Aravanis v. Somerset County

• Decision Date: 01 September 1994
• Docket Number: No. 22,22
• Citation: 339 Md. 644,664 A.2d 888
• Parties: , 64 USLW 2238 George Joseph ARAVANIS v. SOMERSET COUNTY. ,
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 644

339 Md. 644

664 A.2d 888, 64 USLW 2238

George Joseph ARAVANIS v. SOMERSET COUNTY.

No. 22, Sept. Term, 1994.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

Sept. 13, 1995.

Andrew M. Dansicker, Washington, DC (Deborah A. Jeon, ACLU Foundation of Maryland, on brief), Centreville, for appellant.

Logan C. Widdowson, State's Attorney (Robert E. Laird, Jr., Assistant State's Attorney for Somerset County, Charles A. Bruce, Jr., Jack A. Willing, Jr., Jones & Bruce, P.A., all on brief), Princess Anne, for appellee.

Argued before MURPHY, C.J., and ELDRIDGE, RODOWSKY, CHASANOW, BELL, RAKER, and JOHN F. McAULIFFE, Judge of the Court of Appeals (Retired and Specially Assigned), JJ.

BELL, Judge.

We granted certiorari to consider whether Maryland's drug forfeiture statute, Maryland Code (1957, 1992 Repl.Vol.), Article 27, § 297, is subject to an excessive fines analysis pursuant to the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution, ¹ and/or its Maryland counterpart, Article 25 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. ² We are also invited, should we find the analysis appropriate, to formulate a test for determining when a particular forfeiture is unconstitutionally excessive. We shall hold that civil in rem forfeitures are subject to an excessive fines analysis. Therefore, we shall reverse the trial court's judgment.

I.

George Joseph Aravanis, the appellant, and his wife took title to a farm, including a house, located at 5341 Shelltown Road in Westover, Somerset County, Maryland, as tenants by the entireties, on December 31, 1971. They occupied the property while raising their children until they separated and Mrs. Aravanis moved out. Aravanis continued to occupy the property until they were divorced in 1988. Thereafter, in 1991, a part of the property was sold. The appellant obtained sole title to that portion remaining after the sale. At the same time, he acquired approximately $16,000.00 as his share of the proceeds of the sale. He used part of that amount to purchase marijuana for sale.

A search of the appellant's property was conducted pursuant to a search and seizure warrant ³ on July 2, 1991. As a result of that search, approximately two pounds of marijuana were seized from a gas barbecue grill located outside the house. Paraphernalia, i.e. items commonly used in the drug trade for weighing and packaging drugs, see Maryland Code (1957, 1992 Repl.Vol.), Art. 27, § 286(a)(4), consisting of sandwich baggies, found in a bedroom bureau drawer, and a set of triple beam scales were also seized. Forty-two marijuana plants, ranging in height from five to six feet, were discovered about 150-200 yards north of the residence, but adjacent thereto. The trial court did not consider these plants as evidence supporting forfeiture since the plants apparently were not located on the appellant's property.

The appellant pled guilty to one count of possession of a controlled dangerous substance in sufficient quantity to indicate an intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense pursuant to Article 27, § 286. ⁴ He was sentenced to five years imprisonment three and one-half years of which were suspended. ⁵ Thereafter, the appellee filed a petition to forfeit Aravanis's property.

At the forfeiture trial, the appellee relied upon the application and affidavit for the search and seizure warrant, detailing two controlled buys from the appellant's property, the return showing that 2 1/2 pounds of marijuana and drug paraphernalia were discovered on the property, and the appellant's guilty plea to possession of marijuana with intent to distribute.

Appearing pro se, the appellant maintained that the appellee failed to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) he acquired the real property in question during the period he was violating § 286 and (2) there was no other source for the acquisition of the property, as required by § 297(l). ⁶ On the other hand, the appellee argued that the forfeiture was controlled by § 297(m). ⁷ It maintained that § 297(l) applies only when there are questions as to ownership, and legislative presumptions thereof. It is inapplicable in this case, the appellee asserts, because there is no doubt that the appellant owned the property in question. The trial court agreed. Stating, "there is no doubt that Aravanis owns the real property in question," it determined that subsection (1) was inapplicable as it is "directed towards establishing an ownership in property for which there is no tangible evidence of ownership, e.g., a deed, motor vehicle title or a bill of sale." Memorandum Opinion and Order at 5. ⁸

