Arcand v. Brother Intern. Corp.

Citation673 F.Supp.2d 282
Decision Date30 November 2009
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 3:07-cv-4987 (FLW).
PartiesDiana ARCAND and Thomas Shoosmith, on Behalf of Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs, v. BROTHER INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of New Jersey

Arnold Carl Lakind, Szaferman, Lakind, Blumstein, Blader & Lehmann, PC, Lawrenceville, NJ, for Plaintiffs.

Michael R. McDonald, Lan Hoang, Gibbons, PC, Newark, NJ, for Defendant.

OPINION

WOLFSON, District Judge:

Presently before the Court are two motions filed by Defendant Brother International Corporation ("BIC"): (1) a motion to dismiss all claims pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), and (2) a motion to strike nationwide class allegations pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(f). In their First Amended Complaint ("Complaint"), Plaintiffs Diana Arcand ("Arcand") and Thomas Shoosmith ("Shoosmith"), individually, and on behalf of a putative class of consumers (collectively "Plaintiffs"), who purchased Brother-brand laser printers and toner cartridges, assert claims against BIC for: (1) fraudulent concealment; (2) violations of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act ("NJCFA"); (3) trespass to chattels; and (4) conversion. Plaintiffs claim that they were injured by BIC each time they had to prematurely buy new toner cartridges for their laser printers when the printers falsely indicated the toner cartridge needed to be replaced notwithstanding the fact that usable toner remained in the cartridge. For the reasons that follow, the Court finds that Plaintiffs' NJCFA claim must be dismissed because Plaintiffs fail to allege that they suffered an ascertainable loss due to BIC's unlawful conduct. The Court also dismisses Plaintiffs' fraudulent concealment claim. These claims are dismissed without prejudice, with a right to re-plead. Additionally, the Court dismisses with prejudice Plaintiffs' trespass to chattels and conversion claims.

I. Statement of Facts and Procedural History

The following version of events assumes Plaintiffs' allegations in the Complaint to be true because BIC moves pursuant to Fed. Civ. R.P. 12(b)(6) and (f). Defendant BIC, a Delaware corporation headquartered in Bridgewater, New Jersey, is a subsidiary of Brother Industries LTD ("BIL") and the authorized distributer and provider of customer support for Brother-brand laser printers and toner cartridges sold within the United States. Compl. ¶ 6. Arcand, a Virginia resident, purchased a Brother HL-2040 laser printer and replacement Brother toner cartridges in Virginia. Id. ¶ 4. Shoosmith, a New Jersey resident, purchased a Brother HL-2070 laser printer and replacement Brother toner cartridges in New Jersey. Id. ¶ 5. Both printers, as indicated in the user manual, denote a maximum page yield: "replacement toner cartridges print up to 2,500 A4 or Letter-size single-sided pages at 5% coverage." Supplemental Certification of Michael R. McDonald, ("Supp. McDonald Certif."), Ex. E, User Manual p. 5-2.1

Brother-brand printers notify the user when the toner reaches a certain level. Compl. ¶ 17. In this case, both Arcand's and Shoosmith's laser printers display a yellow LED light and a "Toner Life End" message when the toner reaches this level. Id. ¶¶ 17-18. According to the service manuals for the models owned by Arcand and Shoosmith,2 the toner cartridge is considered to be at life end when approximately forty-four grams of toner are remaining in the cartridge. Id. ¶ 36. A new cartridge contains approximately 100 grams of toner. Id. Notwithstanding the fact that some toner remains in the cartridge, the user manual explains that this light and message indicate that the printer has run out of toner. Id. ¶ 17. The user manual also "strongly recommend[s]" that users not refill toner cartridges or purchase any toner cartridges other than "Genuine Brother Brand." Id. ¶ 15. The LED light and message indicating the end of toner life not only act as a warning but preclude the user from printing until the "empty" toner cartridge is replaced. Id. ¶¶ 26, 32. According to Arcand and Shoosmith, they were unaware when they purchased the printer of this "forced shut-down mechanism," which causes the LED light to illuminate and to display an empty message when there is what Plaintiffs consider to be "a large amount of usable toner" remaining, thereby preventing them from using all the toner in the cartridges. Id. ¶¶ 2, 28, 34.

