Archdiocese of St. Louis v. Burwell
| Citation | 28 F.Supp.3d 944 |
| Decision Date | 30 June 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 4:13–CV–2300–JAR.,4:13–CV–2300–JAR. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
| Parties | ARCHDIOCESE OF ST. LOUIS and Catholic Charities of St. Louis, Plaintiffs, v. Sylvia M. BURWELL, in her official capacity as Secretary, United States Department of Health and Human Services, et al., Defendants. |
Brian J. Murray, Carol A. Hogan, Daniel E. Reidy, Dennis Murashko, Mark P. Rotatori, Jones Day, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiffs.
Michelle R. Bennett, Washington, DC, for Defendants.
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Request for Oral Argument.2
(Doc. No. 48) The motion is fully briefed and ready for disposition. On June 13, 2014 and June 26, 2014, Defendants filed Notices of Supplemental Authority related to the pending motion for preliminary injunction. (Doc. Nos. 56, 57)
This action is one of many cases filed throughout the United States challenging a provision of the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”)3 and the regulations issued under it, which mandate that certain employers provide health coverage for contraceptives to their employees, or face fines for failing to do so. The relevant statutory and regulatory background of the ACA has been set out in detail in several recent opinions. See, e.g., Michigan Catholic Conference and Catholic Family Services v. Burwell, 755 F.3d 372, 379–81 (6th Cir.2014) ; The Catholic Benefits Association LCA v. Sebelius, 24 F.Supp.3d 1094, 1097–99, 2014 WL 2522357, at *1–3 (W.D.Okla. June 4, 2014) ; The Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Atlanta v. Sebelius, 2014 WL 1256373, at *2–4 (N.D.Ga. Mar. 26, 2014).
Briefly, under the ACA, “employment-based group health plans covered by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) must provide certain types of preventive health services.” Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1122 (10th Cir.2013), aff'd sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., ––– U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 2751, 189 L.Ed.2d 675 (2014) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 300gg–13 ; 29 U.S.C. § 1185(d) ). The provision of the ACA at issue, herein referred to as the contraceptive mandate, “mandates coverage, without cost-sharing by plan participants or beneficiaries, of ‘preventive care and screenings' for women ‘as provided for in comprehensive guidelines supported by the Health Resources and Services Administration.’ ” Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 300gg–13(a)(4) ). The scope of “preventive care” includes “[a]ll Food and Drug Administration approved contraceptive methods4 , sterilization procedures, and patient education and counseling for all women with reproductive capacity.” Health Resources & Services Administration, “Women's Preventive Services Guidelines,” www.hrsa.gov/womensguidelines (last visited June 29, 2014).
The mandate exempts “religious employers” from the contraceptive requirement. Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1123. This exemption is limited, however, and includes only “churches, synagogues, mosques, and other houses of worship, and religious orders.” Diocese of Cheyenne v. Sebelius, 21 F.Supp.3d 1215, 1219, 2014 WL 1911873, at *2 (quoting 78 Fed.Reg. 8456, 8461 (Feb. 6,2013) ).
The mandate also includes an “accommodation” for certain non-exempt employers who do not want to provide coverage for the required contraceptive services based on religious objections. See 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(b). Id. A non-exempt employer is eligible for this accommodation if it satisfies the following requirements:
29 C.F.R. § 2590.715–2713A(a)(1) –(4).
To meet this last requirement, self-certification, an employer must provide the self-certification form to its insurance company, or, if the employer has a self-insured health plan (as is the case here), to its third-party administrator (“TPA”). 26 C.F.R. § 54.9815–2713A(b) –(c) ; 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715–2713A(b) –(c) ; 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(c) ; 78 Fed.Reg. at 39,878 –79. The law then requires the TPA to provide or arrange separate payments for contraceptive products and services, without participation, payment, or interference from the eligible organization. 26 C.F.R. § 54.9815–2713A(b) –(d) ; 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715–2713A(b) –(d) ; 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(c) -(d) ; 78 Fed.Reg. at 39,878 –80. The TPA is reimbursed for the costs it incurs when it provides such coverage. See 45 C.F.R. § 156.50(d)(3)(ii).
If an employer subject to the contraceptive mandate fails to provide the required contraceptive coverage in its health plan, then the employer faces fines of $100 per day per employee, or up to $36,500 per year per employee. 26 U.S.C. § 4980D(b)(1). Further, if the employer fails to provide any health plan whatsoever to its employees, then the employer faces fines of $2,000 per year per full time employee (less 30 employees). 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(a), (c)(1).
