Arata v. Faubion
| Decision Date | 28 June 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. 43993.,43993. |
| Citation | 161 P.3d 244 |
| Parties | Andrew E. ARATA; Rocque Pucci; and Sherri A. Pucci, Appellants, v. Betty S. FAUBION, Respondent. |
| Court | Nevada Supreme Court |
Barron, Vivone & Pruitt and David L. Barron, Las Vegas; Beckley Singleton, Chtd., and Daniel F. Polsenberg, Las Vegas; Tamela L. Kahle, Las Vegas, for Appellants.
Vannah & Vannah and Matthew R. Vannah and Robert D. Vannah, Las Vegas, for Respondent.
Before the Court En Banc.
In this appeal, we consider the constitutionality of NRS 41.440, which imposes vicarious liability on motor vehicle owners who loan their vehicles to immediate family members. We also consider whether, under the facts of this case, the district court erred in concluding, as a matter of law, that a stepfather and a biological mother are the immediate family members of an adult son for purposes of imposing vicarious liability under NRS 41.440. For the reasons stated below, we affirm the judgment and order of the district court in part, reverse in part, and remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
In January of 1999, appellant Andrew Arata struck respondent Betty S. Faubion in a pedestrian crosswalk while driving a vehicle owned by his mother and stepfather, appellants Sherri and Rocque Pucci.
At the time of the accident, Arata was nineteen years old and living in the Puccis' residence.1 The Puccis owned four vehicles, including a pickup truck that they purchased for Arata and a sports utility vehicle (SUV) driven predominately by Sherri Pucci. Arata was a named insured on the motor vehicle liability policies that covered the family vehicles.
On the morning of the accident, Arata drove the Puccis to the airport in the SUV on his way to work. Rather than return home to retrieve his own vehicle, Arata used the SUV throughout the day. He was driving the SUV to a friend's house after work when he struck Faubion.
Faubion ultimately commenced an action for damages against Arata and the Puccis under NRS 41.440, which imposes vicarious liability on motor vehicle owners when members of the owners' immediate family cause injuries arising from the express or implied permissive use of the owned vehicle.2
The Puccis moved the district court for summary judgment, arguing that NRS 41.440 is unconstitutional and, in any event, that Rocque Pucci was not an immediate family member within the meaning of NRS 41.440.3 In denying the motion, the district court found the following undisputed facts: that the Puccis owned the SUV involved in the accident; that the Puccis gave Arata express or implied permission to drive the SUV on the day of the accident; that Sherri Pucci was Arata's natural mother; and that Rocque Pucci was his stepfather. The court then concluded that NRS 41.440 supported the claim of liability against both Sherri and Rocque Pucci because a mother and a stepfather are immediate family members of a son; that NRS 41.440 is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose and, therefore, is not constitutionally infirm; and that, accordingly, the Puccis would be held jointly and severally liable for any damages caused by Arata's negligence.
At trial, a jury awarded Faubion approximately $5 million in damages, which the district court reduced to $3.5 million in accordance with a pretrial stipulation entered into by the parties. The district court subsequently denied a defense motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial. This appeal followed.
Faubion alleged below that the Puccis, as the vehicle's owners, were vicariously liable for Arata's negligence. In general, a vehicle owner is not responsible at common law for another person's negligent operation of the vehicle.4 This rule is based upon the general principle that each person is accountable for his or her own legal fault and, in the absence of such fault, is not responsible for the actions of others. However, our 1922 decision in Jones v. Golick implicitly adopted an exception to this rule, known as the family purpose doctrine, which subjects the owner of a car to vicarious liability when the owner provides a vehicle for the family's general use for family purposes and when the vehicle is so used by a family member.5 This doctrine represents a social policy generated in response to problems presented by widespread use of automobiles.6 Specifically, the increasing number of automobile collisions led to more frequent situations in which the negligent driver was found to be judgment proof.7
In 1957, the Legislature expanded upon the family purpose doctrine by enacting NRS 41.440, which imposes vicarious liability upon a vehicle owner for a family member's negligence while driving:
Any liability imposed upon a wife, husband, son, daughter, father, mother, brother, sister or other immediate member of a family arising out of his or her driving and operating a motor vehicle upon a highway with the permission, express or implied, of such owner is hereby imposed upon the owner of the motor vehicle, and such owner shall be jointly and severally liable with his or her wife, husband, son, daughter, father, mother, brother, sister or other immediate member of a family for any damages proximately resulting from such negligence or willful misconduct, and such negligent or willful misconduct shall be imputed to the owner of the motor vehicle for all purposes of civil damages.8
Although inartfully written, this statute is clearly broader than the common-law family purpose doctrine because it does not require that the vehicle be driven for a family purpose for vicarious liability to attach.
