Arbia v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 1:02CV00111 (M.D.N.C. 6/4/2003)

• Decision Date: 04 June 2003
• Docket Number: 1:02CV00111.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of North Carolina
• Parties: LISA MCLENDON ARBIA, Plaintiff, v. OWENS-ILLINOIS, INC., DAVID LEINEWEBER, EUGENE ESCOLAS, TIMOTHY STEBBINS, AND JACK SHANK, Defendants.

Page 1

LISA MCLENDON ARBIA, Plaintiff, v. OWENS-ILLINOIS, INC., DAVID LEINEWEBER, EUGENE ESCOLAS, TIMOTHY STEBBINS, AND JACK SHANK, Defendants.

1:02CV00111.

United States District Court, M.D. North Carolina.

June 4, 2003.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

OSTEEN, District Judge.

Plaintiff Lisa McLendon Arbia, acting pro se, brings this employment discrimination action against her former employer, Defendant Owens-Illinois, Inc., and several of its managing employees: Defendants David Leineweber, Eugene Escolas, Timothy Stebbins, and Jack Shank. Plaintiff alleges violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act ("Title VII"), the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), and asserts common law claims for hostile work environment, wrongful discharge and slander. The matter is before the court on Defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Rule 12(b)(6)"). Because Plaintiff did not commence a civil action by timely filing a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) and Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Rule 3"), the court will grant Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Title VII and ADA claims. The court will grant Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's hostile work environment claim against all Defendants, and the wrongful discharge, FMLA and FLSA claims against the individual Defendants. The court will deny Defendants' motion to dismiss the wrongful discharge, FMLA, and FLSA claims against Defendant Owens-Illinois, and the slander claim against all Defendants because Plaintiff has stated claims upon which relief may be granted.

I. BACKGROUND

The following facts in this multi-claim employment discrimination suit are presented in the light most favorable to Plaintiff.¹ Plaintiff was hired by Owens-Illinois, a glass and plastics manufacturing company, as a full-time employee. She was promoted twice within the sales and customer service departments of the company. Approximately six years after her second promotion, Plaintiff required a medical leave of absence from work.² Defendant Eugene Escolas notified Plaintiff by letter dated October 29, 1999, that Owens-Illinois was classifying her medical leave as FMLA protected. Plaintiff returned to work on November 8, 1999. Approximately 10 days later, she suffered an adverse employment action (a written reprimand) because of absences previously excused as medical leave. Plaintiff submitted both oral and written complaints within the company questioning this adverse employment action. She did not receive clarification from management until she initiated an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") investigation.

Plaintiff claims that this adverse employment action was in retaliation for taking leave in accordance with the FMLA.

In addition to retaliating against her for taking FMLA leave, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants ratified slanderous statements of her co-workers. Several of her co-workers made statements relating to an alleged affair between Plaintiff and her supervisor, and that she was "faking her illness" to receive medical leave. (Am. Compl. at 7.) Plaintiff contends that these statements, other disability harassment, and "invasion of privacy issues" created a hostile work environment. Plaintiff asserts that she alerted management to these statements but that Defendants neither corrected nor prevented her co-workers' behavior.

Plaintiff also contends that Defendants owe her overtime compensation for work she performed in addition to her normal duties. Plaintiff suffered a pay reduction when Defendants changed the overtime payment policy with only one day of notice to employees. She attempted unsuccessfully to clarify her job description to determine whether she was on the proper pay scale. Because of the overtime payment policy change, she was no longer eligible for overtime compensation. Plaintiff contends that she is not exempt from the FLSA's overtime provisions under the "administrative exemption." See 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1).

Plaintiff's work problems peaked when she was confronted by management in February 2001. Defendants Stebbins and Escolas met with Plaintiff concerning her "inability to come to work." (Am. Compl. at 8.) Defendant Escolas indicated that if Plaintiff chose not to resign and to accept continued insurance coverage, severance pay, and a neutral job reference, she would be discharged due to absenteeism. Although Defendant Escolas explained Plaintiff's options in signing the prepared documents, Plaintiff contends that because she was denied an attorney's presence while she reviewed the documents, she signed them under duress "for health insurance purposes." (Am. Compl. at 9.) Defendants admit that even if Plaintiff had consulted an attorney, the package would have been rescinded if the prepared documents were not signed during the meeting. Despite the fact that Plaintiff did in fact resign, she alleges that Defendants terminated her employment based on a "mixed motive": a position for another employee's spouse needed to be created, "lack of business," and because accommodation of Plaintiff's request for modification under the ADA was too burdensome. (Am. Compl. at 10.)

