Arbelaez v. Crews

• Decision Date: 20 August 2014
• Docket Number: Case No. 12–23304–CIV.
• Citation: 43 F.Supp.3d 1271
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida
• Parties: Guillermo Octavio ARBELAEZ, Petitioner, v. Michael D. CREWS, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, Respondent.

43 F.Supp.3d 1271

Guillermo Octavio ARBELAEZ, Petitioner

v.Michael D. CREWS, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, Respondent.

Case No. 12–23304–CIV.

United States District Court, S.D. Florida.

Signed Aug. 20, 2014.

Elizabeth Tandiwe Stewart, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Rachel Lawrence Day, Office of CCRC, Fort Lauderdale, FL, for Plaintiff.

Sandra Sue Jaggard, Attorney General Office, Department of Legal Affairs, Miami, FL, for Defendant.

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

FEDERICO A. MORENO, District Judge.

In 1988, Petitioner Guillermo Arbelaez was sentenced to death for kidnapping, strangling, and throwing over a Key Biscayne bridge into the water 75–feet below the 5–year old son of a woman in revenge for her rejection of his romantic advances. After two decades of post-conviction litigation in Florida state courts, the Petitioner claims that his execution is impermissible because he is intellectually disabled and that his trial counsel was ineffective. The State of Florida argues that the September 2012 federal petition is untimely and should be denied. The Court holds that, although the federal petition should have been filed no later than April 4, 2006, the State has waived its timeliness objection. However, the Court denies the petition on the merits, finding the Florida Supreme Court's determination that Petitioner was not intellectually disabled and that he suffered no prejudice by any alleged ineffective assistance of counsel was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established United States Supreme Court law.

I. Factual Background

Petitioner Arbelaez seeks to vacate the death sentence imposed upon him for the 1988 murder of Julio Rivas, the 5–year old son of Graciela Alfara. Arbelaez rented a room in a Miami house he shared with Ms. Alfara and her 5–year old son, two teenaged daughters and a 19–year old cousin. Arbelaez had an intimate relationship with Ms. Alfara, but that ended when she accused him of touching one of her daughters. Ms. Alfara began seeing other men causing Arbelaez to say that he would do something that would assure “that bitch is going to remember me for the rest of her life.” Arbelaez kidnapped Ms. Alfara's son, strangled, bruised, and threw him from a bridge in Key Biscayne, Florida. Arbelaez confessed to a friend that he did so as revenge against the mother. Arbelaez obtained an airline ticket to Puerto Rico under an assumed name and eventually fled to Colombia. After obtaining monetary wire transfers from his family, he returned to Miami. He waived his Miranda rights and gave two statements admitting that he killed the child as a plan of revenge against the mother.¹ At trial, Arbelaez, contrary to his three prior statements, testified that the child's death was an accident, and not an intentional killing.

After his conviction, Arbelaez was sentenced to death and subsequently filed an appeal, and several post-conviction motions in state court. On September 11, 2012 Arbelaez filed this federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The case was assigned to Judge Robin Rosenbaum and later transferred to the undersigned upon Judge Rosenbaum's elevation to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.

The State of Florida argues that Arbelaez's petition is time-barred. Arbelaez claims that his execution would violate the United States Constitution because of his intellectual disability. Petitioner further alleges that his court-appointed attorney rendered ineffective assistance of counsel at both the guilt and penalty phases of his trial. For the reasons further discussed below, the Court holds that the State of Florida has waived the timeliness argument, but also finds Arbelaez's petition should be dismissed on the merits because he has not met his considerable burden under § 2254(d). The Florida Supreme Court's determinations were not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of clearly established United States Supreme Court law.

II. Procedural History

On April 27, 1988, Petitioner Arbelaez was charged by indictment in Miami–Dade County with first degree murder and kidnapping of 5–year old Julio Rivas. On February 19, 1991, the jury found Arbelaez guilty. Arbelaez v. State, 626 So.2d 169, 174 (Fla.1993). After the penalty phase, the jury recommended a death sentence by a vote of eleven to one. Id. at 175. The trial judge found three aggravating factors² and two mitigating factors.³ After weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the court sentenced Arbelaez to death. On direct appeal, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence and found that: (1) the defendant was not in custody when he had telephone conversations with police, and thus was not entitled to Miranda warnings; (2) the emotional outburst of the victim's mother as she took the witness stand did not require a mistrial; (3) the trial court properly found aggravating circumstances; (4) the trial court properly rejected the defendant's claim of mitigating circumstances; and (5) the death sentence was not disproportionate. See id. at 178.

Thereafter, Arbelaez sought post-conviction relief. The trial court summarily denied all relief requested. See Arbelaez v. State, 775 So.2d 909 (Fla.2000). On appeal from the denial of the post-conviction motion, Arbelaez raised thirteen claims.⁴ The Florida Supreme Court denied relief but remanded “because the record does not conclusively demonstrate that Arbelaez is entitled to no relief on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase, the trial court could not properly deny his post-conviction motion without an evidentiary hearing.” Id. at 920. The court remanded “this matter to the trial court with instruction to conduct an evidentiary hearing on this claim.” Id.

On remand, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing and again denied the motion for post-conviction relief. Just before the court entered its order, Arbelaez filed a supplemental motion under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 arguing the applicability of the then-recent United States Supreme Court decisions in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), and Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002).⁵ The trial court denied the supplemental claims as untimely and procedurally barred. Arbelaez appealed the trial court's order denying post-conviction relief, as well as the denial of his supplemental Ring and Atkins claims. Arbelaez also petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus raising five separate claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. See Arbelaez v. State, 898 So.2d 25 (Fla.2005). The Florida Supreme Court denied all relief. Id. During the pendency of his appeal, Arbelaez filed a second motion for post-conviction relief in the trial court asserting that his execution is forbidden by state and federal law because he was mentally retarded. The trial court denied relief but the Florida Supreme Court remanded for an evidentiary hearing on that claim. Arbelaez v. State, 950 So.2d 413 (Fla.2006) (table decision).

The trial court held evidentiary hearings over a two-month period. Ultimately, the trial court again denied relief. On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed indicating: “We hereby affirm the post-conviction court's denial of relief. Arbelaez did not prove that he has concurrent deficits in adaptive behavior as required by section 921.137(1), Florida Statutes (2004), and Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.203(b).” Arbelaez v. State, 72 So.3d 745 (Fla.2011). On September 11, 2012, Arbelaez filed this federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 claiming ineffective assistance of counsel and that his mental disability

precludes his execution. The State has asserted that the petition is untimely.

III. Timeliness

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) imposed a 1–year limitation period for the filing of an application for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Accordingly, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) provides:

(1) A 1–year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of—

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.

In most cases, including the present case, the limitation period begins to run pursuant to § 2244(d)(1)(A). The Eleventh Circuit has decided that the judgment becomes “final” within the meaning of § 2244(d)(1)(A) as follows: (1) “if the prisoner files a timely petition for certiorari, the judgment becomes ‘final’ on the date on which the Supreme Court issues a decision on the merits or denies certiorari, or (2) the judgment becomes ‘final’ on the date on which the defendant's time for filing such a petition expires.” Kaufmann v. United States, 282 F.3d 1336, 1339 (11th Cir.2002).

In 1996, Congress set a 1–year limitation period for the filing of an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to a state...