Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. Barth
Decision Date | 19 October 1984 |
Docket Number | No. 58994,58994 |
Citation | 83 Ill.Dec. 332,103 Ill.2d 536,470 N.E.2d 290 |
Parties | , 83 Ill.Dec. 332 ARCHER DANIELS MIDLAND COMPANY, Appellee, v. Edward BARTH, Appellant. |
Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
George H. Huber and Richard O. Habermann, Vandalia, for appellant.
Jeanne Sathre and H. Michael Thompson of Carr, Korein, Kunin, Schlichter & Brennan, East St. Louis, for appellee.
On March 10, 1980, plaintiff, Archer Daniels Midland Company, filed a complaint in the circuit court of Madison County alleging that defendant, Edward Barth, breached a contract to deliver to plaintiff various quantities of soybeans. A motion for summary judgment was filed by plaintiff on August 11, 1982, and an entry in the minute record shows that the motion was granted on August 30. The minute-record entry further states: "(Formal order to be submitted)." On September 20 defendant filed a motion to reconsider the August 30 order. The formal order granting summary judgment, however, was not signed and filed until October 6. The motion to reconsider was denied on December 30, and defendant filed his notice of appeal on January 28, 1983. The appellate court dismissed the appeal sua sponte on the ground that the notice of appeal was not timely filed. We allowed defendant's petition for leave to appeal.
To vest the appellate court with jurisdiction a party must file a notice of appeal within 30 days after entry of the judgment appealed from, or within 30 days after entry of an order disposing of a timely post-trial motion. (87 Ill.2d R. 303(a).) Since the notice of appeal here was filed 29 days after the motion to reconsider was denied, albeit more than two months after judgment was entered, the question before us is whether the motion to reconsider was timely filed, thereby extending the time within which defendant could file his notice of appeal.
A motion to reconsider a judgment falls within the category of post-judgment motions which must be filed within 30 days after the challenged judgment is entered. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 110, par. 2-1203; Sears v. Sears (1981), 85 Ill.2d 253, 258, 52 Ill.Dec. 608, 422 N.E.2d 610.) The time and method of entering judgment are controlled by our Rule 272, which provides:
It is, of course, beyond dispute that the judgment here was not entered until the signed judgment order was filed on October 6. Until then it could not be attacked by motion, appealed from, or enforced. (In re Marriage of Roberts (1980), 84 Ill.App.3d 538, 542, 40 Ill.Dec. 300, 406 N.E.2d 1; Green v. Green (1974), 21 Ill.App.3d 396, 403, 315 N.E.2d 324; Davidson Masonry v. J.L. Wroan & Sons, Inc. (1971), 2 Ill.App.3d 524, 526-27, 275 N.E.2d 654.) It follows that the September 20 motion to reconsider was untimely (Berkheimer v. Berkheimer (1978), 63 Ill.App.3d 19, 20-21, 20 Ill.Dec. 496, 380 N.E.2d 474), and an untimely post-judgment motion does not extend the time for filing a notice of appeal (87 Ill.2d R. 303(a); Sears v. Sears (1981), 85 Ill.2d 253, 259, 52 Ill.Dec. 608, 422 N.E.2d 610). Consequently, the January 28, 1983, notice of appeal, filed more than 30 days after the October 6, 1982, judgment was entered, did not vest the appellate court with jurisdiction, and the appeal was properly dismissed.
Defendant's argument that it was error for the appellate court to dismiss the appeal on its own motion misstates the law. The correct rule is that a reviewing court has a duty to consider its jurisdiction and to dismiss the appeal if it determines that jurisdiction is wanting. Berber v. Hass (1964), 30 Ill.2d 263, 266, 195 N.E.2d 263; Guttman v. Schiller (1961), 23 Ill.2d 323, 325, 178 N.E.2d 387; Uptown National Bank v. Puris (1959), 17 Ill.2d 547, 548, 162 N.E.2d 426.
Nor is this an appropriate case for application of the revestment doctrine. We concluded in People v. Kaeding (1983), 98 Ill.2d 237, 74 Ill.Dec. 509, 456 N.E.2d 11, that an untimely post-trial motion revested the trial court with jurisdiction since neither party objected to further proceedings in that court and both sought to set aside the judgment. Unlike Kaeding, however, we are here presented with a factual situation akin to that involved in Sears v. Sears (1981), 85 Ill.2d 253, 260, 52 Ill.Dec. 608, 422 N.E.2d 610, where we expressly declined to apply the revestment doctrine because ...
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