The appellant maintained that he had lived on his property for over twenty years, but had dealt drugs for only two months. Therefore, he argued that forfeiture of his property was excessive: the "penalty is far beyond the ... crime" and "for this state or this country to take a man's home ... for a few months of illegal activity, is not right." Maintaining that forfeiture was punishment, the appellee argued that it was intended to be harsh. Neither it nor the appellant presented any other evidence concerning the value of either the subject property or of the marijuana seized or as to any other factor bearing on the fairness of the forfeiture. Concluding that "[t]here is no question that the real property at Shelltown Road was used in connection with the distributing and dispensing of marijuana," the court believed that it had no discretion to do anything except order forfeiture. It reasoned that its "only responsibilities are to determine if any statutory exceptions apply ... and whether there has been an adherence to due process...." Opinion and Order of the Court at 9. The court found no exceptions applied and that due process had been met. In doing so, the court acknowledged the harshness of the forfeiture, particularly the subject one, as it relates to the appellant. Nevertheless, it was satisfied that it was justified in light of the legislative intent of Maryland's drug statutes, including § 297. The court pointed out that the latter statute was another "enforcement tool in [the State's] arsenal against the spread of controlled dangerous substances," Order and Opinion of the Court at 7, a " 'part of [the State's] "full court press" against the illicit drug traffic.' " Id. (quoting Ewachiw v. Director of Finance of Baltimore City, 70 Md.App. 58, 60, 519 A.2d 1327, 1328 (1987). The constitutional issue this appeal presents was not expressly addressed.

The appellant appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. We granted certiorari on our own motion prior to that court considering it.

II.

The appellant challenges the forfeiture in this case as an excessive fine under both the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 25 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. For the former proposition, he relies on Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 113 S.Ct. 2801, 125 L.Ed.2d 488 (1993), in which the United States Supreme Court held that the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment applies to in rem civil forfeitures ordered pursuant to a punitive federal forfeiture statute. Because he maintains that it is binding on the several states, through the Fourteenth Amendment, necessarily, civil forfeitures imposed pursuant to punitive state forfeiture statutes, such as § 297, are also subject to that clause's limitations. Moreover, he asserts, Article 25 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, is in para materia with the Eighth Amendment and, thus, must be interpreted co-extensively with it. As such, the appellant contends that, even if this Court were to determine that the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment is inapplicable, the Excessive Fines clause in Article 25 is applicable.

A.

At issue in Austin was "whether the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment applies to forfeitures of property under 21 USC §§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7)." 509 U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2803, 125 L.Ed.2d at 494. To resolve that issue, the Court perceived the question to be "not, as the United States would have it, whether forfeiture under §§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) is civil or criminal, but rather whether it is punishment." Id. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2806, 125 L.Ed.2d at 497. This formulation of the issue was compelled by the purpose of the Eighth Amendment in general and the Excessive Fines Clause in particular. Relying on Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 109 S.Ct. 2909, 106 L.Ed.2d 219 (1989), the Court observed:

The purpose of the Eighth Amendment, putting the Bail Clause to one side, was to limit the government's power to punish.... The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause is self-evidently concerned with punishment. The Excessive Fines Clause limits the Government's power to extract payments, whether in cash or in kind, "as punishment for some offense." (Citation omitted)

509 U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2805, 125 L.Ed.2d at 497 (quoting Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 265, 109 S.Ct. at 2915, 106 L.Ed.2d at 232).

The Court held that §§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) are punitive. It was led to that conclusion by four factors: (1) "forfeiture generally and statutory in rem forfeitures in particular, historically have been understood, at least in part, as punishment," 509 U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2810, 125 L.Ed.2d at 503; (2) both § 881(a)(4) and § 881(a)(7) contain an "innocent owner" defense or exemption, which, because it "reveals a ... congressional intent to punish only those involved in drug trafficking," id. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2811, 125 L.Ed.2d at 504, "serve[s] to focus the provisions on the culpability of the owner in a way that makes them look more like punishment, not less," id. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2810, 125 L.Ed.2d at 503; (3) Congress chose to tie forfeiture under §§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) directly to the commission of drug offenses, by permitting forfeiture of a vehicle or real property on the basis of its use or intended use to facilitate either the...