Arbitron Inc. v. Renda Broad. Corp.
| Decision Date | 27 March 2014 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:13-cv-716-J-34JRK |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
| Parties | ARBITRON INC., Plaintiff, v. RENDA BROADCASTING CORPORATION, Defendant. |
THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Plaintiff Arbitron, Inc.'s ("Arbitron") First Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 7; Amended Complaint); Defendant Renda Broadcasting Corporation's ("Renda") Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint and Memorandum of Legal Authority in Support (Doc. No. 16; Motion); the Memorandum of Law of Plaintiff, Arbitron [sic] Inc., in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 25; Opposition Memorandum); and Renda Broadcasting Corporation's Reply Brief in Support of its Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 26; Reply).
Arbitron initiated this action by filing its initial complaint (Doc. No. 1; Complaint) on June 18, 2013. Upon review, the Court, sua sponte, issued an order (Doc. No. 5) striking the Complaint as an impermissible "shotgun pleading." Thereafter, on June 25, 2013, Arbitron filed its Amended Complaint, which is the operative pleading in this action.
Arbitron sues Renda, alleging copyright infringement, as well as a violation of Florida's Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, FLA. STAT. § 501.201, et seq. ("FDUTPA"). Seegenerally Amended Complaint. Arbitron is a media and marketing research firm that, among other things, collects radio audience listening data. Id. at ¶¶ 7, 8. The copyrighted works at issue in this case are Arbitron's Reports and Databases which contain radio audience estimates and station rankings created from Arbitron's radio audience listening data. Id. at ¶¶ 8-9. Renda owns, controls, and operates multiple radio stations throughout the United States, including the Jacksonville, Florida area. Id. at ¶ 4. Arbitron alleges that Renda subscribed to Arbitron's radio audience estimates and Reports for Renda's Jacksonville stations from May 2008 through December 2010. Id. at ¶ 13. Beginning in or about May 2011, and continuing through at least December 2012, Arbitron contends that Renda illicitly obtained copies of the Arbitron Reports and Databases from a Jacksonville, Florida advertising agency ("the Agency") that was an Arbitron subscriber. Id. at ¶ 19.
In the First Claim for Relief, Arbitron alleges that Renda infringed Arbitron's copyright in the Reports and Databases by reproducing and distributing these materials without a license or authorization. Id. at ¶¶ 18-35. In the Second Claim for Relief, Arbitron alleges that Renda induced the Agency to infringe Arbitron's copyright by providing Renda with copies of Arbitron's Reports and Databases. Id. at ¶¶ 36-44. Finally, in the Third Claim for Relief, Arbitron alleges that Renda violated FDUTPA by improperly acquiring and using Arbitron's copyrighted materials in making programming decisions and determining advertising rates without a license or authorization. Id. at ¶¶ 45-51. For these alleged violations, Arbitron seeks damages and injunctive relief. See generally id.
On August 22, 2013, Renda filed the Motion, in which it argues that the First and Second Claims for Relief should be dismissed because the Amended Complaint fails to setforth plausible grounds for relief for copyright infringement and contributory infringement. Motion at 5-8. Renda identifies numerous alleged deficiencies with these claims, including that Arbitron alleges "sweeping legal conclusions[;]" that Arbitron "repeatedly" relies upon "information and belief[;]" and that Arbitron does not allege sufficient details regarding the fourteen "relevant" Reports and Databases. Id. Renda also argues that Arbitron's failure to identify the Agency from which Renda allegedly received the Reports and Databases renders Arbitron's inducement claim insufficient to impart "fair notice." Id. at 8. Additionally, Renda argues that these claims violate Rules 8 and 10 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule(s)) because they impermissibly lump multiple claims together in that each claim relates to fourteen different copyrights. Id. at 9. In this regard, Renda asserts that "[s]eparate and distinct allegations are required to show that any particular alleged copyright was infringed." Id. at 9-10. With regard to Arbitron's FDUTPA claim, Renda asserts that this claim is preempted by the Copyright Act because the rights Arbitron seeks to protect fall within the subject matter of the copyrights and because the rights Arbitron asserts under FDUTPA are equivalent to the exclusive rights provided by section 106 of the Copyright Act. Id. at 10-12. Renda also argues that even if Arbitron's FDUTPA claim is not preempted, it should be dismissed because Arbitron "fails to set forth plausible grounds upon which relief can be granted" and because "Arbitron has failed to allege acts that would constitute violations under the statute." Id. at 14-18. Arbitron filed its Opposition Memorandum on September 25, 2013, and Renda filed its Reply on October 8, 2013. This matter is ripe for review, and the Court will address each of Renda's grounds for dismissal in turn.
In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept the factual allegations set forth in the complaint as true. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 n.1 (2002); see also Lotierzo v. Woman's World Med. Ctr., Inc., 278 F.3d 1180, 1182 (11th Cir. 2002). In addition, all reasonable inferences should be drawn in favor of the plaintiff. See Omar ex. rel. Cannon v. Lindsey, 334 F.3d 1246, 1247 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam). Nonetheless, the plaintiff must still meet some minimal pleading requirements. Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomm., 372 F.3d 1250, 1262-63 (11th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Indeed, while "[s]pecific facts are not necessary," the complaint should "'give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Further, the plaintiff must allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). A "plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do[.]" Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal quotations omitted); see also Jackson, 372 F.3d at 1262 () (internal citation and quotations omitted). Indeed, "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable tolegal conclusions[,]" which simply "are not entitled to [an] assumption of truth." See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79. Thus, in ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court must determine whether the complaint contains "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
In the First Claim for Relief, Arbitron alleges that Renda infringed Arbitron's copyrights in the Reports and Databases by reproducing and distributing these materials. Id. at ¶¶ 18-35. "To establish a prima facie case of copyright infringement, 'two elements must be proven: (1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements of the work that are original.'" Latimer v. Roaring Toyz, Inc., 601 F.3d 1224, 1232-33 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991)).
Renda raises a variety of arguments in support of its claim that Arbitron's allegations do not establish the level of plausibility required under the Rules and the Supreme Court's decisions in Twombly and Iqbal. First, Renda points out that Arbitron relies repeatedly on "information and belief," and that these allegations are "little more than 'belief' and insufficient 'information.'" Motion at 6, 8. However, "the mere fact that a complaint includes allegations asserted on information and belief is not, in and of itself, a basis for dismissal." Latele Television C.A. v. Telemundo Commc'ns Grp., LLC, No. 12-22539-CIV, 2013 WL 1296314, at *11 (S.D. Fla. March 27, 2013) (citing Arista Records, LLC v. Doe 3, 604 F.3d 110, 120 (2d Cir. 2010)). Indeed, "[t]he Twombly plausibility standard . . . does not prevent a plaintiff from'pleading facts alleged upon information and belief' where the belief is based on factual information that makes the inference of culpability plausible." Associated Indus. Ins. Co. v. Advanced Mgmt. Servs., Inc., No. 12-80393-CIV, 2013 WL 1176252, at *3 (S.D. Fla. March 20, 2013) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Renda also asserts that Arbitron's pleading is deficient because Arbitron does not allege with specificity "which reports or databases Renda allegedly received during this broad time frame, which of the fourteen allegedly 'relevant' reports or databases were copied," or "when" the allegedly infringing activity took place. Motion at 7-8. However, to state a claim for copyright infringement, a claimant need only allege ownership of a valid copyright and copying of constituent elements that are original. Latimer, 601 F.3d at 1232-33. Upon review of the Amended Complaint, the Court finds that Arbitron has sufficiently pled both elements. Arbitron has alleged that it "is the owner of registered...
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