Plaintiffs, the Archdiocese of St. Louis (“Archdiocese”) and Catholic Charities of St. Louis (“Catholic Charities”), describe themselves as Catholic entities “that provide a wide range of spiritual, educational, and social services to members of the greater St. Louis community, Catholic and non-Catholic alike.” (Compl., Doc. No. 1, ¶ 2) Catholic Church teachings uphold the firm conviction that sexual union should be reserved to married couples who are open to the creation of life; thus, artificial interference with the creation of life, including through abortion, sterilization, and contraceptives, is contrary to Catholic doctrine. (Id., ¶ 4) The Archdiocese operates a self-insured health plan that encompasses not only individuals directly employed by the Archdiocese itself, but also individuals employed by affiliated Catholic organizations, including Catholic Charities. (Id., ¶ 12) Consistent with Church teachings, the Archdiocese's plan does not cover abortion-inducing drugs, sterilization, or contraceptives. (Id., ¶ 39) The Archdiocese is exempt from the contraceptive mandate as a religious employer. (Id., ¶ 12) Catholic Charities is eligible for the “accommodation” as a nonprofit religious organization that objects to providing coverage for contraceptive services. (Id., ¶ 10)
Plaintiffs have brought this action against the Secretary of the United States Department of Health and Human Services, along with other government officials and agencies (“the Government”), alleging that the contraceptive mandate violates their rights under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb et seq., the First Amendment, and the Administrative Procedure Act. Plaintiffs also allege claims for interference with internal church governance and erroneous interpretation of regulations by the Government.
On May 8, 2014, Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction against the Government's enforcement of the contraceptive mandate against them in light of the July 1, 2014 mandate, when their new plan year begins for its employee group health plan. The motion was fully briefed on May 30, 2014. On June 13 and June 26, 2014, Defendants filed Notices of Supplemental Authority related to the pending motion for preliminary injunction.
“[T]he basis of injunctive relief in the federal courts has always been irreparable harm and inadequacy of legal remedies.” Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 506–07, 79 S.Ct. 948, 3 L.Ed.2d 988 (1959). A district court has broad discretion when ruling on a request for injunction. Novus Franchising, Inc. v. Dawson, 725 F.3d 885, 893 (8th Cir.2013). In determining whether a preliminary injunction should be issued, a district court must consider: (1) the threat of irreparable harm to the movant, (2) the balance between this harm and the harm to the other party if the injunction is granted, (3) the probability of movant's success on the merits, and (4) the public interest. Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. C.L. Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 114 (8th Cir.1981).
In its opposition to Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction, the Government challenges Plaintiffs' standing. To establish standing, Plaintiffs “must show an injury that is (1) concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; (2) fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) redressable by a favorable ruling.” Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1126 (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, ––– U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 1138, 1147, 185 L.Ed.2d 264 (2013) (internal quotation omitted)). The first element requires that Plaintiffs “must have suffered an ‘injury in fact’—an invasion of a legally protected interest.” See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992).
The asserted injury in this case flows from the mandate's requirement that Plaintiffs provide, pay for, and/or facilitate access to insurance coverage for contraceptive services, including contracting with a TPA that will, as a result, provide or procure contraceptive products and services to Plaintiffs' employees. Likewise, Plaintiffs object to being forced to take other actions that facilitate access to the products and services they believe to be objectionable, including the self-certification requirement.
The Government argues it has no ERISA authority to require a church plan to contract with a TPA to provide contraceptive coverage or compel a TPA to provide contraceptive coverage after it agrees to enter into a contract with the Plaintiffs and receives the self-certification form.5 (Doc. No. 52, p. 2) Thus, Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate an injury in fact since the regulations will not actually force Plaintiffs' TPA to provide coverage for the objectionable services.
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Archdiocese Catholic Charities of St. Louis v. Burwell, 4:13–CV–2300–JAR.
...28 F.Supp.3d 944ARCHDIOCESE OF ST. LOUIS and Catholic Charities of St. Louis, Plaintiffs,v.Sylvia M. BURWELL 1, in her official capacity as Secretary, United States Department of Health and Human Services, et al., Defendants. No. 4:13–CV–2300–JAR.United States District Court, E.D. Missouri,......