A. Procedural History

Plaintiffs initiated this putative class action on October 17, 2007. A motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, to stay the proceeding pending resolution of a similar action in California, was filed by BIC on January 4, 2008, and was subsequently denied by this Court on August 27, 2008. BIC again filed a motion to stay the proceedings, this time due to another action in California that was pending class certification, on September 19, 2008. On January 30, 2009, this Court again denied BIC's motion to stay the proceedings. On February 9, 2009, BIC filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint and strike nationwide class allegations. This Court later terminated the motion, however, because Plaintiffs filed their first amended complaint on February 27, 2009. In response, BIC filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' amended complaint and strike nationwide class allegations on March 16, 2009. After a recent decision in this District, in a case factually analogous to the one at bar, Knox v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., No. 08-cv-4308, 2009 WL 1810728 (D.N.J. July 2009), the Court provided both parties the opportunity to submit a sur-reply brief in support of their respective positions.

II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review

When reviewing a motion to dismiss on the pleadings, courts "accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief." Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir.2008) (citation and quotations omitted). In Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), the Supreme Court clarified the 12(b)(6) standard. Specifically, the Court "retired" the language contained in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957), that "a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Id. at 1968 (quoting Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99). Instead, the factual allegations set forth in a complaint "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id. at 1965. As the Third Circuit has stated, "[t]he Supreme Court's Twombly formulation of the pleading standard can be summed up thus: `stating ... a claim requires a complaint with enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest' the required element. This `does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage,' but instead `simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of' the necessary element." Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234 (quoting Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1965).

In affirming that Twombly standards apply to all motions to dismiss, the Supreme Court recently explained the principles. "First, the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009); Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009). "Second, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss." Id. at 1950. Therefore, "a court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Id. Ultimately, "a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief. A complaint has to `show' such an entitlement with its facts." Fowler, 578 F.3d at 211.

Before reaching the merits of Plaintiffs' claims, there is a threshold procedural question as to what, if any, documents and exhibits may be considered on this Motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Plaintiffs supply this Court with several exhibits, including (1) a response by BIC to an Order to Show Cause in the matter of Kandel v. Brother International Corporation, No. 08-1040 ("Kandel"), a case currently pending in the Central District of California (Kaplan Decl. ¶ 2; Ex. A); (2) a letter from BIC's counsel to the plaintiff's counsel in Kandel titled Responding to Consumer Legal Remedies Act Demand Letter (Kaplan Decl. ¶ 3; Ex. B); (3) selected pages from the service manual for Brother-brand printers model numbers HL-2030/2040/2070N (Kaplan Decl. ¶ 4; Ex. C); (4) a survey of user manuals, compiled by Plaintiffs' counsel, listing printer model numbers, control panel messages and explanations purportedly found in the user guides (Kaplan Decl. ¶ 5; Ex. D); (5) selected excerpts from the user manual for Arcand's printer (model HL-2040) and Shoosmith's printer (model HL-2070) (Kaplan Decl. ¶ 6; Ex. E); and (5) an article from an online web magazine detailing one user's frustration with the shutdown mechanism equipped on Brother-branded printers (Kaplan Decl. ¶ 7; Ex. F);.

BIC objects to Plaintiffs' introduction of the foregoing materials in this Motion to Dismiss, yet likewise attaches several documents as exhibits to its Motion, including: (1) an Opinion by the Central District of California in the Kandel matter (McDonald Decl. ¶ 3; Ex. B); (2) class action complaints in Lipper v. Brother International Corporation, No. CV08-06126 ("Lipper"), a case...

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