Aranyos v. State, 2011-CP-00351-COA

Decision Date29 January 2013
Docket NumberNO. 2011-CP-00351-COA,2011-CP-00351-COA
PartiesALLAN ARTHUR ARANYOS APPELLANT v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE
CourtCourt of Appeals of Mississippi

ALLAN ARTHUR ARANYOS APPELLANT
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE

NO. 2011-CP-00351-COA

COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

Dated: January 29, 2013


DATE OF JUDGMENT: 02/14/2011
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. ROBERT P. CHAMBERLIN
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: DESOTO COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ALLAN ARTHUR ARANYOS (PRO SE)
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: JEFFREY A. KLINGFUSS
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION: MOTION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
DENIED
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 01/29/2013
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:

BEFORE LEE, C.J., BARNES AND MAXWELL, JJ.

BARNES, J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. Allan Arthur Aranyos was indicted on one count of embezzlement. At his plea hearing on September 24, 2009, the State amended the indictment to reflect that Aranyos was a habitual offender under Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-19-81 (Rev. 2007). Aranyos pleaded guilty and was sentenced to ten years, with five years to be served in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC) and five years of probation.

¶2. Aranyos filed a motion for post-conviction relief, claiming he was erroneously sentenced as a habitual offender. The circuit court denied the motion, and finding no error

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on appeal, we affirm.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶3. A circuit court's denial of a motion for post-conviction relief will not be disturbed on appeal unless its factual findings are "clearly erroneous." Mann v. State, 73 So. 3d 564, 565 (¶4) (Miss. Ct. App. 2011) (citing Bradley v. State, 919 So. 2d 1062, 1063 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2005)). "However, where questions of law are raised, the applicable standard of review is de novo." Id.

DISCUSSION

I. Whether Aranyos's prior conviction and sentence of probation support his classification as a habitual offender.

¶4. Aranyos argues that one of the prior convictions used by the State to support his habitual-offender status does not meet the statutory requirements of section 99-19-81, which states:

Every person convicted in this state of a felony who shall have been convicted twice previously of any felony or federal crime upon charges separately brought and arising out of separate incidents at different times and who shall have been sentenced to separate terms of one (1) year or more in any state and/or federal penal institution, whether in this state or elsewhere, shall be sentenced to the maximum term of imprisonment prescribed for such felony, and such sentence shall not be reduced or suspended nor shall such person be eligible for parole or probation.

(Emphasis added). The amended indictment listed two prior convictions to support Aranyos's classification as a habitual offender. The first was an Ohio conviction for bank robbery, for which Aranyos received a sentence of thirty-seven months of imprisonment and two years of supervised release. The second conviction, from Pennsylvania, was for Count One, burglary, for which Aranyos received five years of probation, to run consecutively to

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the sentence for Count Two, theft by unlawful taking or disposition. For Count Two, Aranyos received "an indefinite term, the minimum of which shall be eleven and one[-] half (11½) calendar months, and the maximum twenty[-]three (23) calender months[.]" Count Two was not specifically listed in the amended indictment as a prior conviction, although the "Order of Parole" and plea agreement for Count Two were included in the circuit court's record. The basis of Aranyos's argument on appeal is that since his sentence for the Pennsylvania burglary conviction (Count One) was merely for five years of probation, he was never sentenced to a term in a penal institution for this particular conviction, and the prior conviction does not meet the requirements of section 99-19-81. After reviewing the relevant authority, we find there was sufficient evidence to support Aranyos's classification as a habitual offender.

¶5. In the appellee's brief, the State contends that Aranyos admitted to his prior convictions at the plea hearing and summarily states that Aranyos's allegations regarding his Pennsylvania burglary conviction "are unsupported[.]" The State is correct that a defendant's admission to prior convictions is sufficient to meet the necessary burden of proof.

Generally, to sentence a defendant as a habitual offender, the State must prove the prior offenses by competent evidence, and the defendant must be given a reasonable opportunity to challenge the prosecution's proof. However, where the defendant enters a plea of guilty and admits those facts which establish his habitual status, the State has met its burden of proof.

Wilkins v. State, 57 So. 3d 19, 26 (¶23) (Miss. Ct. App. 2010) (emphasis added and internal citations omitted). The following conversation took place at the hearing:

Q. Do you admit you've been convicted of these two underlying convictions which establish you as a habitual offender?

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A. Yes, Your Honor.
. . . .
Q. Do you also admit that you've been convicted of these underlying felonies which establish you as a habitual offender.
A. Yes, Your Honor.

Thus, Aranyos did admit that he had been convicted of the two underlying convictions listed in the indictment.

¶6. However, we cannot state with certainty that Aranyos's acknowledgment of his prior conviction and sentence of probation in the indictment constitutes an admission of "those facts which establish his habitual status." See id. As the State did not substantively address Aranyos's argument in its brief, we requested supplemental briefing on this issue.1

¶7. In its supplemental brief, the State argues that actual incarceration for a prior conviction is not required in order to be sentenced as a habitual offender. The State is correct that Mississippi precedent has consistently held:

Service of [a] sentence through actual incarceration is not mandatory when considering habitual[-]offender status under [section] 99-19-81. Where a defendant has been twice previously judged guilty of distinct felonies on which sentences of one year or more have been pronounced, irrespective of subsequent probation or suspension, statutory intent is satisfied regarding habitual[-]offender statutes.

Green v. State, 802 So. 2d 181, 183-84 (¶14) (Miss. Ct. App. 2001) (citing Jackson v. State,

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