v. Brewhaha Bellevue, LLC, 73447-4-I
    • United States
    • Washington Court of Appeals
    • August 8, 2016
    ...the definition of the parent-child relationship in the context of a wrongful death proceeding. Munchbar relies on Aranda v. Cardenas, 215 Ariz. 210, 159 P.3d 76 (Ct. App. 2007) in which the court stated that "[t]he different purposes of the [paternity and wrongful death] statutes suggest no......
  • Montgomery v. Brewhaha Bellevue, LLC
    • United States
    • Washington Court of Appeals
    • September 19, 2016
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT