Archer v. Economic Opportunity Comm'n of Nassau, 96 cv 598.
| Decision Date | 23 December 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 96 cv 2712.,No. 96 cv 598.,96 cv 598.,96 cv 2712. |
| Parties | Cheryl ARCHER, Angela Bryant, Timothy Green, Christina Guzman, Mary Hewitt, Carol Lynch and Neal Thompson, Plaintiffs, v. ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION OF NASSAU COUNTY INC., Roosevelt Community Action Program, Inc., Roosevelt Head Start Child Development Program, Manhasset Great Neck Community Action Program, Long Beach Community Action Program, Long Beach Head Start Child Development Program, Martin Luther King Scholarship Fund, the Nassau County Democratic Committee, the Friends of Fred Brewington, John Kearse, Wilbur McCall, Iris Johnson, Jean Love, Jean Davis, Carrie Lewis, Lawrence Burns, Levena Diamond, Stephanie Chenault, Yvette Wright and R. William Cooper, Defendants. Bertha Ortega, Plaintiff, v. Economic Opportunity Commission of Nassau County, Hempstead Community Action Program, Martin Luther King Scholarship Fund, the Nassau County Democratic Committee, the Friends of Fred Brewington, Iris Johnson, John Kearse, Wilbur McCall, Gregory Navarro and Carrie Tiller, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
John Gianfortune, Garden City, NY, for Cheryl Archer, Angela Bryant, Timothy Green, Christina Guzman, Mary Hewitt, Carol Lynch, Neal Thompson, plaintiffs.
L. Susan Slavin, Slavin & Steinberg, Huntington, NY, for Bertha Ortega, plaintiff.
Mark Mulholland, Ruskin, Moscou, Evans & Faltischek, Mineola, NY, for defendants.
Plaintiffs, Bertha Ortega ("Ortega"), Cheryl Archer ("Archer"), Angela Bryant ("Bryant"), Timothy Green ("Green"), Christina Guzman ("Guzman"), Mary Hewitt ("Hewitt") and Carol Lynch ("Lynch") are former employees of the Economic Opportunity Commission of Nassau County, Inc. ("EOC"), a private, not-for-profit anti-poverty organization. Defendants are the EOC; two Nassau County Head Start programs that are delegate agencies and programs of the EOC; three Nassau County Community Action Programs ("CAP"s), also delegate agencies and programs of the EOC; the Martin Luther King Scholarship Fund, a scholarship fund created and run by the EOC; John Kearse, Chief Executive Officer of the EOC; Wilbur McCall, Deputy Director of the EOC; Iris Johnson, Executive Director of the Heampstead CAP and assistant to the CEO; Carrie Lewis, Roosevelt Head Start supervisor; Stephanie Chenault, Manhasset/Great Neck Head Start supervisor; William Cooper, Director of the Roosevelt CAP; Gregory E. Navarro, Associate Director of the EOC; Carrie Tiller, Community Organizer Supervisor of the EOC; and Jean Love, Jean Davis, Lawrence Burns, Levena Diamond, and Yvette Wright, EOC employees with supervisory authority over one or more of the plaintiffs.1
Plaintiffs allege that, during their employment at the EOC, they were required to register voters and to participate in political campaign activities on their own time, even though these duties were not included in their employment descriptions. Plaintiffs further allege that they were threatened — with termination and/or the denial of their paychecks — into making contributions to the CAP fund and to the annual EOC fundraiser, the Martin Luther King Jr. Dinner Dance ("MLK Dance"). Finally, plaintiffs maintain they were fired solely because they refused to buy tickets to the 1996 MLK Dance. Plaintiff Bryant also asserts that she was sexually harassed by defendants Cooper and McCall.
