Arceo v. City of Junction City, Kansas
| Decision Date | 17 January 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 00-1320-JTM.,00-1320-JTM. |
| Citation | 182 F.Supp.2d 1062 |
| Parties | Pete ARCEO, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF JUNCTION CITY, KANSAS, Jeffrey Clark, J.M. Warren, and Suzanne Lueker, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Kansas |
Pedro L. Irigonegaray, Robert V. Eye, Irigonegaray & Associates, Timothy H. Girard, Bruce J. Woner, R. Patrick Riordan, Woner, Glenn, Reeder, Girard & Riordan, P.A., Topeka, KS, for Plaintiff.
Donald Patterson, Fisher, Patterson, Sayler & Smith, Topeka, KS, David P. Madden, Linda Monroe Davenport, Fisher, Patterson, Sayler & Smith, Overland Park, KS, Arthur S. Chalmers, Bradley Joseph LaForge, Hite, Fanning & Honeyman L.L.P., Marc A. Powell, David L. Vogel, Powell, Brewer, Gough & Withers, L.L.P., Dustin L. DeVaughn, Richard W. James, McDonald, Tinker, Skaer, Quinn & Herrington, P.A., Wichita, KS, J. Franklin Hummer, Med James, Inc., Shawnee Mission, KS, for Defendants.
This matter comes before the court on the separate motion of each defendant for summary judgment. Plaintiff filed a single response addressing all four summary judgment motions. The City of Junction City ("City") and all defendants have replied. On that record, the court considers this matter fully briefed and ripe for determination. For the reasons set forth below, the court grants the motion of each defendant.
Plaintiff, Pete Arceo (hereinafter "Arceo"), brings three causes of action: 1) a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by malicious prosecution and false arrest/imprisonment; 2) a violation of state law by false arrest/imprisonment; and 3) a violation of state law by malicious prosecution. Specifically, paragraph 14 of Arceo's complaint states, in pertinent part: "The defendants Clark, Warren and Lueker conspired together to violate the civil rights of Arceo and to charge, imprison, and convict him of a crime which he did not commit and which the defendants should have recognized he did not commit." With Arceo's claims as a backdrop, the court will set forth its findings of material fact. The court assumes that the parties made every effort to focus the pleadings in this case on the actual facts in controversy. Still, the record is extensive and frequently duplicitous. To draft a comprehensive and comprehensible order, the court sets out a single recitation of facts incorporating the positions of all parties. The court cites to the record only where necessary to clarify its findings as to facts allegedly in controversy.
The court's findings include facts taken from various defendants' grand jury testimony. Defendants object to the use of grand jury testimony as a basis for a summary judgment record. The court overrules those objections for the reasons set forth below.
A. Structure of City, JCPD, and Geary County Attorney's Office
The City of Junction City is organized as a City of the First Class pursuant to K.S.A. § 12-1036b et seq. Pursuant to K.S.A. § 12-1014, such cities are overseen by a City Manager who is generally responsible for ensuring that the City's laws and ordinances are enforced. The statutes do not directly state whether the City Manager has the authority to instigate, facilitate, or terminate a police investigation. The parties dispute whether the City Manager or the Chief of Police has final authority as to investigatory decisions. The City Commission, which the public elects, appoints the City Manager. City's Employee Handbook, City's Memorandum in Support, Exhibit 54A, Bates No. 1227. The Employee Handbook states that the City Manager's responsibilities include the "exercise and control over all departments and divisions that may be created by the City Commission." Id. at 1230. The Handbook further indicates that "[e]ach Department Head is responsible to the City Manager and the City Manager is, in turn, responsible to the City Commission for the efficient operation and maximum provision of service." Id.