Plaintiff filed a complaint with the EEOC in March 2001. The EEOC dismissed her claim and issued her a right-to-sue letter. Plaintiff claims that she received the right-to-sue letter on September 6, 2001. On December 4, 2001, within 90 days of when she allegedly received the right-to-sue letter, Plaintiff filed an application to extend the time for filing in state court. A state court clerk granted Plaintiff's application and extended the filing deadline until December 24, 2001. Plaintiff did not file a complaint in this action until December 27, 2001. Defendants timely removed the case on the basis of federal question, 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Plaintiff amended her complaint pursuant to a court order and Defendants filed an amended answer. Plaintiff seeks reinstatement, reasonable accommodation, back pay, lost wages, retroactive medical benefits, compensatory and punitive damages, and "a court appointed program for sensitivity training to aid [Defendants] in their understanding of accommodating persons with disabilities . . . ." (Am. Compl. at 11.)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A court should dismiss a case for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted "only in very limited circumstances." Rogers v. Jefferson-Pilot Life Ins. Co., 883 F.2d 324, 325 (4^th Cir. 1989). When considering a motion to dismiss, the court must evaluate the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accepting as true all well-pleaded factual allegations. Randall v. United States, 30 F.3d 518, 522 (4^th Cir. 1994). Because pleadings drafted by pro se claimants are held to less rigorous standards than pleadings drafted by attorneys, it must appear "beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21, 92 S. Ct. 594, 596 (1972) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S. Ct. 99, 102 (1957)). In considering a defendant's motion to dismiss a pro se civil rights plaintiff's claim, the court should "not permit technical pleading requirements to defeat the vindication of any constitutional rights which the plaintiff alleges, however inartfully, to have been infringed." Canty v. City of Richmond, Va. Police Dep't, 383 F. Supp. 1396, 1400 (E.D. Va. 1974).

III. ANALYSIS

1. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act

The first issue before the court is whether Plaintiff's Title VII and ADA claims are time barred because she failed to file her complaint within 90 days after receiving her right-to-sue letter. For a claimant to be entitled to relief under both Title VII and the ADA, she must file a civil action within 90 days of receipt of the EEOC's right-to-sue letter.³ 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)-(1). If a claimant does not file within this 90-day period a court may equitably toll the statute of limitations in the following circumstances: (1) the claimant received inadequate notice, (2) a motion for appointment of counsel is pending, (3) the court led the plaintiff to believe that she completed all necessary requirements, or (4) the defendant's affirmative misconduct lulled the plaintiff into inaction. See Baldwin County Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 151, 104 S. Ct. 1723, 1725-26 (1984). Otherwise, a claimant's failure to bring suit within 90 days generally forfeits her right to pursue the claim. Id., 466 U.S. at 152, 104 S. Ct. at 1726 ("Procedural requirements established by Congress for gaining access to the federal courts are not to be disregarded by courts out of a vague sympathy for particular litigants.").

In her amended complaint, Plaintiff stated that she received the right-to-sue letter from the EEOC on September 6, 2001. She filed an application to extend the time to file the complaint in state court on December 4, 2001, two days before the 90-day filing deadline. Although Plaintiff was granted an extension to file until December 24, 2001, Plaintiff concedes that she did not file a complaint until December 27, 2001. Plaintiff offers no explanation for her untimely filing in either her complaint or her amended complaint.

In addressing a pro se plaintiff's failure to file a complaint within the 90-day time period, the Baldwin court stated expressly that the principles of equitable tolling do not apply when a plaintiff has been told multiple times how to preserve his or her claim, but elects not to act diligently. Baldwin, 466 U.S. at 151, 104 S. Ct. at 1726. A claimant who simply lacks diligence is precluded from taking advantage of the principles of equitable tolling, whether or not he or she is proceeding pro se. Id.

Here, there was a directive on the Application...