Plaintiffs filed this action in 1996 claiming civil rights violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1985, violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) ("RICO"), and RICO conspiracy pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d). Specifically, plaintiffs claim that defendants violated their rights to due process and to freedom of association under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, subjected them to involuntary servitude in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment, and conspired to deprive them of equal protection of the laws, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Additionally, plaintiffs assert breach of contract, wrongful discharge, conversion and state constitutional claims pursuant to the doctrine of supplemental jurisdiction. Plaintiff Bryant also brings claims under Section 1983; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2; Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681; and state law claims for assault and battery, negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional distress against various defendants based on the alleged sexual harassment by Cooper and McCall.
Defendants move for partial summary judgment (1) dismissing plaintiffs' RICO conspiracy claim on the ground that they have failed to present evidence of an agreement; (2) dismissing their civil rights claims under Sections 1983 and 1985 on the ground that the EOC is not a state agency and, thus, was not acting under "color of law"; (3) dismissing plaintiffs' breach of contract claim because they were at-will employees; and (4) dismissing Bryant's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress as deficient under New York law.
Motions for summary judgment are granted if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Lipton v. Nature Co., 71 F.3d 464, 469 (2d Cir.1995). The moving party must demonstrate the absence of any material factual issue genuinely in dispute. See id. The court must view the inferences to be drawn from the facts in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). However, the non-moving party may not "rely on mere speculation or conjecture as to the true nature of the facts to overcome a motion for summary judgment." Knight v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 9, 12 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 932, 107 S.Ct. 1570, 94 L.Ed.2d 762 (1987). The party must produce specific facts sufficient to establish that there is a genuine factual issue for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
The facts will be treated in the discussions of each claim. If not otherwise noted, the facts are undisputed.
Defendants argue that plaintiffs' constitutional claims under Sections 1983 and 1985 must be dismissed because plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate state action. Plaintiffs contend that, because the EOC and its local CAPs rely on public funding, and because they carry out functions that are governmental in nature, they should be considered state actors.
Private individuals and entities are not normally liable for violations of rights secured by the United States Constitution. In order to maintain a claim based on alleged constitutional violations, a plaintiff must show that the actions complained of are "fairly attributable" to the government. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838, 102 S.Ct. 2764, 73 L.Ed.2d 418 (1982). The Supreme Court has developed several formulations to determine whether an action is taken under color of state law. Plaintiffs bear the burden of proving state action under each of these tests. See Scheiner v. Wallace, 860 F.Supp. 991, 999 (S.D.N.Y.1994).
The "symbiotic relationship" test, established by the Supreme Court in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 81 S.Ct. 856, 6 L.Ed.2d 45 (1961), asks whether "[t]he State has so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with [the organization] ... that it must be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity." Id. at 725, 81 S.Ct. 856. Plaintiffs maintain that, since the EOC and its CAP programs receive more than 95% of their funding from government agencies, and since the CAP programs are subject to federal regulation, the EOC is essentially an instrumentality of the State. Plaintiffs' arguments are without merit. The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a private entity's dependence on government funding does not make the organization a state actor. See e.g., Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 840, 102 S.Ct. 2764 (). Extensive state regulation is also insufficient unless the contested action is compelled or influenced by such regulation. Id. at 841, 102 S.Ct. 2764. Plaintiffs have not provided any evidence that their discharge was compelled or influenced by a state-created regulation.
The test requires that a state "exercis[e] coercive power or ... provid[e] such significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that the choice must in law be deemed to be that of the State." Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004, 102 S.Ct. 2777, 73 L.Ed.2d 534 (1982). Plaintiffs contend that, since one third of the EOC's Board of Directors ("Board") is comprised of government officials,2 and since the Board and the Board's Personnel Committee ("Committee") are authorized to make personnel decisions, government officials had a direct involvement in the decision to fire plaintiffs.
The "Contract and Manual of Operations and Procedures for Community Action Programs in Nassau County" ("Contract"), which governs the relationship between the EOC and its local CAPs, vests full authority for hiring and firing CAP employees in the CAP program directors. However, plaintiffs have provided evidence that defendant Kearse ordered the CAP program directors to terminate them and that he received the consent of the Board. In a memorandum to the Board members dated January 25, 1996, Kearse implied that all employees who did not attend the dance would be terminated. He further stated: ...
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