Defendant Warren was the City's Chief of Police from October 7, 1996 through January 4, 2000. Warren testified that he was a department head, he was responsible to the City Manager, and the City Manager had the right to hire and fire him. Warren Deposition, City's Memorandum in Support, at 20. At Warren's deposition, he discussed section 1.3 of the City's Employee Handbook, which states:
The [Handbook] shall not be construed as limiting the power and authority of any Department Head to make, or cause to be made, any rules and regulations governing the conduct and performance of department employees. Departmental rules and regulations shall not conflict with provisions of these rules and shall be approved by the City Manager. Such rules and regulations, when approved, published and distributed, shall have the force and effect of rules of the department and disciplinary action may be based upon breach of any such rules and regulations.
Employee Handbook, Exhibit 54A, Bates No. 1231. Section 1.4 of the Handbook provides that the City Manager is responsible for the "administration of these rules and regulations." Id. In considering these Handbook sections, Warren stated the following:
Warren Deposition, at 23. Based on this deposition testimony, the City contends that "Warren did not have any control over investigations that was not subject to change, modification, or reversal by the [City Manager]." City's Reply, at 21, ¶ 8 (see also ¶ 5). On the other side, Arceo relies on the testimony of Jeffrey Clark who stated that Warren had the authority to terminate investigations. Clark Deposition II, Arceo's Response, at 238-239.
Clark's testimony on this topic is not highly persuasive, but the court nonetheless finds the City's position to be unsupported by the record. The City's Handbook, sections 1.3 and 1.4, clearly outlines the authority structure relative to promulgated rules and regulations, specifically, personnel rules and regulations. Warren, during his deposition, discussed the City Manager's authority to review, set aside, etc., such promulgated rules and regulations. Counsel then continued the questioning by discussing a broad or general "power of review" and the concept of "final authority." The context of the deposition, coupled with the text of the Handbook, reflects the logical premise that the City Manager could oversee the generation and application of personnel and policy rules and regulations. Now, the City argues that Warren's broad statements suggest that the City Manager likewise had the authority to terminate or otherwise control police investigations. The record instructs such a conclusion only if one takes Warren's deposition statements out of context. The City's position may very well be accurate, but on the basis of the record before the court, the possessor of final authority over police investigations within the City's power structure is a matter in controversy. The court does find, however, that the City Manager has the final authority to review and set aside any promulgated policies and procedures which the Chief of Police might generate.
The Junction City Police Department ("JCPD"), at all relevant times, was divided into three sections: 1) uniformed patrol, including K-9 units and animal control; 2) administrative services; and 3) investigation, including detectives, the Drug Task Force, and laboratory services. The Chief of Police is responsible for all three divisions. Captain Winter and Lieutenant Royce Rasmussen supervised the investigation division and were the immediate supervisors of all JCPD detectives. When the investigation division receives a call for service, the call is assigned a case number and where investigation is necessary, it is also assigned a detective. The officer's observations generally govern further activity.
The JCPD handles an average load of 20,000 cases per year. The City is authorized to have 55 sworn officers, but during the relevant periods, the department's average size was 45-50 officers. Due to the size of the department and caseload, the Chief of Police does not know the details of every case. Chief Warren is certain, however, that the JCPD does not expressly or impliedly authorize or permit an arrest without probable cause.
Chief Warren attended and graduated from the Kansas Law Enforcement Training Center ("KLETC") at Hutchinson, Kansas, thereby becoming certified by the State of Kansas as a law enforcement officer. All of the officers, including defendant Jeff Clark were certified by KLETC or by other states which had reciprocal agreements with Kansas. All JCPD officers had training in probable cause analysis, arrest procedures, reports to prosecutors, and working with prosecutors.
As required by state law, the JCPD also has a specific policy ("Geary County Domestic Violence Policy") instructing officers on appropriate ways in which to deal with domestic violence situations. The JCPD regards domestic violence calls as dangerous investigations, with the danger extending to both responding officers and the parties involved. When a JCPD officer responds to a domestic violence call, the JCPD policy instructs the officer to listen to both sides of the dispute, to look for signs of abuse or physical damage to the surroundings, and to interview any witnesses who remained at the scene, including children and neighbors. The policy requires an arrest if...
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