Arata and the Puccis contend that NRS 41.440, as interpreted by the district court, violates principles of substantive due process by imputing liability to the car owner solely on the basis of the owner's blood or stepparent relationship with the driver, and violates principles of equal protection by discriminating based on family relationships.9 In making these challenges, they argue that this court should evaluate NRS 41.440 under a heightened level of scrutiny because NRS 41.440 implicates their fundamental right to associate in a household as a family.
Before turning to the merits of Arata and the Puccis' equal protection and due process challenges, we must identify the appropriate level of constitutional scrutiny to apply in evaluating the challenged statute. The scrutiny level we use depends on the nature and importance of the rights asserted and the classification the statute creates. Unless a statute interferes with a fundamental right or discriminates against a suspect class, it will survive an equal protection attack so long as the classification withstands "minimum scrutiny," i.e., is rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.10 Likewise, "a due process challenge requires only minimum scrutiny in the absence of a suspect classification or impingement on fundamental rights."11 Thus, we discuss these claims together.
The United States Supreme Court has held that certain aspects of family autonomy such as the right to marry, the right to custody of one's children, and the right to keep the family together are fundamental liberty interests protected under substantive due process.12 NRS 41.440, however, does not implicate any of these aspects of family autonomy. Rather, NRS 41.440 only addresses a vehicle owner's liability when loaning a vehicle to an immediate family member. Consequently, NRS 41.440 does not infringe upon a fundamental right. Moreover, NRS 41.440 effects no discrimination against a suspect class. Accordingly, the constitutional validity of this measure depends upon whether the classifications it creates are rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.
Under the prescribed low level of scrutiny, we are not limited to considering only the justifications actually asserted by the Legislature.13 As we have recognized, "[i]t is well-settled under rational basis scrutiny that the reviewing court may hypothesize the legislative purpose behind legislative action."14 We have further noted that "`[i]f any state of facts may reasonably be conceived to justify [the legislation], a statut[e] . . . will not be set aside.'"15 While no legislative history exists indicating the Legislature's actual purpose for enacting NRS 41.440, we can conceive of at least two rational bases for the statute's enactment.
First, NRS 41.440 provides "`an injured party, who is free of negligence, a cause of action against a financially responsible defendant.'"16 Arata and the Puccis argue that better means exist to make an injured party whole. In this, they note that, under NRS 485.3091(1)(b), an owner's policy of liability insurance insures any person using the motor vehicle with the express or implied permission of the named insured. Where, as here, however, the damages caused by a negligent driver exceed the limits of the owner's liability policy, NRS 41.440 provides an additional means to make an injured party whole.17
Second, the Legislature could have concluded that imposing vicarious liability in circumstances such as those presented here would "encourage owners to exercise a greater degree of care when deciding whether to permit a financially irresponsible driver to use the family car."18 In this, the Legislature could have concluded that a family member is generally in a far better position than a mere acquaintance to determine whether another family member is competent to drive the vehicle.19 Certainly, the Puccis, having raised and lived with Arata for much of his life, were in a better position to determine his competency to drive.
Because NRS 41.440 is rationally related to legitimate government interests, we conclude the statute survives Arata and the Puccis' due process and equal protection challenges.20
Having concluded that NRS 41.440 is...
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