Arc Electrical Construction Co. v. Commissioner, Docket No. 20563-82.
Decision Date | 17 January 1990 |
Docket Number | Docket No. 20563-82. |
Citation | 58 TCM (CCH) 1235,1990 TC Memo 30 |
Parties | Arc Electrical Construction Co. v. Commissioner. |
Court | U.S. Tax Court |
Paul Friedman, 1450 Broadway, New York, N.Y., for the petitioner. Kevin M. Flynn, for the respondent.
Supplemental Memorandum Opinion
This matter is before us on petitioner's motion to vacate.
On December 29, 1988, we filed our Memorandum Findings of Fact and Opinion in this case. Arc Electrical Construction Co. v. Commissioner Dec. 45,246(M), T.C. Memo. 1988-592. We held that (1) petitioner suffered a $6 million embezzlement loss in 1980, which could be carried back to 1977, and (2) the determined deficiencies in tax for 1977 and 1974 were attributable to fraud. With respect to our finding of fraud for 1974, we stated:
We withheld entry of decision under Rule 1551 for the purpose of permitting the parties to submit computations pursuant to our determination of the issues.
On April 19, 1989, respondent's computation for entry of decision was filed with the Court. On May 9, 1989, petitioner filed notice of objection to respondent's computation, together with an alternative computation. Both respondent's and petitioner's computations provided for an overpayment of tax of $31,769 in 1974. However, respondent's computation provided for an addition to tax under section 6653(b) of $27,884 in 1974, while petitioner's alternative computation provided for no addition to tax.
On May 11, 1989, we ordered respondent to submit a detailed explanation of his computation for the 1974 taxable year, since it appeared that he was allowing petitioner to carry back a 1977 jobs credit to 1974, the disallowance of which was the basis for the 1974 deficiency and addition to tax under section 6653(b).
On May 31, 1989, respondent filed a motion to amend his computation for entry of decision together with a memorandum in support of such motion. Respondent's amended computation was exactly the same numerically as the first computation, although it provided additional explanation. The amended computation for the 1974 taxable year stated:
On June 6, 1989, we granted respondent's motion to amend his computation. On June 7, 1989, we entered decision in this case finding an overpayment of tax of $31,769.00 and an addition to tax under section 6653(b) of $27,884.00 for 1974.
On June 15, 1989, petitioner filed a motion to vacate the decision entered June 7, 1989. Petitioner's motion to vacate states in pertinent part:
Petitioner's motion to vacate raises a number of different arguments which we will address separately.
First, petitioner appears to argue in paragraph 15 of its motion to vacate that the new jobs credit carryback from 1977 to 1974 should reduce the underpayment to which the 50-percent fraud addition is applied in 1974. We disagree.
The base for computing the 50-percent addition to tax for fraud is undiminished by any subsequent carryback. Petterson v. Commissioner Dec. 19,359, 19 T.C. 486 (1952). "The unforeseen circumstance that a carry-back later arises to offset the deficiency should not operate to relieve the taxpayer of the addition imposed for the fraud." Auerbach Shoe Co. v. Commissioner Dec. 19,972, 21 T.C. 191, 196 (1953), affd. 54-2 USTC ¶ 9673 216 F.2d 693 (1st Cir. 1954).
Petitioner's second argument stems from its first argument. The jobs credit carryback from 1977 to 1974 resulted in an overpayment of tax in 1974 of $31,769, but at the same time there was an underpayment of $55,676 to which the 50-percent fraud addition was applied. "The basic principle to be found in prior case law would permit reduction for carryforward loss deductions and credits, but prohibit carryback loss deductions and credits, when computing additions to tax." See Blanton Coal Co. v. Commissioner Dec. 41,382(M), T.C. Memo. 1984-397. Petitioner's grievance seems to be that to the extent the jobs credit carryback was allowed in 1974, it is unavailable as a carryover to be applied to 1978 and subsequent years where petitioner states respondent is going to determine the addition to tax for fraud.
The simple response to petitioner's argument is that a taxpayer does not have the option of carrying a new jobs credit forward if the credit is able to be carried back. See sec. 53(c).2 Since the carryback to 1974 is a result mandated by law, peti...
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